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In the past few decades, digital technologies have profoundly altered virtually every 
aspect of human life. While the direct impact of digital technologies on individuals’ 
economic welfare or personal behaviors has attracted considerable attention, the 
interplay of digital technologies with social connections remains underexplored.  
Indeed, regardless of whether formed offline or online, social connections in the form 
of personal ties and affiliations that have long been the bedrock of human society 
continue to shape human behaviors and outcomes. To the extent that digitization will 
only continue to grow in scale and scope, an understanding of such effects is important 
for scholars, practitioners, and policymakers. I address two overarching research 
questions in my dissertation: (1) Whether, and to what extent digital technologies affect 
individuals’ economic welfare and habituated behavior, and (2) How social 
  
connections such as personal ties and affiliations condition the impact of the digital 
technologies.  
My studies are conducted in two distinct contexts: mobile interventions for health, and 
computer ownership for social and economic welfare. Drawing on diverse bodies of 
literature and using various econometric methods, I seek to answer questions related to 
how interventions orchestrated on mobile platforms help individuals form healthy 
behaviors, and how computer ownership affects long-term income mobility. In the first 
essay, I show that a social norms intervention on a mobile platform is effective in 
increasing individuals’ physical activity. In the second study, I investigate how the 
motivational incentive of reciprocity can be leveraged to promote healthy behavior. 
Finally, in my third essay, I show that computer ownership generates both private and 
social returns (IT spillovers) on individuals’ income mobility. All three papers then 
consider how individuals’ social connections condition the direct effects of digital 
technologies. The first two studies explore how online social ties and social 
relationships moderate the impact of mobile interventions, and the third study examines 
how caste groups affect the positive spillover effects of computer ownership. 
Collectively, the three studies advance our understanding of the heterogeneous effects 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
Digital technologies have become deeply embedded in our work and personal 
lives and have led to widespread changes in outcomes and behaviors. My research 
centers on two contexts where digital technologies play a critical role: the effects of the 
mobile interventions on physical activity and the effects of computer ownership on 
income mobility. Although the direct effect of digital technologies on individuals’ 
economic welfare or healthy behavior has attracted considerable attention (Dolton and 
Makepeace 2004; Free et al. 2013), how digital technologies interplay with one’s social 
connections remain underexplored. In many respects, humans are not solitary actors, 
but rather exist within interconnected groups. In the three studies of my dissertation, I 
explore the following two questions: (1) Whether, and to what extent digital 
technologies affect individuals’ economic welfare and habituated behavior, and (2) 
How social connections such as personal ties and affiliations condition the impact of 
the digital technologies. 
Collectively, the three studies draw on a large body of literature on social 
connections from a wide range of disciplines. The network approach originated in 
graph theory and has been widely used in the social sciences and psychology. A node 
in a social network could be individuals, groups, organizations, or even societies 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994) and a tie represents relationships among connected actors. 
Network theories argue that people’s behaviors are not best predicted by individual 
attributes or demographic characteristics, but rather by the social networks in which 
they are embedded (Wellman 1997). They further suggest that the focus of social 





nodes’ inner characteristics (Katz et al. 2004). My research does not address the 
phenomenon of how people create or maintain network ties, which have its roots in 
theories such as self-interest theory (Coleman 1988) or social exchange theory 
(Emerson 1972). Rather, I focus on what happens after a social network already exists 
– i.e., how social connections such as tie strength (Granovetter 1973) and 
embeddedness (Granovetter 1985) affect individuals’ behaviors. With the proliferation 
of social network platforms, researchers now have an unprecedented opportunity to 
directly observe social relationships among actors and have started exploring the effects 
of digital connections in various contexts (Aral and Walker 2014; Bapna and Umyarov 
2015). 
In social networks, ties can assume a variety of forms, including proximity ties 
(e.g., same location), memberships ties (e.g., same clubs), kinship ties (e.g., siblings), 
affective ties (e.g., who likes whom), or cognitive ties (e.g., who knows whom) 
(Borgatti et al. 2009). Regarding operationalization of network ties, consistent with 
prevailing views in the literature, I use three types of social connections in my studies. 
First, the degree of social ties is probably one of the simplest measures of social 
connections and refers to the total number of friends one has. The volume of one’s 
friends affects how an individual accesses directly connected resources or the extensity 
of being connected. Social ties have been linked to various outcomes such as video 
sharing (Yoganarasimhan 2012), musical service adoption (Bapna and Umyarov 2015), 
and successful fundings in P2P lending (Lin et al. 2013). Second, the level of closeness 
between a pair of users has been associated with social influence. Studies have 





influence in product adoption (Aral and Walker 2014) and affects the level of trust in 
an investment game (Bapna et al. 2017). Third, social affiliations such as ethnicity or 
caste affect one’s social capital, and in turn, affect outcomes. Individuals within the 
same group usually have a strong bond and relatively frictionless communications, and 
the ethnic group has shown to generate higher social capital that affects the survival 
rate of an entrepreneur (Kalnins and Chung 2006). Each of my studies discusses one or 
multiple types of social connections, and examines how social connections deepen our 
understanding of mobile interventions and computer ownership. 
For my first essay, I study the conditional influence of social ties to explore 
heterogeneous treatment effects of a mobile intervention that aims at motivating 
individuals to exercise more. My intervention is comprised of a social norms message 
that seeks to motivate users’ goal setting and goal attainment behaviors related to 
physical activity on a mobile platform. The purpose of my randomized field experiment 
is to test whether social norms information about what others in the community are 
doing induces more people to set a monthly goal of running a self-determined distance. 
To construct the social ties, I use the degree centrality as the number of social 
connections that have been extensively used in previous studies (Grewal et al. 2006; 
Hinz et al. 2015). In my examination of the effect of social norms on users’ goal setting 
and goal attainment behaviors, I find a significant moderating role for social 
connectivity: individuals with higher levels of social connectivity are more susceptible 
to a social norms message. Further analysis reveals that individuals who have many 
followers (i.e., high in-degree) but do not follow many others (low out-degree) are the 





lead to a substantially lower rate of goal attainment as compared with the control 
message; this adverse effect is also heterogeneously experienced, conditional on the 
number of social ties. These findings have important implications for the safe design 
of interventions based on social norms. 
My second essay investigates how the motivational incentive of reciprocity can 
be leveraged to promote healthy behavior. The maturity of wearable devices and 
smartphones has afforded us the ability to precisely track individuals’ physical activity 
at relatively low cost. The increased observability, coupled with digital social networks 
that enable connections at an unprecedented scale, offer a unique opportunity to explore 
the power of reciprocity. I find that reciprocity-based incentive outperforms a self-
interest based incentive to motivate individuals to exercise more. Compared to existing 
self-interest based incentives, this finding opens a new avenue for mechanism design 
in promoting healthy behavior. Moreover, I find that the magnitude of the reciprocity 
effect is contingent on the closeness between the senders and the receivers. 
Surprisingly, the closeness has an inverted U-shaped influence on the reciprocity effect. 
The effect is the strongest when the closeness is moderate and wanes when the 
closeness is either too strong or too weak. These findings suggest that reciprocity can 
be a potentially powerful mechanism for improving the effectiveness of mHealth 
interventions. 
The final essay in my dissertation examines the effects of computer ownership 
and IT spillover effects on income mobility, which is an important metric to assess the 
extent of equality of opportunities for individuals to progress along economic and 





2005 and 2011 (Desai and Vanneman 2016; Desai et al. 2016), and show that computer 
ownership is associated with a household’s income mobility and that computer 
ownership in the same district generates positive spillover effects. Every 1% increase 
of owning a computer in a district leads to an increase of 0.11% in upward income 
mobility. I then leverage the caste system in India to further assess the existence of the 
spillover effects of computer ownership. The caste system is a social stratification 
system in India that is deeply entrenched in the fabric of society, it is responsible for 
the existence of unique personal affiliations, and there is an increasing trend to view 
caste as a form of ethnicity in India (Desai and Dubey 2012). Thus, I argue that the IT 
spillover effect would exist when individuals closely interact with each other. I show 
that higher computer ownership in a region from the same caste group is associated 
with an increase in upward mobility, but not from higher computer ownership of distant 
caste groups. These findings underscore the need to consider social interactions for a 
complete understanding of returns on digitization. 
To conclude, my research not only focuses on the direct effect of digital 
technologies but also tests the conditioning effects of different facets of social 
connections. I examine whether the effects of a mobile intervention for physical activity 
goal setting would be conditional on the social connectivity, and whether reciprocity 
can foster healthy behavior and whether it is conditional on the social closeness 
between a sender and a receiver. I further use a social stratification system to validate 
the spillover effects of computer ownership. Together, these three studies provide a 





groups of people depending on their social ties, and make theoretical contributions to 









Chapter 2: Unraveling the “Social” in Social Norms: The 
Conditioning Effect of User Connectivity 
Abstract 
Abundant empirical evidence supports the overall efficacy of social norms as a 
strategy to induce behavior change. However, very few studies examine how the effects 
of social norms are differentially manifest across individuals, especially in today’s 
socially connected digital world. We conjecture that the effects of social norms are 
conditional on an individual’s digital social ties, and we provide new empirical 
evidence from a randomized field experiment that included more than 7,000 individuals 
on an online physical activity community observed for a two-month period. In our 
examination of the effect of social norms on users’ goal setting and goal attainment 
behaviors we find a significant moderating role for social connectivity: individuals with 
higher levels of social connectivity are more susceptible to a social norms message. 
Further analysis reveals that individuals who have many followers (i.e., high in-degree) 
but do not follow many others (low out-degree) are the most susceptible to the social 
norms treatment. Strikingly, we find that social norms also lead to a substantially lower 
rate of goal attainment as compared with the control message; this adverse effect is also 
heterogeneously experienced, conditional on the number of social ties. Our findings 
have important implications for the design of interventions based on social norms. 
 
Keywords: Social norms; social connections; goal setting; goal attainment; goal 
setting theory; heterogeneous treatment effect 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Researchers and practitioners have long sought to exploit the power of 
interventions to “nudge” behavior change in many domains that have important societal 
implications. One such popular intervention is based on disseminating social norms, 
i.e., conveying information about behaviors that are widely prevalent among others. 
These social norms interventions, operating on the basic principle of “telling people 
about what lots of other people do” (Burchell et al. 2013, p. 1), have demonstrated 
efficacy in inducing behavior change in diverse traditional settings including towel 





excessive drinking (Wechsler et al. 2003), healthy eating, and weight loss (Bittner and 
Kulesz 2015; Napolitano et al. 2013).  
While most studies on the efficacy of social norms have been conducted in 
traditional settings, in recent years, digital technologies have profoundly altered how 
one connects to society. Individuals are now embedded in vast virtual networks of 
friends, family, co-workers, and acquaintances enabled by digital social platforms, 
where they may “friend” someone, follow them, and be followed. Indeed, the 
prevalence of connectivity is a defining feature of modern social media platforms. A 
robust stream of research has shown that ubiquitous connectivity has significant 
impacts on individual actions and behavior (Aral and Walker 2014; Bapna and 
Umyarov 2015; Dewan et al. 2017). 
This unprecedented digital connectivity has given rise to novel and unexplored 
questions about the effects of social norms. Since social norms are rooted in an 
individual’s perception of what others do and in psychological theories of conformity 
(Burchell et al. 2013), how one is connected to others may play a significant role in 
their impact. In traditional settings such as towel reuse, energy consumption, or alcohol 
consumption, the behavior of “others” reflected in the norms is often not directly 
observable. By contrast, digital platforms today make it virtually effortless for users to 
learn about each other’s actions, such as liking a campaign, writing a review, or posting 
a picture. In addition, the degree of connectivity, as well as the types of ties (whether 
they are one-directional, such as in-degree or out-degree, or reciprocated) can vary 
significantly among users of digital platforms, potentially complicating a user’s 





care about the impressions they create (Tong et al. 2008), observability by others is 
likely to affect behavior (Exley and Naecker 2016; Kast et al. 2012). To our knowledge, 
the question of whether social norms exert differential influence across individuals in 
a social network has not been investigated.  
We address this knowledge gap by examining the moderating role of digital 
social connections on the effects of social norms. We further explore whether the 
differential impact of the social norms can be related to the types of connections1 that 
exist within a digital social network. Finally, given the growing use of social norms in 
nudging individuals’ behavior, it is imperative to ensure their safe use and protect 
against unintended outcomes. We therefore examine whether the high connectivity 
might lead to an overly potent social norms effect and yield undesirable consequences.  
Our empirical setting is the use of a social norms-based behavioral intervention 
to motivate goal setting for physical activity on a digital platform. We conducted a 
randomized field experiment in collaboration with one of the largest online physical 
activity communities in Taiwan. Like most digital platforms, this platform provides 
connectivity as a standard feature: a user can befriend other users and follow their posts 
and status updates. In the experiment, we sent over 7,000 users messages that 
encouraged them to set a self-determined monthly running distance goal. We 
randomized users to receive one of two message types: a Control message with 
standard language that refers to the benefits of setting goals, or a Treatment message 
that augments the control message with social norms by indicating the number of users 
                                                





in this community who set a goal in the pretreatment month.2 In addition to the action 
of goal setting, the platform allows us to capture the actual running distance, i.e., the 
extent of goal attainment, over a two-month period. This important feature enables us 
to assess the degree to which the social norms result in miscalibration by the user, i.e., 
if runners over-shoot by setting a goal that exceeds their capabilities.  
Our experiment yields three main findings. First, we find that connectivity plays 
an important role in moderating the effectiveness of social norms. For users who are 
not highly socially connected, the social norms message leads to a modest increase in 
the goal setting rate (1%) as compared to the control message. However, users who are 
highly socially connected respond significantly more vigorously to the social norms 
message, with a 7.7% increase in the goal setting rate as compared to the control 
message. Second, our analysis reveals that individuals who have many followers (i.e., 
high in-degree) but do not follow many others (low out-degree) are the most susceptible 
to the social norms treatment; however, the same results do not apply to individuals 
who elect to establish unreciprocated ties to many others but do not have many 
followers themselves. This result is consistent with our theoretical arguments that 
individuals who care about impression management are the most susceptible because 
their visibility is high. Third, we find that social norms also lead to a substantially lower 
rate of goal attainment than the control message (-17.0%). This effect is also 
heterogeneous among individuals. When a user is not highly socially connected, the 
social norms and control messages produce similar effects on goal attainment rate 
                                                
2 The study is part of a broader set of experiments in which we examined other treatments. Users in the 





(37.3% and 40.2%, respectively). For a highly socially connected user, the goal 
attainment rates are sharply different (32.1% for the social norms condition and 69.5% 
for the control). Further analysis shows that the highly socially connected individuals 
who are motivated by social norms to set goals have a propensity to set goals beyond 
their capabilities. In other words, social norms exert “too strong” an effect on these 
users, leading them to set unrealistic goals that are difficult to attain. 
Our study makes useful theoretical and policy contributions. First, our work 
bridges the literature between social norms and social networks, adding to both streams 
of research. Despite the fact that the efficacy of social norms for behavior change has 
been established in varied contexts, most of the existing studies focus on the overall 
effects. As a result, we know surprisingly little about differences in individual 
susceptibility to its influence3. Our work represents the first exploration of the 
heterogeneous treatment effects of social norm interventions as conditioned by a user’s 
social network characteristics, thereby extending our understanding of how social 
norms work.  
Second, by drawing attention to the salience of digital connectivity for the 
effects of social norms, we offer a subtle insight for research on social networks. 
Following the work of Freeman (1978), it has been well known that a highly connected 
“central” user can influence the behavior of others, and empirical studies have 
established that opinion leaders can influence the actions and behaviors of others 
connected to them (Hinz et al. 2011; Iyengar et al. 2011). In this study, rather than the 
                                                
3 Some prior work in traditional settings also points to the existence of variation in the effects of social 
norms (Allcott 2011; Ferraro and Miranda 2013). However, these studies focus on individual 





influence of a highly connected user on others, we explore whether high social 
connectivity might also passively shape the focal users’ decisions. We enrich this 
stream of research by showing that a user’s connectivity has implications beyond the 
direct influence exerted on their friends; since people care that others observe their 
actions and care about the impressions others have of them, connectivity is also 
correlated with individuals’ own decisions. 
Finally, from a practice and policy perspective, our study has important 
implications for the effective and safe use of social norms in nudging people’s 
behavior. Our finding that social norms do not affect all users equally should help 
optimize interventions towards those with high susceptibility based on easily 
observable measures (in our case, a user’s connectivity on digital platforms). More 
importantly, the specific behavior we study, increasing physical activity, is highly 
consequential for individual and public health. Our finding that users in certain 
subgroups tend to “overshoot” in their goal setting is especially important, as it may 
help prevent harm to patients in health programs (Kent and Hayward 2007). 
2.2. Background and Prior Literature 
The conceptual background for our study is informed by three streams of 
literature, which we discuss below. First, we provide an overview of prior research on 
social norms and their efficacy in motivating diverse behaviors. Second, we present 
goal setting as a mechanism that can potentially help overcome the persistent human 
failing of self-control, which is frequently implicated in the existence of unhealthy 
behavior, by allowing individuals to self-regulate. Here we also discuss the possible 





social norms, explaining why in digitally connected communities the effects of social 
norms on goal setting are likely to be amplified for individuals with more social ties, 
and how the nature of ties (in-degree vs. out-degree) plays an important role.  
2.2.1 Social Norms 
Social norms encapsulate rules of behavior considered acceptable within a 
group. Mackie et al. (2012) defined social norms as “what people in some group believe 
to be normal in the group, that is, believed to be a typical action, an appropriate action 
or both” (p. 7). Theoretically, it has been argued that people conform to a norm in an 
attempt to enhance affiliation with the referent social group and become “liked” (Higgs 
2015). As noted, substantial evidence supports the effectiveness of social norms for 
inducing specific behaviors. To illustrate, Gerber and Rogers (2009) examined the 
effect of social norms messages on voter turnout and found that descriptive social 
norms affect voting intention among citizens who vote less frequently. Goldstein et al. 
(2007) conducted two field experiments to examine the effect of a descriptive norm 
(i.e., the majority of guests reuse their towels) on an environmental conservation 
program. Their study revealed that signage containing normative appeals outperforms 
traditional appeals. Schultz et al. (2007) conducted a field experiment to examine the 
effect of a descriptive norm (doing what others do) combined with an injunctive norm 
(doing what others think one should do) on energy consumption and reported that an 
injunctive message eliminated the boomerang effect, where outperforming individuals 
regress to the average behavior. Chen et al. (2010) showed that social norms are useful 
to increase the number of online reviews of movies provided by users, while Burtch et 





the most effective way to increase the number and length of online reviews in an online 
clothing retailer setting.  
In the specific context of healthy behavior, the focus of our study, limited prior 
research has examined the effects of social norms on inducing behavior change. Ball et 
al. (2010) conducted a survey-based study in which participants self-reported their 
physical activity and eating behaviors and the factors influencing them. Results 
supported the significance of social norms in inducing those healthy behavior, even 
after controlling for social support from the referent group. Lally et al. (2011) found 
that individuals indulge in unhealthy food habits because of misperceptions about 
peers’ dietary behaviors and concluded that interventions to correct such a 
misperception have the potential to promote healthy diets via the social norms effect. 
Given the prevalence and power of social norms in traditional settings, it is reasonable 
to expect that individuals on a social network platform would be likewise affected by 
information communicating a norm that is prevalent among other users on the same 
platform.  
It is important to note that such norms are distinct from other social mechanisms 
such as peer effects or homophily that focus on the influence or correlation among peers 
(Aral et al. 2009). While peer influence refers to the direct influence of one friend on 
another, homophily represents the tendency of similar individuals to be connected and 
make correlated choices (Dewan et al. 2017; Manski 1993). Unlike these two contexts 
that involve interactions among individuals, in our setting a third party – the social 
network platform – sends a message to users. We then observe how users in different 





2.2.2 Social Norms and Goal Setting 
Physical activity is a behavior where there is significant innate heterogeneity in 
individual capabilities based on a variety of biological factors, such as age and gender, 
and psychological factors, such as self-efficacy and self-motivation (Biddle and Mutrie 
2007). In this context, setting goals for a physical activity regimen is a widely 
recommended motivational mechanism (Shilts et al. 2004). A self-imposed goal is 
considered an ideal motivational device because it allows individuals to calibrate their 
goals based on self-knowledge about their own capabilities. Goal setting has been 
investigated in empirical research spanning more than three decades and has been 
shown to be effective for performance enhancement (Locke and Latham 2002). It is an 
important means to address the persistent human failing of self-control and has been 
extensively studied in both psychology and behavioral economics. A goal serves as a 
reference point for performance, and failure to attain goals creates a psychological loss 
(Koch and Nafziger 2011). A goal can be useful even when not explicitly accompanied 
by rewards or punishments – individuals may use non-binding goals to self-regulate 
(Hsiaw 2013). Given the importance of establishing a goal as the first step in behavior 
change, it is arguably appropriate to communicate a social norm related to goals. 
Shilts et al. (2004) conducted a detailed literature review on the effect of goal 
setting on physical activity and concluded that “moderate evidence indicates that 
implementing goal setting as a dietary or physical activity behavior change strategy is 
effective with adults” (p. 92). The study that is closest to our work is Ariely and 
Wertenbroch (2002), which reports results from a series of experiments on 
procrastination. Ariely and Wertenbroch found that people would self-impose a 





deadline was not as effective as externally imposed ones. In contrast to their setting, 
our research focuses on first, whether an external message motivates a user to set a 
goal, and second, on a comparison of the goal induced by a general message relative to 
one induced by a social norms message.  
While setting a goal has generally been associated with improvements in 
performance, research on the after-effects of goal failure has yielded inconclusive 
results. Goals may be counterproductive because failure leads to subsequent 
performance deterioration (Soman and Cheema 2004) and can be demotivating (Jones 
et al. 2013). Alternatively, individuals with autonomous motives may not simply give 
up, but may make reengagement plans to fulfill a new goal (Ntoumanis et al. 2014). In 
other words, people have different coping strategies when facing goal failure (Bittner 
and Zondervan 2015). 
2.2.3 Social Connections and the Effects of Social Norms 
As discussed previously, our review of the existing literature indicated strong 
evidence to support the “average” effect of social norms on individuals’ behavior 
modification. However, to the extent that individuals possess heterogeneous 
characteristics, the expectation that social norms would yield identical effects for every 
individual has been challenged (Dorresteijn et al. 2011). Only a limited number of 
experimental studies examine heterogeneous treatment effects in social norms 
campaigns. In a campaign for energy conservation, Allcott (2011) finds a 
heterogeneous treatment effect across households. A household’s pre-treatment level 
of energy consumption affects the magnitude of the treatment effect: the response to 





find that households’ political and environmental ideologies affect the response to 
social norms campaigns. Liberals tend to reduce energy consumption more than 
conservatives when exposed to a social norm. Ferraro and Miranda’s (2013) results in 
the context of a water conservation program indicate that households’ characteristics 
such as wealth and past usage behaviors yield heterogeneous treatment effects. 
As we argued previously, dense digital connectivity has raised new questions 
about the heterogeneous effects of social norms. The social norms effect represents 
how our behaviors are shaped by how we think others behave (Burchell et al. 2013). A 
defining characteristic of digital social networks is the high level of observability and 
visibility across connections. When users change behavior to conform to a social norm 
communicated to them, this behavior is transparent to others in their network. Thus, 
individuals with different levels of visibility might react differently to the social norms 
based on the size of their audience. Studies have indeed suggested that observability 
can cause behavior change (Exley and Naecker 2016). For instance, Kast et al. (2012) 
showed that individuals’ precautionary savings can be effectively increased by simply 
announcing personal saving goals to peers. Thus, we propose that a key factor 
moderating the response to social norms is the level of an individual’s social 
connectivity, especially when individuals are highly socially connected. To the best of 
our knowledge, none of the previous studies have investigated how social norms could 
be moderated by individuals’ social connections, an important aspect that has been 
repeatedly shown to be a powerful factor in human behaviors (Aral and Walker 2014; 





Why would individuals with high social connectivity be more susceptible to a 
social norms message? Research suggests that individuals on social network platforms 
frequently engage in impression management (Tong et al. 2008), and prior work notes 
that impression management is one of the most important motivations for individuals 
to actively participate in such platforms (Krämer and Winter 2008). A user would thus 
rationally engage in activities that can enhance a positive image and avoid behaviors 
that would be harmful to their impression. For example, a commonly used strategy to 
create an impression is updating profile elements (Lampe et al. 2007; Walther et al. 
2008), which represents signaling to gain social status in the network. Social network 
participants have even been shown to engage in atypical behaviors such as using 
conspicuous consumption as a signal to foster social status (Hinz et al. 2015). 
Setting a goal, an action that is transparent in our setting, represents a signal as 
it is not only a challenge to the self, but also an explicit, visible act of conformance to 
the norm. Individuals who receive a social norms message have a choice in regard to 
whether they follow or ignore the norm. To the extent that the behavior of setting a goal 
is a positive act, highly socially connected individuals stand to gain more for their 
image. Not conforming to an accepted norm might incur costs – a group member who 
does not follow a norm is likely to be labeled as a deviant and runs the risk of being 
isolated if s/he continues to violate the norms (Hackman 1992). The costs of damaging 
one’s impression because of non-conformance to a norm are obviously higher for 
individuals with more social connections and, as a result, their response to the social 





We further propose that the benefits of conforming to the norms are not 
identical across users. Since the directed link determines the flow of information, it 
represents an individual’s influence on others. In a directional social network platform, 
an individual can follow (i.e., have outgoing social ties) or be followed (incoming 
social ties) by another individual. Using incoming and outgoing ties as a source of 
variation, research has identified three user categories on Twitter, a directional social 
network platform (Dann 2010; Java et al. 2007): users who engage in information 
sharing (high followers, low followees), those who are information seeking (low 
followers, high followees), and those in friendship relationships (roughly equivalent 
followers and followees). 
Of these categories, which users are likely to be more responsive to a social 
norms message?  There are potentially two competing arguments. On the one hand, 
information seekers (high out-degree only) represent “sociability” (Rice et al. 1999), 
implying that they tend to access others in the network. According to Liebowitz (2006), 
high out-degree individuals tend to seek others’ guidance and advice. Thus, information 
seekers might have a greater tendency to learn from others and follow others’ 
behaviors. Since social norms convey information about what most others do, the 
tendency of information seekers might make them more susceptible to the social norms 
treatment. On the other hand, because individuals’ behaviors are more visible to the 
incoming ties than the outgoing ties, the gains from impression management are likely 
to be stronger for information sharers (high in-degree only). Individuals with a high 
number of followers as compared to followees have a sizeable audience and are likely 





Such individuals who “share information” would clearly benefit more from conforming 
to the norms to avoid poor impression management. Thus, this type of user might be 
more susceptible to the social norms message. Both arguments are plausible, prompting 
us to examine this issue empirically. 
To summarize the conceptual background for this study, robust evidence 
supports the efficacy of social norms in diverse settings, although the literature on the 
use of social norms for physical activity is relatively modest. We draw on prior research 
in goal setting to argue that a social norms message encapsulating information about 
how others have established a goal for physical activity may address the self-control 
challenge that prevents individuals from undertaking healthy behavior. Although prior 
research has alluded to heterogeneous treatment effects for social norms, empirical 
work in this area is limited, and the conditioning effect of today’s pervasive digital 
social connections has not been examined. Theoretical arguments based on individuals’ 
desires to engage in impression management indicate that highly socially connected 
individuals would benefit more from conforming to the norms. We further suggest that 
norm conformance is not likely to be identical across users and present competing 
arguments for why both information sharers (high followers, low followees) and 
information seekers (low followers, high followees) may be susceptible to the social 
norms treatment. In the following section, we describe our experimental design and 






2.3.1 Research Context 
To estimate the causal effect of social norms on individuals’ goal setting and 
subsequent physical activity, we conducted a randomized field experiment following 
the methodology proposed by List and Rasul (2011). We observed individuals’ running 
behaviors across a period of time in a controlled environment, and these individuals 
were unaware that they were under observation. This design enables us to eliminate the 
undesirable Hawthorne effect (Adair 1984), also referred to as the observer effect, in 
which individuals change their behavior in response to their awareness of being 
observed. 
Our field experiment was effected in cooperation with an online running 
platform, henceforth referred to as RunningPlatform to maintain anonymity. The 
platform is currently a leading physical activity platform in Taiwan, with more than 
250,000 registered users. The platform provides services for runners who seek to keep 
track of their running activities and connect with friends. Its social network features 
allow us to investigate the interaction between social norms and social connections. 
Users in this online community can upload their running activity either through the 
website or by using the mobile app provided by the company. Although users share a 
common interest in developing a physical activity habit, participation does not mean 
that they are veteran runners. Rather, most users on the platform still suffer from 
insufficient physical activity (e.g., only around 3.9% of registered users run more than 
30km in the pre-treatment month), making them a suitable target population for 





The majority of users rely on the platform’s mobile app to track their physical 
activities. Combining modern GPS technology with Google Maps, the platform shows 
users their route in detail for each running episode. Furthermore, the platform allows 
users to monitor their running pace, enabling them to adjust their training plans 
accordingly. For each running episode, the platform records not only the time spent 
running, but also detailed personal information such as average heart rate and even 
environmental information such as temperature and humidity. In addition, the platform 
shares information about marathon races in Taiwan. Individuals can then indicate 
whether they would like to attend the races and share their race experience with friends. 
This physical activity community offers standard social network-related 
functions. Similar to Twitter, individuals on this platform can follow or be followed by 
other runners. This means that an individual’s friend can be one she/he follows 
(followee), one who follows her/him (follower), or the two users could be mutual 
followers. A follower can see the followee’s updated physical activity if the followee 
makes their running records available to the public or his/her friends. Each individual 
has his/her own personal page, which is similar to the personal wall feature on 
Facebook. The personal wall contains several pieces of information, including 
individuals’ profile, pictures, friends, timeline of physical activity, monthly 
accumulated running distances, and monthly goal. One can also easily follow strangers 
by clicking the “follow” button on their personal wall. 
2.3.2 Experiment Design 
Prior to the start of our experiment, a goal-setting feature was already available 





inputting a self-determined number (in kilometers) at any time in the month. Our study 
seeks to examine the effectiveness of social norms messaging on users’ willingness to 
set a goal and on their subsequent behaviors after setting a goal. We randomly assign 
individuals to two groups who received distinct messages, as listed in Table 2.1.4 The 
baseline message conveys information about the benefit of setting up a goal – a 17% 
increase in running frequency, i.e., the number of times run in a given month, which is 
calculated based on historical data from this platform. For the treatment group, we then 
add the social norms information to the baseline message (see Table 2.1). Consistent 
with Burtch et al. (2017), we use descriptive social norms of what other people on the 
platform do by displaying the absolute number of individuals setting a goal in the pre-
treatment month (e.g., there were 5,223 individuals setting up a goal in January and 
5,715 individuals in February).  
We intentionally elected not to include a “pure” social norms message that 
merely conveys the number of individuals setting a goal without describing the benefit 
of setting a goal. This decision was motivated by the rationale that highlighting social 
norms without underscoring their benefits is not common or feasible in practice. For 
example, in the towel reuse program studied by Goldstein et al. (2008), messages not 
only stated that the majority of hotel guests reuse towels, but also underscored that 
reusing towels can save the environment: “… to help save the environment by reusing 
                                                
4 The randomization procedure between the social norms and control groups helps us alleviate any 
concerns related to peer influence processes in the social network platform. Since individuals are 
randomly assigned to the treatment and control groups, their social connections are virtually identical, 
which means that if a social influence effect exists, all participants be equally affected by friends who 
set a goal. Therefore, when calculating the average treatment effects and heterogeneous treatment effects 
between these two groups, the social influence is canceled out. The difference between the two groups 





your towels during your stay” (p. 474). Allcott (2011), in attempts to modify energy 
consumption behavior, not only mentioned users’ average energy consumption to 
convey a social norm but also provided tips emphasizing the benefit of reducing energy 
consumption: “Things you can do right now … SAVE UP TO $40” (p. 1084). 
Therefore, we use a pure benefit message group as a control group, then add a social 
norms message on top of the benefit message for the treatment group, making the use 
of a social norms message more appropriate in practice.  
We further note that our control message serves an appropriate control because 
it is identical to the message received by the treatment group in every respect except 
for the addition of the social norm information. Finally, we do not include a “no 
message” group as the baseline group because the reminder effect of a message has 
been extensively studied and is well-known (Fjeldsoe et al. 2009; Hurling et al. 2007).5 
Our experiment occurred over a two-month period in February and March 2016. 
When individuals logged in to the online community for the first time in a treatment 
month, they received a pop-up message. In any treatment month, an individual received 
only one message regardless of the device she used (website or mobile). Both website 
and mobile app users were directed to a page displaying the message, shown in Table 
2.1, and a box to input a monthly goal. We did not force users to set a goal, and a user 
could simply close the window or click a return button to leave this page without setting 
a goal.  
                                                
5 We conduct additional analysis to determine if our treatment outperforms a pseudo-baseline control 
group that does not receive a reminder message. We construct a control group from the same time period 
in the previous year to account for any seasonal effect; we then compare goal-setting rates from February 
and March 2015 to the experimental data. We find that the social norms message (treatment) has the 
strongest effect on goal setting, followed by the control group message, and both combined together are 





Starting at 00:00 a.m. on February 1, 2016, every individual who logged in to 
the system, either through the website or the mobile app, was randomly assigned to one 
of the two groups. The randomization process was based on the user’s identification 
number (user_id). This user ID is generated randomly when a user registers with the 
platform and is independent of users’ preferences and capabilities.  
2.3.3 Data 
Since we are interested in estimating the impact on goal setting, we need to 
exclude users who are already self-motivated to set a goal in the pre-treatment month. 
Further, we seek to understand whether setting a goal increases individuals’ 
performance in terms of total monthly running distance. Thus, we retain only 
individuals who have running records in the pre-treatment month (to allow for a 
comparison of pre- and post-treatment performance). We sent messages to a total of 
7,196 individuals. As detailed in Table 2.2, there were 3,682 users in the Control group 
and 3,514 users in the Social Norms groups. Each group accounts for roughly 50% of 
the total sample. 
Figure 2.1 summarizes the number of individuals in each group who logged into 
the system daily. As noted, each individual received only one message per month, 
which was delivered at the time of her first login during the treatment month. To 
simplify the visual representation, we retain only 29 days from both February and 
March and merge these numbers into one graph (2016 was a leap year, with 29 days in 
February). We drop the last two days of March to keep the graph parsimonious because 





neglect.6 As can be seen in the top half of Figure 2.1, most users received their messages 
in the first few days of the months when they logged in to the system. The bottom half 
of Figure 2.1 presents the proportion of individuals in each group. We see that the 
proportions are quite stable across time, offering some initial evidence for the success 
of the randomization procedure. 
 We conduct a series of t-tests (Table 2.2) as a randomization check by 
comparing means between the two groups for various characteristics, including age, 
gender, distance in the pre-treatment month, registered by Facebook account, log of the 
number of friends, log of the number of comments, log of the number of races attended, 
log of tenure from registration, and whether the message was read on a weekend or not. 
Users provide their age and gender during the registration step when they first use this 
platform. The platform tracks users’ running activities across time, enabling us to 
capture running distance before and during the treatment month. When a user registers 
for an account, they can choose to use “Facebook login” to simplify the registration 
procedure, and we calculate the proportion of users who did so. We calculate the 
number of friends by summing the number of a user’s followers and the number of 
followees (all-degree). Similar to Facebook functionality, users can leave comments on 
each other’s running posts. Therefore, we can calculate the number of comments. We 
further calculate each user’s tenure by counting the number of days elapsed from their 
registration date. The platform has also tracked all the major marathon races in Taiwan 
since it was first launched in 2011. Individuals who attend a race can indicate their 
participation, and we calculate the number of races users attended. We take log forms 
                                                





of these variables to reduce concerns regarding skewness. Finally, we calculate the 
proportion of users who read messages during a weekend.7 
T-test results in Table 2.2 for these characteristics provide strong evidence of 
comparability and balance across the Control and Social Norms groups, affirming that 
the randomization process is successful. Among all the characteristics, only “% 
Registered by Facebook account” is modestly higher in the Social Norms group than in 
the Control group, but the difference (2.5%) is not practically significant. When 
comparing so many characteristics between two groups, one minor difference is not 
unusual (see Bloom et al. 2014 for more discussion). Furthermore, a joint test on all 
characteristics shows no significant difference. The F-test for all variables in the 
randomization yields a p-value of 0.20. 
Table 2.3 shows the correlation of all the variables. Log(# of friends) and Log(# 
of comments) are highly correlated because both variables capture some form of social 
connection. Therefore, to avoid the multicollinearity problem, we do not include both 
variables in the formal models. Instead, we use Log(# of friends) in the main model 
and use Log(# of comments) to replace Log(# of friends) in the additional analysis to 
further demonstrate the robustness of our findings. 
2.4. Results 
2.4.1 Model-free Evidence 
In Figure 2.2, we first visually depict the model-free evidence of the average 
treatment effect (ATE) on Goal Setting Rate and Goal Attainment Rate. In the Control 
group, 7.6% of users set a goal, while in the Social Norms group, 9.4% of users set a 
                                                





goal, indicating a 23.7% increase in goal setting (t-test, p < 0.01). This result is 
consistent with the literature supporting the efficacy of social norms campaigns: 
individuals conform to the behavior of the majority in their referent group to set a goal. 
For Goal Attainment Rate, it is interesting to note that we find just the opposite. While 
individuals in the Control group have a moderate attainment rate (43.5%), users in the 
Social Norms group have a substantially lower success rate in reaching their self-
determined goal (36.1%). This constitutes a drop of 17% in goal attainment. However, 
the effect is only weakly supported by the statistical test (t-test, p < 0.1). One plausible 
explanation for the weak result, which we investigate further below, may be that 
individuals are not uniformly affected by the social norms message. 
Earlier, we argued that the effects of social norms are likely to be conditioned 
by social connections. To examine this heterogeneity in treatment effects (HTE), we 
use the log of “# of friends” as an indicator of social connections, representing the sum 
of followers and followees. To quantify HTE, we follow Green and Kern (2012)’s 
approach and estimate average treatment effects among subgroups along with a 
continuous covariate. Ten subgroups are constructed based on the continuous covariate 
of social connections. A higher number indicates individuals in that group have more 
friends. For example, after taking the exponential function of the log of number of 
friends, individuals in subgroup 1 only have 1.1 friends, while those in subgroup 10 
have on average 312.1 friends. Figure 2.3 shows raw differences between the Control 
group and Social Norms group for each subgroup. Here we see that the treatment effects 





providing initial support for the conjecture that social connections moderate the 
treatment effects, especially when individuals are highly connected. 
2.4.2 Regression Analyses 
2.4.2.1 Regression Analyses for the Average Treatment Effects 
Since the outcome variables of goal setting and goal attainment are 
dichotomous (setting a goal or not; attaining a goal or not), we use a Probit model to 
examine the treatment effect (Wooldridge 2010). Specifically, we consider the 
following model in the latent variable form: 




𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙	𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔2 = 1	[𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙	𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔2∗ > 0] 
(1) 




𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡2 = 1	[𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡2∗ > 0] 
(2) 
where T represents the treatment dummy, which equals 1 when the group is the Social 
Norms group and equals 0 when the group is the Control group. We also construct the 
variable high social connection (HS) to capture individuals’ social connections. We 
define high social connection as those individuals whose number of friends places them 
in the top 10%, which is motivated by the initial findings of the model-free evidence in 
Figure 2.3.8 We also control for a wide range of individual characteristics (Z), including 
age, gender, average daily distance in pre-treatment month, whether the account was 
                                                
8 To provide robustness, we used the following two alternative variables to construct social connections. 
First, we use the number of comments to construct another facet of social connections. The results are 
broadly similar to the results of using the number of friends (all-degree). Second, we construct a new 
social connections variable that only counts the number of mutual followers, since mutual following 






registered by using Facebook ID, log of the number of races, log of tenure since 
registration, and monthly dummy. 
Regression results are in Table 2.4. Consistent with the model-free evidence, 
we find that the social norms treatment has a strong effect on the Goal Setting Rate. 
Table 2.4 Column (1) shows a positive coefficient of 0.115 (p<0.01) of the social norms 
treatment. The marginal effect is a 17.5% difference between the treatment and control 
groups. Regression results for the second outcome, Goal Attainment Rate, are shown 
in Table 2.4 Column (3). As with Goal Setting Rate, we see a difference between the 
Social Norms group and the Control group: the coefficient of the treatment is -0.179 
and is only significant at the p<0.1 level. The marginal analysis shows a 6.6% drop of 
Goal Attainment Rate in the Social Norms group as compared to the rate in the Control 
group. 
Overall, our results support the existence of a strong effect of social norms in 
motivating goal-setting behavior. More importantly, these results highlight the need to 
observe and pay attention to a subsequent effect. In this situation, an individual might 
elect to conform to the behavior of others because of normative pressures to do so; 
however, such conformity may then be accompanied by an adverse side effect, 
reflected in the lower Goal Attainment Rate. We discuss this finding further in section 
2.4.5. 
2.4.2.2 Quantile Treatment Effects of Social Connections 
To better estimate the HTE across the spectrum of social connections, we follow 
Allcott (2011) to examine the Quantile Treatment Effects (QTEs). Similar to the 





as an indicator of social connections and construct ten subgroups by the level of social 
connections. The QTE then estimates the differences between the Social Norms and 
Control groups in each of the ten corresponding quantiles. Figure 2.4 and Table A1 
show the average treatment effects on each subpopulation for both Goal Setting and 
Goal Attainment outcomes. The number on the x-axis indicates each subgroup, with 
higher numbers reflecting a higher log of number of friends. We regress in each 
subgroup to calculate the conditional average treatment effects (CATE) using equations 
(1) and (2) by excluding the variable high social connection because this variable is 
directly related to the log of number of friends. Therefore, the y-axis in Figure 2.4 
indicates the conditional average treatment effect. As can be seen, the treatment effect 
of Goal Setting is especially strong for subgroup 10, which has the highest number of 
friends. The CATE of Goal Setting in subgroup 10 is 8.3%, which is almost twice as 
large as the maximum of the conditional treatment effect for other subgroups.  
The CATE of Goal Attainment in subgroup 10 is also strikingly strong. On 
average, individuals in the treatment condition of subgroup 10 have a 33.7% lower 
Goal Attainment Rate than individuals in the control condition. These plots vividly 
illustrate a sharp rise in Goal Setting for subgroup 10 and a steep decline in Goal 
Attainment for the same subgroup. Together, these two findings indicate that 
individuals with strong social connections are more susceptible to the social norms 
message and perform worse after receiving the treatment message. To provide further 
robustness, we follow the procedure of Feller and Holmes (2009) to calculate CATE 





similar finding, which provides additional confidence for the presence of HTE caused 
by social connections. 
We note that although subgroup 10 only represents 10% of the sample, the low 
Goal Attainment Rate for this group might represent an economically substantial 
impact in other social network platforms. We have argued that such highly socially 
connected individuals are more susceptible to social norms because they are more 
visible to others. Individuals in subgroup 10 have an average of 312 friends in our target 
platform, but other popular social network platforms report levels of connectivity that 
easily exceed that of subgroup 10. For instance, individuals on Facebook in 2014 had 
an average of 350 Facebook friends in the United States9, and active Twitter users have 
707 followers on average10. With the growing numbers of online friends and the high 
penetration rates of the major social network platforms, the impact of the social norms 
treatment might be comparatively modest in a specialized setting like the 
RunningPlatform and greater in other settings such as Facebook or Twitter. 
Furthermore, individuals in subgroup 10 represent the most socially active group on 
the platform. If a social norms treatment negatively affects individuals in subgroup 10 
and prompts them to reduce their engagement with the platform, then the treatment 
might adversely affect individuals’ activities in other subgroups as well.  
2.4.2.3 Regression Analyses for the Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
                                                
9 Statista: Average number of Facebook friends of users in the United States as of February 2014. 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/232499/americans-who-use-social-networking-sites-several-times-
per-day/ 






As with ATE, we use regression analyses for HTE to formally test our 
conjecture that individuals who are more socially connected are more susceptible to the 
social norms message. Specifically, consider the following model in the latent variable 
form: 
𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙	𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔2∗




𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙	𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔2 = 1	[𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙	𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔2∗ > 0] 
(3) 
𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡2∗




𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡2 = 1	[𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡2∗ > 0] 
(4) 
where all the variables are exactly the same as shown in equations (1) and (2). We add 
the moderating effect of high social connection (HS) on social norms (T) by interacting 
both terms. Following Baron and Kenny (1986) and Dawson (2014), when testing the 
moderation, the interaction term is the core element. If the term is significant, we show 
that the variable (HS) is a statistically significant moderator between the independent 
variable (T) and the outcome variable.  
As shown in Table 2.4 Column (2), the interaction term’s coefficient is 0.381 
and significant at p<0.01 level. The positive sign of the interaction term in Table 2.4 
Column (2) indicates a complementarity effect between the Social Norms intervention 
and high social connection: individuals who have high social connectivity have a 
greater chance of setting a goal when receiving a Social Norms message. After 
calculating the predictive margins, we find that for individuals who are not highly 





Norms groups is very close (8.7% (SN) - 7.7% (Control) = 1.0%), but for individuals 
who are highly socially connected, the probability of setting a goal between the Control 
and the Social Norms groups is quite different (14.3% (SN) - 6.6% (Control) = 7.7%). 
Therefore, the complementarity effect between the Social Norms intervention and high 
social connection leads to an overall increase of 7.7% - 1.0% = 6.7% in goal setting. 
For the Goal Attainment Rate, Table 2.4 Column (4) shows a strong interaction 
effect between high social connection and the Social Norms message. The negative 
sign of the interaction term in Table 2.4 Column (4) indicates a substitution effect 
between Social Norms intervention and high social connection. This suggests that 
individuals who have high social connectivity have a lower chance of attaining a goal 
when receiving the Social Norms message. Similarly, after calculating the predictive 
margins, we find that for individuals who are not highly socially connected, the 
probability of attaining a goal between the Control and the Social Norms groups is very 
similar (37.7% (SN) - 40.2% (Control) = -2.6%). In contrast, for individuals who are 
highly socially connected, the probability of attaining a goal between the Control and 
the Social Norms groups is drastically different (32.1% (SN) - 69.5% (Control) = -
37.4%). Therefore, the substitution effect between Social Norms intervention and high 
social connection leads to an overall decrease of 34.8% ((-37.4%) - (-2.6%)) in goal 
attainment. 
2.4.3 Addressing Selection Concerns 
Although random assignment of treatments is the ideal approach to identify the 
treatment effects, analyzing the goal attainment effect in equations (2) and (4) might 





distorted by nonrandom sample attrition. Although our treatment was assigned 
randomly in the original sample, the randomization does not hold for goal attainment 
because the actual estimated sample suffers from a selection bias issue, which can result 
in attrition bias with unknown direction. To correct the selection issue, we estimate the 
treatment effects by using the Heckman selection model (Heckman 1976; Heckman 
1979). Since the outcome variable (Goal Attainment) is binary, we use a probit 
selection model, also known as heckprobit model, to correct for the selection problem 
(Greene 2012; Van de Ven and Van Praag 1981). Specifically, we use the following 
equations11: 
𝑮𝒐𝒂𝒍	𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆















                                               	+𝜷𝟐𝟓 ∗ 	𝑰𝒊 + 𝝁𝒊 
𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓(𝜺, 𝝁) = 	𝝆 
 
(5.2) 
 The dependent variable is not always observed. Rather, goal attainment is 
observed only when individuals choose to set a goal. When 𝜌 ≠ 0, the standard probit 
model for the first equation yields biased results, and we use the heckprobit model to 
provide consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates for all the parameters. For the 
                                                
11 For simplicity, we only present the heckprobit model to correct Equation (4). Simply removing an 
interaction term in Equations (5) can be used to correct Equation (2). It is also worth noting that the Goal 
AttainmentSelect in Equation (5.2) of the heckprobit model is the binary value determined by the Goal 






model to be well identified, we need to satisfy the exclusion restriction, which requires 
that at least one variable appears with a non-zero coefficient in the selection model but 
not in the outcome equation. We construct a variable, Is weekend (I), to indicate 
whether an individual reads the message during a weekend or not. Previous literature 
has documented that day of the week can affect mood (McFarlane et al. 1988; Ryan et 
al. 2010) and human behaviors such as diet (An 2016), sedentary behaviors (Marshall 
et al. 2015), or online behaviors (Leunga et al. 2016). The differences between a 
weekend and a weekday can even be observed in one’s physiological condition, likely 
because of the chronic work stress experienced during weekdays (Schlotz et al. 2004). 
A weekend is typically characterized by a relaxed atmosphere that is associated with 
close relations and leisure (Rybczynski and Glancy 1992), and a weekday is often 
linked with routine jobs, fatigue, stress, and work pressure (Schlotz et al. 2004; van 
Hooff et al. 2007). These differences would affect goal-setting behaviors because 
establishing a goal involves the development of an action plan to motivate oneself 
toward a goal, which is very likely to be different under different environmental 
contexts. Therefore, we conjecture that reading the message on the weekend would 
affect the goal-setting behavior differently from reading the message on a weekday. 
Finally, because goal attainment is a relatively longer-term behavior, there is no 
legitimate reason to believe that the specific type of day when the message is read 
would affect goal attainment, making it a suitable variable to use in the selection model.  
 Table 2.5 shows the results of addressing the selection issue. While Columns 
(1) and (2) show the results of the main effects, Columns (3) and (4) display the 





have a different likelihood of setting a goal (Columns (1) and (3)). Columns (2) and (4) 
show that the main effect and the moderating effect are still significant, and with a very 
similar magnitude as in the main model, reducing the concern regarding selection 
attrition. In fact, the p-values (Prob > chi2) at the bottom of Table 2.5 are insignificant. 
Since 𝜌 denotes the correlation between the error terms of the selection and outcome 
equations, this means the two stage equations are not statistically correlated and the 
selection issue is less of a concern.  
2.4.4 Types of High Social Connections 
 We had earlier proposed competing arguments for different types of social ties. 
Prior research (Dann 2010; Java et al. 2007) has shown that users who engage in 
information sharing (high followers, low followees) are very different from those who 
are information seeking (low followers, high followees). Based on our previous 
arguments, information sharers might benefit more from conforming to the norm in 
order to make a good impression because they have a sizeable audience, but 
information seekers might also follow the norms because of their innate tendency to 
obtain guidance and information from others. We thus use the nature of the ties to 
further examine these theoretical arguments. 
We categorized highly socially connected users into the following three types: 
only high in-degree users (high followers), only high out-degree users (high followees), 
and both high in-degree and out-degree users. We use the same threshold of 90% to 
differentiate high and low in-degree and out-degree. We then combine the baseline 
type, the low socially connected users, to create a dummy variable representing these 





newly constructed variable with the original high social connection variable. Table 2.6 
shows the results. We find that individuals who have only high in-degree are more 
likely to set a goal and less likely to achieve the goal, but the same results cannot be 
observed for individuals with only high out-degree. The finding further buttresses the 
argument that individuals who care more about impression management are more 
susceptible to the norms. Information seekers’ natural tendencies might not be strong 
enough to be affected by the social norms intervention. For individuals with both high 
in-degree and out-degree, as might be expected, the results are very similar to the main 
findings. 
2.4.5 The Consequences of Susceptibility to Social Norms 
Our results related to the heterogeneous effects of social norms for highly 
socially connected individuals reveal an interesting puzzle: why are individuals in the 
treatment group with high social connectivity less likely to attain goals? In this section, 
we explore plausible explanations for this puzzle. To gain deeper insights into the 
differences in user behavior between the treatment and control groups, we first 
construct two identical samples by applying a matching procedure.12 We use a simple 
matching algorithm on observable variables, including age, gender, distance in the pre-
treatment month, number of friends, registered by FB account, number of comments, 
and number of races attended, to match individuals in the Control group with 
individuals in the Social Norms group. For each pair, we calculate the Mahalanobis 
distance between individuals in the Control group and individuals in the Social Norms 
group. The Mahalanobis distance is one of the most commonly used distance measures 
                                                





(De Maesschalck et al. 2000) and has been extensively used for matching (Leuven and 
Sianesi 2015; Rubin 1980). We iterate the matrix to find the smallest set of the sum of 
Mahalanobis distances between individuals in the Control group and individuals in the 
Social Norms group. We employ a one-to-one match between these two groups and 
find the two sets of individuals having the smallest sum of the Mahalanobis distance.  
All 278 individuals in the Control group who set a goal remain labeled as the 
Control group; the matching procedure helps us isolate two subgroups in the Social 
Norms group because there are more individuals in the Social Norms group setting a 
goal. The first subgroup in the Social Norms group is called the Matched subgroup. 
This subgroup, as a result of the matching procedure, has exactly the same number of 
individuals as the Control group (278) and shares very similar attributes.13 The second 
subgroup in the Social Norms group is the Social Norms motivated subgroup. These 52 
individuals represent the incremental set of users who responded to the social norms 
message.14 We estimated probit models to examine the effect of different groups on 
various outcomes: 




𝑌2 = 1	[𝑌2∗ > 0] 
(6) 
where Y represents different dependent variables, including Goal Attainment, Log (# 
of friends), Goal minus Distance in Previous Month, and Run Next Month.15 “Goal 
                                                
13 We confirm the balance between the Control group and the Matched subgroup by using a series of t-
tests to ensure the quality of our matching. There are no statistically significant differences for all the 
covariates we used for matching. Further, there are no statistical differences for Goal Attainment Rate, 
average daily goal, and average daily distance in the pre-treatment month. 
14 We replicated the matching using a non-parametric procedure, “Coarsened Extract Matching (CEM)” 
(Blackwell et al. 2009). The results of CEM are broadly similar to the main findings. 





minus Distance in Previous Month” is used to represent the deviation of a goal from 
one’s own capability, and “Run Next Month” indicates whether individuals come back 
to the platform to upload their running records. G indicates a group dummy to represent 
Control group, Matched subgroup, and Social Norms motivated subgroup, with Social 
Norms motivated subgroup as the baseline group. Z represents individuals’ 
characteristics used in the previous models. 
Before examining the formal model, we visually compare the Social Norms 
motivated subgroup with the other two groups in Figure 2.5. Compared to the other two 
groups, individuals in the Social Norms motivated subgroup very clearly have a low 
Goal Attainment Rate. Only 25.0% of individuals in this subgroup attain their goal, as 
compared with 43.5% in the Control group and 38.1% in the Matched subgroup. The 
most striking difference between the Social Norms motivated subgroup and the other 
two groups is the log (# of friends). On average, after calculating the exponential 
function of the log of number of friends, individuals in the Social Norms motivated 
subgroup have 75 friends, but individuals in the other two groups have approximately 
25 friends. Table 2.7 Columns (1) and (2) reinforce what we have found in the previous 
section: that individuals who have high social connections are more susceptible to a 
social norms message and perform worse. 
Why does the Social Norms motivated subgroup have such a low attainment 
rate? We explore this question further by examining the value of the goals set by these 
three groups as compared to their previous running performance (see Figure 2.5). We 
calculate the average daily difference between the goal and the pre-treatment distance. 





that individuals in the Social Norms motivated subgroup have a higher difference than 
those in the other two groups. Table 2.7 Column (3) shows the results. To attain their 
goals, individuals in the Social Norms motivated subgroup have to run 0.63 km daily 
more than individuals in the Control group and 0.51 km daily more than individuals in 
the Matched subgroup. This indicates individuals in the Social Norms motivated 
subgroup, as compared to individuals in the Control group and the Matched subgroup, 
overshoot by setting a goal that is hard to attain. 
We offer the following explanation for why individuals in the Social Norms 
motivated subgroup tend to set unrealistic goals. As previously noted, goals are 
transparent in the online platform, therefore individuals can observe others and be 
observed by them, i.e., setting a goal is important for impression management. 
Individuals in the Social Norms motivated subgroup, because of their susceptibility to 
the social norms message, probably care more about what others think and are using 
the goal as a mechanism for self-promotion in their social network (Buffardi and 
Campbell 2008). Thus, in an attempt to portray an “idealized” self to impress their peers 
and set a high goal (Manago et al. 2008; Peluchette and Karl 2009), they may overlook 
the fact that their goals may be too challenging to be feasible. The S.M.A.R.T. rule of 
goal setting theory (in which R stands for “Realistic”) emphasizes the importance of 
setting a goal that can be attained realistically, given available resources and individual 
capabilities (Doran 1981). Therefore, the social norms message appears to be a bit too 
“potent” for these individuals and pushes them to violate the Realistic rule.  
The negative effects of setting an unrealistic goal for physical activity can 





another undesirable consequence of using social norms to motivate highly socially 
connected individuals to set a goal. A high proportion of individuals in the Control 
group and Matched subgroups (92.8% and 93.2%, respectively) keep posting running 
records in the post-treatment month. However, only 80.8% of individuals in the Social 
Norms motivated subgroup do so. The formal model in Table 2.7 Column (4) shows a 
similar difference in magnitude of 12.3% and 13.5%. It may be the case that failing to 
attain the goal creates frustration, or that the unrealistic goal causes unexpected injuries 
that prevent users from running in the post-treatment month. This finding is consistent 
with the goal-setting literature, which has repeatedly shown that while setting a 
challenging goal is beneficial for performance (Locke and Latham 2002), the gains are 
achieved only up to a point (Mento et al. 1987).  
2.4.6 Additional Analyses for Robustness 
 It could be argued that our definition of goal attainment is overly restrictive in 
that we require individuals to meet or exceed their goals. We conducted additional 
analyses by redefining goal attainment by the level of accomplishment.16 Specifically, 
we use 90%, 75%, and 50% of the goal to redefine goal attainment; for example, if an 
individual runs more than 75% of his/her goal, we treat this as goal attainment. 
Table 2.8 shows the results of each of the heckprobit models. We find that our 
results still hold when we redefine goal attainment as 90% or 75%, but not 50%. This 
finding is consistent with earlier arguments that highly socially connected users are 
more likely to set an unrealistic goal that is beyond their capabilities, resulting in low 
goal attainment. We find that highly socially connected users still perform worse than 
                                                





other users in terms of goal attainment rates even when we relax the constraint by 75%, 
meaning that highly socially connected users might, on average, set goals 
unrealistically by more than 133% (1/0.75) of their capabilities. However, we do not 
see the same results when we relax the constraint by 50%, probably because even 
highly socially connected users would not set a goal that is beyond 200% (1/0.5) of 
their capabilities. These results add further nuance to our understanding of highly 
socially connected users: that they are likely to set an unrealistic goal, but only up to a 
point. 
2.5. Discussion 
2.5.1 Main Findings 
Social norms campaigns, predicated on the innate human tendency to conform 
with what most other people do, have been extensively used to induce behavior change 
in many contexts, such as environmental protection (Goldstein et al. 2008) and energy 
consumption (Schultz et al. 2007). In contrast to these traditional settings, a digital 
platform with social network features has greatly increased each user’s visibility and 
the ease of observing others. Given the widespread use of such platforms, we sought to 
unpack the interaction between social norms and social connections. We conducted a 
randomized field experiment with more than 7,000 individuals in an online physical 
activity community to understand the mechanisms underlying the heterogeneous 
treatment effects of social norms campaigns. Our research bridges the literature on 
social norms and social networks and provides the first evidence on how the effects of 





We confirm that social norms do have a strong effect in motivating behavioral 
changes related to goal setting, but the effects are not uniformly distributed among 
users in our sample. Our analysis of conditional average treatment effects shows that 
individuals who are highly socially connected are more susceptible to the social norms 
message. In particular, individuals in the top 10th percentile of social connectivity 
appear to be disproportionately influenced by social norms. For users who are highly 
socially connected, the social norms treatment causes a lift of 7.7% in goal setting as 
compared to the control message. However, for users with low social connections, the 
social norms message only induces a 1% increase in Goal Setting Rate relative to the 
control message.  
Moreover, we find that dissimilar types of high social connections moderate the 
effect of social norms differently because variation in the types of social ties reflects 
differences in levels of visibility to others. We argued that individuals who engage in 
information sharing (high followers, low followees) would behave differently from 
those who are information seeking (low followers, high followees) and found that 
individuals who only have high in-degree are more susceptible to social norms, but the 
same does not apply to individuals who only have high out-degree. Previous literature 
has shown that individuals’ behaviors can be conditional on the level of observability 
(Exley and Naecker 2016).  The tendency to conform to the norm to set a goal is 
amplified by the level of visibility, making information sharing users more susceptible 
to the social norms message. 
Finally, we find that the group receiving the social norms message has a 





also similarly heterogeneously experienced by users. Goal Attainment Rates in the 
Control and Social Norms groups are almost identical for low socially connected 
individuals, but the differences become strikingly large for highly socially connected 
individuals (32.1% (SN), and 69.5% (Control)). Further analysis reveals that the highly 
socially connected users in the Social Norms group set more aggressive goals that are 
beyond their capabilities, probably because of the desire to impress their peers, 
resulting in a significantly lower Goal Attainment Rate. Such goal failures may plague 
individuals over a period of time (Brunstein and Gollwitzer 1996), resulting in negative 
effects for subsequent behaviors, such as a low running rate in the post-treatment 
month. 
2.5.2 Limitations and Implications 
We acknowledge several limitations to our study that offer opportunities for 
future work. First, we address the issue of generalizability. Our research was conducted 
in the context of health behavior with observable social connections on a platform for 
physical activity. To the degree that the mechanism driving the moderating effect is a 
desire for impression management, which is one of the most important reasons for 
individuals to participate in social network platforms (Krämer and Winter 2008), such 
effects should be generalizable to other social network platforms. However, we 
acknowledge that the moderating effect might not always be applicable to other 
contexts where a goal is less likely to promote a good impression. For example, our 
goal of increasing physical activity is a positive signal of desirable behavior; a goal 
focused on reduction of negative behavior (e.g., excess alcohol consumption or drug 





connectivity in such settings is not immediately obvious and warrants more study. Our 
results, then, pave the way for future studies to examine the moderating effects of high 
social connectivity on other interventions. Given the growing popularity of social 
network features, more empirical evidence can be obtained relatively easily in other 
settings such as diabetes monitoring or weight control.  
Second, our target users are individuals who choose to participate in this 
physical activity platform, meaning that they are at least aware of the need for physical 
activity. Therefore, the generalizability of our findings to users who lack the initial 
motivation to exercise needs more investigation. However, given the prevalence of 
health-related mobile applications and the penetration of mobile technologies, it is 
reasonable to assume that many individuals might have experience using health-related 
mobile applications. For instance, according to a nationwide survey in the United States 
(Krebs and Duncan 2015), almost 60% of mobile users had downloaded a health-
related app. Consequently, initial adoption might not be a major obstacle for the general 
public; rather, the challenge is sustaining the behavior necessary to foster a healthy 
habit (Krebs and Duncan 2015), which is the focal point of our research.  
Third, practitioners have extensively used push notifications as a strategy to 
motivate users for behavior change. Whether the effects of such interventions attenuate 
after several attempts is an open question. We share this limitation with most social 
norms studies and call for more careful investigations of the effects of repeated 
treatments. Fourth, although we have a large sample for a randomized experiment, it is 
not sufficiently robust to be able to observe and draw a strong conclusion about the 





et al. 2013; Ntoumanis et al. 2014). How do individuals respond differently to a goal 
that they set organically versus a goal induced by a social norms message? How do 
individuals handle their failure to reach different types of goals? These are important 
questions for future research.  
Our study yields useful implications for both research and practice. First, our 
findings indicate that users are essentially different in their response to social norms 
messages. In addition to the level of social connectivity, there might be other 
moderating factors that are relevant in social norms campaigns, such as individuals’ 
positions in a social network or their psychological traits. In the medical literature, there 
is much interest in determining who are “responders” and “non-responders” to 
interventions (Michelle et al. 2018). We call for more research to explore additional 
moderating mechanisms to help decision makers refine social norms campaigns on 
digital platforms. Second, when social norms are coupled with goal setting as a strategy 
to address the self-control problem, one needs to pay special attention to the possible 
negative outcomes for some users. To mitigate the powerful and potentially harmful 
effect of social norms pushing individuals to set unrealistic goals, one might consider 
suggesting a guideline of a maximum running distance, or incorporate a feedback 
system to reinforce users’ perception of the framed messages. A suitable guideline 
might restrain users from setting an unrealistic goal, and appropriate design of the 
feedback system might increase users’ goal commitment. Future research should 
investigate what factors can help alleviate the unexpected negative effects of social 





Finally, a digital nudge as a strategy to change user behavior is increasingly 
popular today, especially in the form of push notifications on online platforms. While 
practitioners have routinely used a simple A-B test approach to examine the average 
treatment effects, our findings signify the need to go a step further to open the black 
box and examine heterogeneous treatment effects on different individuals. Platforms 
should consider multiple indicators to evaluate the trade-offs among interventions in 







Chapter 3: Is It Better to Give Than to Receive? Leveraging 
Digital Social Connections for Healthy Behavior 
 
Abstract 
Motivating individuals to engage in healthy behavior has long persisted as a 
major challenge in society. Although self-interest based financial incentives have been 
widely deployed, there is a pressing need to improve their effectiveness. We investigate 
a new motivational incentive that is based on reciprocity and can be leveraged in 
conjunction with financial incentives to promote desirable behavior. We conducted a 
large randomized field experiment with over 1,700 pairs of users on a mobile social 
network platform. Individuals in our experiment receive a gift from their friends, and 
are asked to return this favor by participating in a challenge related to physical activity. 
We find that on average, reciprocity outperforms self-interest in motivating individuals 
to exercise more. Importantly, our results reveal that the magnitude of the reciprocity 
effect is contingent on the social closeness between senders and receivers. Interestingly, 
social closeness has an inverted U-shaped influence on the reciprocity effect. The effect 
is strongest when closeness is moderate, and wanes when closeness is either too strong 
or too weak. Compared to the widely used self-interest based financial incentives, our 
findings offer a potentially more powerful avenue for mechanism design in promoting 
healthy behavior. This mechanism can be implemented cost-effectively with improved 
precision for better outcomes using today’s ubiquitous digital social connections and 
wearable devices. 
 
Keywords: Reciprocity, self-interest, healthy behavior, financial incentive, social 
connections, social closeness 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Unhealthy lifestyles such as a poor diet, physical inactivity, and alcohol and 
tobacco abuse, have caused substantial economic costs (Scarborough et al. 2011). To 
curb the rapid growth in healthcare expenditure, numerous stakeholders including the 
government, employers, and health plans have increasingly emphasized incentivizing 
healthy behavior (Baicker et al. 2010). Financial incentives to individuals that invoke 
self-interest motivations have been extensively studied in a variety of settings such as 
weight loss, smoking cessation, and physical activity (Charness and Gneezy 2009; 





incentive programs, empirical findings are equivocal (Gneezy et al. 2011): although 
several studies show encouraging results (Halpern et al. 2015; Volpp et al. 2009), others 
(e.g., Cawley and Price 2013) report dropout rates as high as 68%. Blumenthal et al. 
(2013) also note that the effectiveness of financial incentive programs provided by the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid services show mixed results, and call for more 
investigations on improving the design of such interventions.  
In this study, we propose and test a new mechanism in financial incentive 
design to promote healthy behavior: a reciprocity-based incentive. Reciprocity is a 
form of a social rule that underscores the importance of repaying what other people 
have provided. It encapsulates a fundamental aspect of human behavior and has been 
suggested as a universal norm that most societies endorse (Gouldner 1960). We test 
whether being indebted to repay a gift motivates individuals to exercise more than pure 
self-gain. Our work aims to leverage individuals’ social connections to improve the 
effectiveness of financial incentives for changing behaviors related to physical activity. 
Given that social connections can be quite heterogeneous among friends, we also aim 
to identify the conditions under which reciprocity works best for in order to target 
motivations more precisely. 
Although several studies have demonstrated that reciprocity has a significant 
effect on human behavior (Alpizar et al. 2008; Falk 2007; Fehr and Gächter 2000), this 
mechanism has seldom been incorporated into health-promoting programs. This is 
likely due to at least two challenges. One, there are limited means to effectively enable 
user interactions, which are a necessary condition for reciprocity. Obtaining 





setting and indeed, this limiation is a major cause for why prior research on reciprocity 
utilizes a third party previously unknown to the subjects to trigger a reciprocal response 
(see a summary in Appendix Table A2). And two, it is challenging to study reciprocity 
in a public health context due to limited behavior observability. Traditional methods 
for capturing healthy behavior rely on self-reports, which are not conducive to precise 
tracking of physical activity. Furthermore, detailed tracking of social connections and 
physical activity simultaneously can easily become cost-prohibitive for a large sample. 
As a result, extant understanding of how to leverage reciprocity to promote healthy 
behavior is limited. 
Recent advances in information technologies allow us to address the above two 
challenges. The maturity of wearable devices and smartphones has afforded us the 
ability to precisely track individuals’ physical activity at relatively low cost. The 
widespread proliferation of online social networks and mHealth platforms has greatly 
facilitated interactions among individuals. The ease of capturing such interactions 
makes the reciprocity-based incentives more viable today. Additionally, the maturity 
of GPS techniques on smartphones and sports watches increases the observability of 
individuals’ physical activities. When coupled with digital social networks that enable 
connections at an unprecedented scale, it is now feasible to leverage reciprocity for 
promoting healthy behavior. 
Our work departs from prior literature that examines the effects of reciprocity 
in various contexts such as donations (Alpizar et al. 2008; Falk 2007), labor markets 
(Falk et al. 1999; Gneezy and List 2006; Kube et al. 2012), and marketing (Maréchal 





above, previous studies have not used reciprocity as a commitment device to motivate 
behavior change. Our study takes advantage of the capabilities offered by online social 
networks and digital connections to demonstrate the feasibility of using reciprocity as 
a mechanism for healthy behavior change. 
Second, studies that explore reciprocity largely do so by manipulating the form 
of the gifts. For instance, Falk (2007) shows that the donations increase by 17% in a 
small gift treatment and by 75% in a larger gift treatment as compared to a no-gift 
control. Other work (Kube et al. 2012) suggests that a non-monetary gift is a more 
effective trigger for invoking reciprocity than a monetary gift of equivalent value. The 
subsequent behaviors are used to quantify the magnitude of reciprocity when 
comparing the gift treatment and the no-gift control. As a result of the treatments 
examined in these studies, little is known about the relative performance of reciprocity 
versus the widely used self-interest motivation.17 In contrast, we both propose a new 
form of a commitment device on behavior change in health and quantify its effects 
relative to self-interest. Finally, to the degree that reciprocity is meaningful only in the 
context of a dyad, surprisingly, most previous literature does not examine the influence 
of the sender, who is typically an unrelated third party, on the receiver’s reciprocal 
behaviors. In our study, by changing the identity of the gift giver from the third-party 
to a receiver’s online friend, we are able to explore how social closeness between a 
dyad, i.e., the nature of the interpersonal relationship, moderates the effects of 
reciprocity.  
                                                
17 A notable exception is presented in Chung and Narayandas (2017) that compare the unconditional 





We conducted a large randomized controlled experiment with over 1,700 pairs 
of users in an online physical activity community of runners in Taiwan to address two 
research questions related to the efficacy of reciprocity as a mechanism for healthy 
behavior change: (1) Do reciprocity-based incentives compare favorably with the 
widely used self-interest incentives in promoting healthy behavior? (2) Since 
reciprocity is a form of a social rule to repay favors, how does the social closeness 
influence the effectiveness of a reciprocity-based incentive? 
Our field experiment builds on the framework of a gift exchange process and 
includes three groups. A standard gift exchange procedure involves to give, to receive, 
and to reciprocate (Mauss and Halls 1954/2000). Therefore, a pair of online friends are 
randomly chosen: one serves as a sender, and the other as a receiver. In the first group, 
the Reciprocity Treatment group, a receiver receives a gift from a friend. To 
reciprocate, the receiver needs to complete a physical activity challenge (e.g., run 30 
km in two weeks) to return an equivalent gift to the sender. In the second group, the 
Friend Control group, a receiver also receives a gift from a friend and is asked to 
complete the same physical activity challenge, but earns an equivalent gift for 
themselves. Both the reciprocated gift in the Reciprocity Treatment group and earned 
gift in the Friend Control group are provided by the platform. The only difference is 
the beneficiary. By comparing these two groups, we are able to quantify the differences 
between reciprocity-based and self-interest based incentives while controlling for the 
friend’s effect. However, both groups are distinct from a traditional incentive program, 
in which the sender is an unknown third-party. Therefore, in the third group, the 





platform.18 A receiver then completes the same physical activity challenge to earn an 
equivalent gift for themselves. The process is similar to a conventional program that 
provides enrollment rewards to encourage participation and completion rewards to 
motivate behavior change (e.g., Acland and Levy 2015; Charness and Gneezy 2009). 
By comparing the Reciprocity Treatment and the Baseline Control groups, we can 
examine whether a reciprocity-based incentive outperforms a conventional incentive 
program. 
Previewing our findings, the field experiment yields several novel results. Our 
findings show that the reciprocity-based incentive outperforms the self-interest based 
incentive in motivating individuals to exercise more. Compared to a traditional 
incentive program, which was initiated by the platform (i.e., Reciprocity Treatment vs. 
Baseline Control groups), a reciprocity-based incentive initiated by friends leads to a 
sizeable 32.0% increase in challenge completion rate. Even after controlling for the gift 
giver’s effect, the reciprocity-based design still outperforms self-interest incentive by 
20.4% in challenge completion rate (i.e., Reciprocity Treatment vs. Friend Control 
groups). Thus, our study offers new findings for mechanism design in promoting 
healthy behavior.  
We further find that the magnitude of the reciprocity effect is contingent on the 
social closeness between the senders and the receivers. Interestingly, social closeness 
has an inverted U-shaped influence on the reciprocity effect. The effect is strongest 
when closeness is moderate and attenuates when closeness is either too strong or too 
weak. We interpret this finding to suggest that for distant friends, reciprocity may be 
                                                





less effective because there is no strong need for participants to maintain a long-term 
relationship. For close friends, the weaker effect is likely because individuals do not 
worry about jeopardizing the relationship even if they fail to complete the challenge or, 
more practically, because individuals can compensate their friends through offline 
interactions. 
Our study makes important theoretical and practical contributions. First, we 
extend existing evidence on the effects of reciprocity-based incentives to a novel and 
consequential context of healthy behavior. It is not clear whether prior findings can be 
readily generalized due to idiosyncrasies unique to this domain. Healthy behavior 
requires substantial effort; it is costlier to run 40 km than it is to, say, share a coupon 
code. Additionally, most existing studies on reciprocity examine activities that are 
either one-shot or span a short period of time. Indeed, Gneezy and List (2006) point out 
that the duration of behavior is a gap in the literature and show in a field experiment 
that reciprocity works only in the first few hours on workers’ efforts. Our results 
provide empirical evidence that reciprocity can be effective for healthy behavior that 
takes time and effort to complete. We further contribute to literature on incentives by 
juxtaposing reciprocity with the commonly used self-interest based incentive, and 
providing a quantitative estimate of the differences in efficacy. In doing so, we advance 
understanding of an emerging stream of literature by comparing a social or behavioral 
intervention with financial incentives (Ashraf et al. 2014; Chung and Narayandas 2017; 
Kast et al. 2012). 
We extend the literature on commitment devices such as peer pressure and 





new form of a commitment device. With the help of digital technologies and the 
prevalence of online social networks, our study demonstrates that reciprocity can 
greatly improve the effectiveness of a conventional incentive program without 
incurring extra costs. Our study responds the call for “making incentive dollars go 
further” (Blumenthal et al. 2013). This provides a foundation for future studies such as 
those comparing the effects of different commitment devices or examining the 
synthesized effects when combining multiple commitment devices (e.g., increasing 
observability from peers, or loss aversion) with a reciprocity-based design.19  
Our analysis of the conditioning role played by the interpersonal relationship 
on the effects of reciprocity offers a deeper understanding of the mechanism. Since 
most studies in the previous literature use a third party previously unknown to the 
subjects to initiate reciprocity (Appendix Table A2), it is not feasible for them to test 
how interpersonal relationships alter the effects of reciprocity. Empirical evidence 
suggests that social closeness plays a key role in human behaviors (Aral and Walker 
2014; Bapna et al. 2017; Nitzan and Libai 2011), although findings about the precise 
nature of interpersonal relationships on reciprocal behaviors are mixed (Falk et al. 
1999; Maréchal and Thöni 2007). For example, Maréchal and Thöni (2007) show that 
the first time visit of a customer, a proxy to gauge whether sellers and customers know 
each other before the treatment, would moderate the effects of gifts (free samples). The 
effect of a gift to increase sales is conditional on sellers and buyers knowing each other. 
In contrast, Chen et al. (2009) show, in a laboratory experiment setting, that 
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participants’ positive reciprocity is not affected by the existing relationship (strangers 
vs. friends). Our research extends and complements these studies by treating 
interpersonal relationships as existing along a continuum; a more realistic assumption. 
Our finding of an inverted U-shaped relationship between social closeness and the 
effects of reciprocity add further nuance to our understanding of interpersonal 
relationships and allow practitioners to identify optimal pairs to fully exert the power 
of reciprocity to achieve precision motivation for each individual. 
From the perspective of practice, because our study directly leverages 
individuals’ existing social connections, it has the potential to create value for both the 
platform and for participants. For the platform, a reciprocity-based incentive increases 
the bonds between pairs of users, an essential element for a social-network platform to 
thrive (Ellison 2007). For individuals, a reciprocity-based incentive not only enhances 
interpersonal relationships between senders and receivers, but might also enable the 
social support necessary to sustain engagement in healthy behavior in the long run 
(Kiernan et al. 2012).  
3.2. Prior Literature 
Our research context is similar to an incentivized wellness program, which aims 
to reduce health costs and improve employee well-being and productivity by providing 
inducements. Most wellness programs focus on healthy behaviors, such as exercise, 
diet, weight loss, and smoking cessation (Baicker et al. 2010; Naydeck et al. 2008; 
Osilla et al. 2012). Two trends in incentivized wellness programs are noteworthy. One, 
in light of the robust evidence supporting the value of such programs (e.g., Baicker et 





reduces $3.27 in medical costs and $2.73 in absenteeism costs), their use is 
accelerating. And two, online platforms are increasingly being used to orchestrate and 
deliver wellness programs. For example, Herman et al. (2006) test whether a financial 
incentive ($150 cash rebate) integrated into an online physical activity program is 
associated with improvement in health status.  
We briefly review several streams of work that provide the conceptual 
background for our study. First, to address the problem of self-control, especially when 
an individual is able to acknowledge the problem (such as a lack of physical activity or 
being overweight), commitment devices may be used to prevent derailment from an 
intended course of action (Rogers et al. 2014). We review different types of 
commitment devices and discuss the differences between a hard commitment device 
and a soft commitment device. Second, since our experimental design has its roots in 
the power of reciprocity, we discuss gift exchange theory, which offers insights into 
why individuals reciprocate. Finally, we turn to the conditioning effects of individuals’ 
social connections and present arguments for a curvilinear conditioning role played by 
the strength of the social closeness on the effects of reciprocity. 
3.2.1 Commitment Devices 
The difficulty of sustaining healthy habits is a manifestation of the more general 
problem of self-control, a human fallibility that has garnered considerable attention in 
both psychology and economics. Typical examples include failure to quit smoking 
(Hughes et al. 2004), inability to sustain new year’s resolutions (Wiseman 2007), and 
procrastination in submitting homework (Schiming 2012). A self-control problem 





decision-making (Ameriks et al. 2007). In the health field, many people fail to sustain 
a healthy life because of the temptation of short-term benefit, leading individuals to 
deviate from ideal behavior. 
To avoid undesirable future selves (such as becoming indigent, obese, or 
afflicted by disease), individuals employ commitment devices to prevent lapses in self-
control (Bryan et al. 2010). Such devices can be in the form of a formal or informal 
contract with oneself or close friends, where failure to adhere to contract terms would 
cause loss and suffering. A commitment device could be as simple as setting a goal, or 
as harsh as donating a substantial amount of money (e.g., $1000) to a place that one 
dislikes. Bryan et al. (2010) label commitment devices with financial penalties for 
failure or rewards for success as hard commitments. In contrast, a soft commitment 
refers to the psychological consequences of a device. Typical examples of hard 
commitment devices include late penalties on coursework when one fails to meet 
deadlines (Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002) or loss of deposits when one fails to quit 
smoking or lose weight (Giné et al. 2010; Halpern et al. 2012). 
Building on the gift exchange process, our paper combines a hard commitment 
device (enrollment and completion incentives) and a soft commitment device 
(reciprocity) to foster healthy behavior and directly compares reciprocity with self-
interest incentives. Our paper studies a growing body of literature that seeks to directly 
compare social or behavioral interventions with financial incentives. In particular, Kast 
et al. (2012) examine how a self-help peer group acts as a commitment device for 
precautionary savings. They focus on the effect of peer pressure, reflected in being 





et al. (2014) conducted a field experiment to directly compare a pro-social motivation 
with a financial incentive motivation to promote HIV prevention through condom sales. 
They show that agents who receive non-financial rewards, a pro-social motivation 
facilitated by social comparisons, exert more effort than agents receiving financial 
rewards at promoting sales. Departing from prior work, our research directly leverages 
individuals’ social connections to form a psychological debt to repay favors as a soft 
commitment device. Our research context is similar to Milkman et al.’s (2013). While 
they use temptation bundling as a soft commitment device to increase gym attendance 
rates, we use reciprocity to increase individuals’ physical activity. 
3.2.2 Gift Exchange Theory and Reciprocity 
The theory of gift exchange has its roots in literature from anthropology. 
Mauss’s (1954/2000) famous essay investigates the gift exchange process in a primitive 
society that involves a series of actions: to give, to receive, and more importantly, to 
reciprocate. One may give a return gift for the purpose of maintaining a social balance 
or fairness, showing gratitude, or rewarding generosity (Kolm 2000), and sometimes 
might even overcompensate the cost of the initial gift. Gift exchange engenders 
reciprocity because it helps agents to signal social distance and distinguish friends from 
non-friends (Levine 1998). 
Gift exchange has been widely investigated in labor markets. Akerlof’s (1982) 
gift exchange model suggests that firms pay more than the minimum wage to receive 
higher productivity from employees. In an experimental setting, Fehr et al. (1993) show 
that individuals exhibit a form of social preference, perhaps reciprocity, to help others 





the differences between non-monetary and monetary gifts on workers’ reciprocating 
efforts. In their experiment, individuals in a non-monetary group exert higher work 
performance than the control group, while individuals in a cash gift group experience 
no significant effect. 
In the information systems literature, researchers have viewed open source and 
online communities through the lens of a gift economy (Bergquist and Ljungberg 
2001). Wasko and Faraj (2005) discuss why individuals help strangers in computer-
mediated discussion forums even when they know that their help would not be 
reciprocated. Reciprocity between two agents is often difficult because of the 
anonymous nature of interaction in the online forum. However, when individuals offer 
advice in such forums, the contributor does not expect direct reciprocation but rather 
expects the receivers to contribute to someone else someday. This form of reciprocity 
is labeled “generalized exchange” (Ekeh 1974). The sharing in the online environment 
is different from traditional gift exchange (Smith and Kollock 1999), and knowledge 
as a form of a public good in the online forum reflects shared moral obligation for 
generalized reciprocity and prosocial behavior rather than self-interest (Wasko and 
Faraj 2000). 
Reciprocity implies that people behave more nicely and are more cooperative 
in response to friendly actions (Fehr and Gächter 2000). Calls for contributions from 
charities are one of the most common contexts where the power of reciprocity has been 
leveraged. Falk (2007) conducted a randomized field experiment in an event to solicit 
donations. The small gift group elicited 17% more donations, and the large gift group 





that tourists contribute more when receiving a small gift at a national park in Costa 
Rica. Likewise, marketers who provide free samples to increase sales also leverage the 
power of reciprocity. For instance, Bawa and Shoemaker (2004) show that consumers 
feel obliged to purchase when provided with a free sample. Beltramini (1992) found 
that giving a business gift to customers increases positive perceptions of key product 
attributes. Beyond donations and marketing, researchers have also tested reciprocity in 
a hospital setting. Currie et al. (2013) show that when patients bring small gifts such as 
bookmarks to physicians, doctors reciprocate with better service and fewer unnecessary 
prescriptions of antibiotics. 
Why do individuals reciprocate when there is often no overt, material gain from 
doing so? They do so for three primary reasons: conforming to a universal norm, 
expressing gratitude, and avoiding psychological distress. First, reciprocity is essential 
to form human relationships (Gudeman 2001). A classic explanation offered by 
Gouldner (1960) argues that one should help those who have helped them. Such a norm 
has long been imprinted in individuals and internalized in most societies. Yan (2003) 
suggests that failure to fulfill the obligations of reciprocity violates ethics and may be 
viewed as immoral. Second, people reciprocate to show gratitude, an emotional 
appreciation for received benefits. Komter (2004) describes gratitude as an imperative 
force that compels us to return the received benefits. Palmatier et al. (2009) show that 
marketers’ relationship management leads to customers’ gratitude in such a way that it 
increases customers’ purchase intentions. Third, failure to reciprocate may be costly as 





instance, Dahl et al. (2005) show that customers incur a feeling of guilt for not 
purchasing from a salesperson after establishing temporary social connectedness. 
3.2.3 The Conditioning Effects of Social Closeness 
The importance of social connections between a pair of users in an online social 
network is underscored by substantial research showing that connections are related to 
behaviors such as adoption, content sharing, or trust. Yoganarasimhan (2012) finds that 
network structure is a critical driver of the popularity of a video on Youtube, and Nitzan 
and Libai (2011) show that individuals are more likely to defect if connected by a 
defecting neighbor, and such effects would be influenced by tie strength and 
homophily. Katona et al. (2011) find that both the degree effects, i.e., individuals who 
are connected with many adopters, and the clustering effect, i.e., the density of users 
who are the adopters, affect a focal user’s adoption. Bapna et al. (2017) show that 
degree of interaction, embeddedness, and being tagged in the same photo would affect 
individuals’ trust. 
Despite the growing body of research supporting the effects of social 
connections on behaviors, the conditional effects of social closeness on the impact of 
reciprocity have not been empirically tested. This oversight is likely because it is costly 
and hard to leverage individuals’ social connections without the help of modern 
technologies and social network platforms. In this study, address this gap and explore 
how social closeness conditions the effects of reciprocity. To the extent that individuals 
reciprocate to follow universal norms and to conform to the social rules, it is a 
reasonable conjecture that the effects of reciprocity would be stronger when receivers 





a positive relationship would hold only up to a point, and then decay. Specifically, we 
suggest that social closeness between senders and receivers will have an inverted U-
shaped relationship on the effects of reciprocity.  
Our expectation for such a curvilinear effect is predicated on the individual 
utility generated from reciprocating a gift, and supported by findings from prior 
research. According to Fehr and Gächter (2000), positive reciprocity has long been 
embedded in the society, and the received favors create “feelings of indebtedness 
obliging many people to repay the psychological debt.” However, the psychological 
debt should not be uniformly distributed and is likely to be conditional on the 
relationships between senders and receivers prior to receiving the gifts. Studies have 
shown that people respond differently when in close rather than distant relationships 
(Fiske 1992). Grant and Gino (2010) find that receivers’ perceptions of social worth 
can motivate different levels of prosocial behaviors. Therefore, a receiver’s perception 
of the gift would be affected by the social closeness to the sender and, in turn, affect 
the reciprocal response. 
When receiving gifts from distant friends, the desire to return the favor is 
plausibly weak. A strong relationship might exert a more powerful effect than a distant 
tie does. Ryu and Feick (2007) show that the strength of an ego’s social ties (strong tie 
vs. weak tie) affect the effectiveness of a referral program and argue that for strong tie 
relationships, individuals are more concerned about the other’s welfare. For example, 
individuals are more inclined to make a referral for a strong than a weak tie (Frenzen 
and Nakamoto 1993). Aral and Walker (2014) demonstrate that the embeddedness or 





application adoption. Furthermore, one reason people reciprocate is for long-term 
outcomes and the desire for future interaction (Homans 1974). Since distant friends are 
merely online acquaintances, the desire to maintain a long-term relationship and future 
interaction is likely low, thereby dampening the receiver’s desire to reciprocate. 
Likewise, when the gift giver is a very close friend, the need for reciprocation 
may also be low. As noted previously, one reason people reciprocate is the desire for 
future interaction (Homans 1974). With very close friends, the obligation to reciprocate 
may be attenuated because receivers and senders already have an intimate bond. In 
other words, the receiver believes that the relationship will persist even in the absence 
of a return gift. According to Gouldner (1960), the foundation of reciprocity is the 
embedded obligation to repay. Receivers feel indebted toward the senders until they 
have repaid the favors. For a very close friend, the perception of indebtedness is likely 
to be low because receivers are not afraid of jeopardizing the relationship even if they 
fail to repay their friends, or because receivers could reciprocate via other offline 
means. Furthermore, Chen et al. (2009) argue that during interactions with distant 
friends, the dominant mindset is “transactional:” i.e., individuals will often calculate 
the economic outcomes of behaviors. In contrast, with close friends, individuals bring 
a social/relational frame of mind that takes the psychological considerations of the 
exchange into account. With close friends, receivers may take the goodwill for granted. 
Therefore, both the level of gratitude as well as the experience of guilt may not be 
potent enough to invoke a stronger effect of reciprocity. 
To summarize, we propose that for receivers who receive gifts from a sender 





strongest. When viewed through the lens of a long-term relationship, moderate 
closeness would invoke a higher inclination to maintain compared to a distant one (no 
desire) or a very close one (no need to do so, because the relationship is already close). 
For psychological debt, the level of guilt or appreciation would be low for a distant one 
(do not care) or a very close one (there may be other means or occasions to 
compensate). Therefore, the utility gained by repaying a favor would be the strongest 
for moderately close friends. 
3.3. Methodology 
We conducted a randomized field experiment on a mobile physical activity 
platform for runners, henceforth referred to as RunningPlatform to maintain 
anonymity. The platform provides a Twitter-like capability that allows individuals to 
follow or be followed by others. Using this feature we are able to find pairs of friends, 
a necessary condition to test reciprocity. To ensure the quality of the randomization 
process, we assign users to groups based on their online identification numbers. 
Participants in the study are not aware of the existence of our experiment. This helps 
us avoid the well-known “Hawthorne effect” (Adair 1984) threat, where subjects who 
are aware of being observed alter their behavior. 
3.3.1. Experimental Design 
To test the effects of reciprocity, we design an experiment that follows a 
standard gift exchange process: to give, to receive, and then to reciprocate. We first 
describe how we identify user dyads, one of whom serves as a sender and the other as 





intervention date, and use a threshold of 40 km to identify potential senders.20 When 
users log into the platform, the system examines their running performance to 
determine if they qualify as senders. In both the web and mobile platforms, a qualified 
user would be directed to a page that describes the information presented in Table 3.1. 
On this page, we ask whether they would like to help their friends by forwarding a 
physical activity related challenge invitation to them. If a sender agrees to forward the 
message, the system randomly selects a friend who ran less than 40 km in the pre-
treatment period from the sender’s friend list.21 This process ensures that the receivers 
are relatively weak runners. The threshold for differentiating between senders and 
receivers ensures that the same individual is never selected as both a sender and a 
receiver, which could potentially create a confound. Furthermore, since weak runners 
are the ones most in need of motivation, we purposely select weak runners to receive 
the challenge. Indeed, it is a common practice to use capable users as a role model to 
motivate incapable ones because capable individuals show how to perform a skill and 
exhibit that a goal is attainable and desirable (Morgenroth et al. 2015).22 The receivers 
are then randomly assigned to one of three groups. A sender’s friend will receive a gift 
(a virtual gold coin) from the sender and has a chance to win a second virtual gold coin 
if he or she completes the challenge. Each gold coin represents a chance to enter a 
lottery drawing, which provides rewards such as $200 sports watches, $150 sports 
                                                
20 The threshold is based on Physical Activity Guidelines for Americans in 2008.  
21 A sender’s friend could be the sender’s follower, followee, or mutual follower. 
22 Although we select senders from the “strong” (run more than 40km in two weeks) runners, we confirm 
that strong senders’ weak friends are not different from weak runners’ weak friends. Both of them do 
not run more than 10 km in the pre-treatment two-week period; thus, reducing the concern of our sample 





shoes, $50 T-shirts and $30 socks. Figure 3.1 shows the rewards. Each sender is only 
paired with one receiver, and a receiver receives a gold coin only from one sender. 
Therefore, each pair of users is unique in our setting. The goal of the challenge is to 
motivate the receivers to increase running distances. 
We design a between-subjects experiment. The receivers do not overlap among 
groups. In the first group, the treatment group, the receiver receives a virtual gold coin 
from the sender (a gift) and is offered the chance to participate in a running challenge 
to earn a gold coin to give back to the sender. This is our Reciprocity Treatment group. 
In the second group, the Friend Control group, the receiver receives a gold coin from 
the sender and is given a chance to participate in the same challenge, but in this 
treatment, they get to keep the second gold coin for themselves. In both groups, the 
gold coin earned by completing the challenge is provided by the platform, thus the only 
difference between the Reciprocity Treatment and Friend Control groups is the 
beneficiary of the extra coin: the sender (reciprocity) or self (self-interest). Our goal is 
to examine which mechanism will be more powerful in motivating receivers to 
complete the challenge. 
We add a third group, in which the receivers receive a virtual gold coin (gift) 
from the platform and have a chance to participate in the same challenge to earn a 
second coin for themselves. We call this group the Baseline Control group. We include 
this Baseline Control group to mimic a conventional incentive program. Although the 
Friend Control group is the ideal control group to account for the gift giver’s effect and 
helps us isolate the effect of reciprocity, most conventional incentive programs do not 





typically offer enrollment rewards from a third-party (similar to a platform gift in the 
Baseline Control group) and then provide incentives for participants once they 
complete a challenge. For instance, Acland and Levy (2015) provide a first-week 
attendance reward and follow-up incentives for gym attendance and Charness and 
Gneezy (2009) offer a show-up fee and follow-up incentives for gym attendance. The 
Baseline Control group resembles such a traditional incentive program. If, for some 
reason, receiving a gift from a friend dampened rather than amplified the motivation to 
exercise, then even if we show that the Reciprocity Treatment group outperforms the 
Friend Control group, the practical significance would be limited because their effects 
might not even as good as the one in the Baseline Control group. The Baseline Control 
group thus serves as a basis for comparison, helping us measure the overall effects of 
summing up the effect of a friend’s gift and the effect of reciprocity when compared 
with the Reciprocity Treatment group and exclude the possibility that a friend’s gift 
would generate a negative effect when compared with the Friend Control group. 
One potential concern in designing these three groups is the comparability 
issue. To ensure adequate balance, receivers in all groups are chosen from senders’ 
friends lists. Recall that once a qualified user agrees to become a sender, a receiver is 
randomly selected from the sender’s friend list and randomly assigned into one of the 
three groups. Receivers in the Reciprocity Treatment and Friend Control groups receive 
the sender’s information, but such information is not disclosed to receivers in the 
Baseline Control group. Instead, users in the Baseline Control group only know that 
they receive a gold coin (gift) from RunningPlatform. This design ensures that the 





treatments rather than selection. 
Participants in all three groups receive the same challenge. According to the 
Physical Activity Guidelines for Americans (2008), individuals gain health benefits if 
they exercise for at least 150 minutes per week. One can gain additional health benefits 
when increasing aerobic physical activity to 300 minutes. Based on these guidelines, 
we ask individuals who have run less than 25 km in the pre-treatment period to 
complete a 30 km challenge over a two-week period, and we ask individuals who have 
run between 25 km and 40 km in the pre-treatment period to complete a 45 km 
challenge over a two-week period. We avoid using a customized goal for each 
individual because our objective is to promote physical activity that meets 
recommended professional guidelines. Table 3.2 shows the complete messages 
received by all the groups. 
To test for the moderating effect of the closeness between senders and receivers, 
our experimental design disallowed senders from selecting their receivers. Rather, a 
friend is randomly picked from the sender’s friend list. This ensures that there is no 
selection on the senders’ side to pick receivers, and the closeness of the dyad is 
orthogonal to the treatment. Such a design allows us to test the conditional role of social 
closeness on the effects of reciprocity. 
3.3.2. Experimental Timeline 
Figure 3.2 shows the timeline of the experiment, conducted over six weeks in 
July, August, and September 2017. In the pre-treatment period (7/24-8/6), we recorded 
all individuals’ running distances to be used for identifying senders and receivers in the 





distance for each user in the pre-treatment period to identify qualified senders, i.e., 
those whose pre-treatment running distance exceeded 40 km. For senders who agreed 
to forward this message, we sent a push notification to a randomly selected friend (the 
receivers) whose pre-treatment performance (total distance) had to be less than 40 km. 
Upon receiving the message, a receiver can decide to accept or decline this challenge. 
If a receiver does not make a decision right away, she/he can return to that page to 
decide to participate or not before the end of the pairing period. Once receivers agreed 
to accept the challenge, they undertake the challenge during the treatment period (8/21-
9/3). Each period is exactly two weeks. 
One day before the treatment period (at 9:00 am on 8/20), we sent a reminder 
message to each of the participants in all three groups about their upcoming challenge. 
The message communicated the time period for the challenge, the distance they were 
supposed to run, and the list of rewards. Each group gets unique information about the 
beneficiary after completing the challenge. Table 3.3 shows complete messages 
received by all the groups.  
During the two-week challenge period, we sent push notifications to the 
challengers thrice a week at 9:00 am on Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday. In contrast 
to daily push notifications, such a strategy has the advantage of not overly annoying 
users while maintaining a consistent reminder effect. All participants received 
messages about their accumulated distance. For individuals who had not completed the 
challenge, we encouraged them to keep running to win their friends a gold coin 
(Reciprocity Treatment group) or win themselves a second gold coin (Baseline Control 





them that their friends would win a gold coin (Reciprocity Treatment group) or they 
would win a second gold coin (Baseline Control and Friend Control groups). 
Individuals who completed the challenge did not receive the reminder message again. 
Table 3.4 shows complete messages for all the groups. 
At the end of the treatment period, we surveyed participants to elicit their 
opinions about this event and subjective measures of social closeness. To increase the 
response rate, we provided an incentive for users who complete the questionnaire; a 
chance to be entered into another lottery drawing for a $200 sports watch. The 
questionnaires were customized for different individuals based on their experimental 
group.  
3.3.3. Sample Description 
In total, 3,502 users qualified as senders, of which 2,744 agreed to forward the 
message to their friends (receivers) during the pairing period. Interestingly, a large 
majority (78.4%) were willing to serve as a sender to encourage their friends to 
participate in our challenge. Once a sender agreed to participate, we randomly assigned 
the receiver into one of the three groups based on the receiver’s online identification 
number (user_id). Among qualified users, 1,738 receivers logged in to the platform and 
read the message during the pairing period. There were 571 receivers in the Baseline 
Control group, 590 receivers in the Friend Control group, and 577 receivers in the 
Reciprocity Treatment group, respectively. Each group accounts for 32.85%, 33.95%, 
and 33.20% of total receivers. The 1,738 pairs constitute our final sample. 
The most crucial aspect of this randomized controlled trial is to ensure balance 





their location during the pre-treatment period. Figure 3.3 provides a geographical 
visualization of most of the participants23 who provide GPS information in each county 
or city. We use their latest running records to draw this graph. Individuals in all the 
groups are approximately evenly concentrated in cities such as Taipei, New Taipei 
(north), Taichung (center), and Kaohsiung (south). This provides us with preliminary 
confidence in our randomization process. We conduct a series of ANOVA analyses to 
formally test the balance among these three groups (see Table 3.5). Since we pair a 
sender and a receiver to create dyads, extra caution is needed to ensure the balance of 
sender-receiver dyads across the three groups. Therefore, we show both senders’ and 
receiver’s characteristics in Table 3.5, including pre-treatment distance, age, tenure 
from registration date, the number of races they participated in, the proportion of female 
users, and the number of online friends. The F-statistic for each variable provides 
further confidence in our randomization process.24 Finally, since the challenge type is 
based on users’ capabilities, individuals might be assigned the 30 km or the 45 km 
challenge. The results, again, show support for appropriate balance among groups. 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Experimental Results 
 Upon receiving the message, receivers can choose to accept or decline the 
challenge. The acceptance rates are 86.3% (Baseline Control group), 82.7% (Friend 
Control group), and 83.9% (Reciprocity Treatment group), respectively. Pairwise t-
                                                
23 We draw this graph by using 93.1% of participants who have GPS information. 
24 Although there is no statistical difference of the pre-treatment distances in the 30 km challenge types 
or the 45 km challenge types, respectively, we do find statistical differences when pooling these two 
types together. We address this problem by matching the groups and by controlling the inverse-





tests show no statistical differences between acceptance rates. Major individual 
characteristics such as age, gender, tenure, and the number of friends are also 
statistically identical across groups.25 Nevertheless, as a further caution against a 
selection problem, we include the declined users in the analyses. Our dependent 
variable is Complete_Challenge, which is equal to 1 when an individual’s total running 
distance during the treatment period is greater than the total distance of their predefined 
challenge (either 30 km or 45 km); 0 otherwise. Since declining the challenge indicates 
no chance to win the second gold coin, we treat this case as a failure to complete the 
challenge.26 This allows us to avoid self-selection problem when calculating the 
average treatment effects (ATE). 
We find that 30.6% of individuals in the Baseline Control group, 34.4% of 
individuals in the Friend Control group, and 40.4% of individuals in the Reciprocity 
Treatment group complete the challenge. Further analysis using t-tests show that the 
completion rate of the Reciprocity Treatment group is statistically higher than that of 
the Baseline Control group (p < 0.01) and that of the Friend Control group (p < 0.05). 
This indicates that the motivation to earn a gold coin for a friend (Reciprocity 
Treatment group) is stronger than the traditional incentive program (Baseline Control 
group) and also greater than the motivation to earn a coin for oneself while controlling 
the effects of a friend’s gift (Friend Control group).  
We formally test the average treatment effects with a Probit model:  
                                                
25 The pre-treatment distance difference is addressed later. 
26 In the additional analysis, we treat those declined individuals as normal participants and calculate 
whether they complete the challenge or not based on their predefined challenges. The results are similar 





𝑌2∗ = 	𝛽n + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	2 + Σ𝛽q𝑍2 + 𝜀2 
𝑌2 = 1	[𝑌2∗ > 0] 
(1) 
where 𝑌2∗ is the key dependent variable, Complete_Challenge, indicating 
whether an individual completes the challenge or not. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	2 is the Reciprocity 
Treatment group as compared to the Friend Control or Baseline Control groups, 
respectively.27 𝑍2 indicates both senders’ and receivers’ characteristics, including pre-
treatment distance, the number of friends, gender (female), age, tenure, and the number 
of races participated, and the type of challenge (30 km or 45 km) that the participant 
was assigned to. 𝜀2 is the error term for individual observation i. Results are reported 
in Table 3.6. In the odd columns we show the results of comparing the Reciprocity 
Treatment and Baseline Control groups, and in the even columns the results of 
comparing the Reciprocity Treatment and Friend Control groups. In Column (1), the 
Baseline Control group is the default group. The results show that the Reciprocity 
Treatment group’s completion rate is positive and significant at p < 0.01 level as 
compared to the Baseline Control group. The marginal effect of reciprocity is 9.8%. 
Since the completion rate of the Baseline Control group is 30.6%, reciprocity leads to 
a sizable 32.0% increase in the completion rate. The regression shows that changing 
the identity of the gift giver from the platform (a third party) to a friend and leveraging 
the effect of reciprocity can dramatically improve the performance of a traditional 
incentive program without incurring extra costs. In Column (2), the Friend Control 
group is the default group. The results show that the Reciprocity Treatment group’s 
                                                
27 The results are broadly similar if we include three groups in the same models. We present them 





completion rate is positive and significant at p < 0.05 level. The marginal effect of 
reciprocity is 7.0%. Since the completion rate of the Friend Control group is 34.3%, 
reciprocity leads to a 20.4% increase in the completion rate. The regression shows that 
after controlling for the effect of the gift giver, the pure effect of reciprocity still 
outperforms an incentive scheme that is based on a self-interest mechanism. 
Recall that we treat individuals who do not participate in our treatment as a 
failure in Table 3.6 Columns (1) and (2). One potential concern may be that individuals 
who decline our invitation were also affected by the message in regard to their physical 
activity and treating them as failures might not be appropriate. To address this concern, 
we release this constraint by treating them in the same way as individuals who 
participate. As long as their running distance in the treatment period is greater than the 
challenge distance, we treat them as having completed the challenge. The completion 
rates after removing the constraint are 33.6%, 36.6%, and 42.4% in the Baseline 
Control, Friend Control, and Reciprocity Treatment groups, respectively. Columns (3) 
and (4) show the results. Similar to the main results, the Reciprocity Treatment group 
outperforms both Baseline Control (p < 0.01) and Friend Control groups (p < 0.05). 
The marginal effects of the Reciprocity Treatment group are 8.83% in Column (3) and 
7.02% in Column (4), respectively. Thus, our results are robust to alternate measures 
of Complete_Challenge. 
In Columns (1) to (4), we included participants who declined in the analyses. 
Although the overarching goal of our treatments is to evaluate the average impacts of 
a reciprocity-based intervention on healthy behavior, it is particularly important for a 





who choose to participate. Therefore, we are interested in quantifying the average 
treatment effects in the treated (ATT). We conduct the analysis by excluding 
individuals who decline our invitations. Table 3.6 Columns (5) and (6) show the results. 
Although the average completion rates are higher when we calculate these rates on the 
subset of treated participants (35.5% in the Baseline Control group, 41.6% in the Friend 
Control group and 48.1% in the Reciprocity Treatment group), the marginal effects for 
the Reciprocity Treatment group as compared to the mean completion rates in the 
Baseline Control and Friend Control groups are similar to the main models (37.0% 
increase as compared to the Baseline Control group and 18.6% increase as compared 
to the Friend Control group). Since more than 84% of participants accepted the 
challenge, it is not surprising to find a similar magnitude of ATE and ATT. 
Figure 3.4 shows the cumulative challenge completion rate across the 14-day 
treatment period. The Reciprocity Treatment group outperforms the other two groups 
throughout. Over the course of the treatment period, there are a higher proportion of 
individuals in the Reciprocity Treatment group who complete the challenge than 
individuals in the other two groups. This shows that the effect of reciprocity is 
consistent across time and that the reciprocity-based incentive does not generate a 
short-term booster effect such as running in the last few days to complete the challenge. 
Our results are therefore informative for the missing link of the role of duration in 
reciprocity that Gneezy and List (2006) highlight. This is especially essential to help 





3.4.2. The Curvilinear Relationship of Closeness and Reciprocity 
Because reciprocity is fundamentally a response to social rules, we expected 
that its effects would not be uniformly distributed across receivers in the Reciprocity 
Treatment group; rather they would be conditional on the social closeness between 
senders and receivers. To examine this conjecture, we construct a closeness index 
(ClosenessIndex), drawing on insights from prior work, that comprises the interaction 
between senders and receivers to capture social contexts (Aral and Walker 2014). We 
create this index as a summative measure of the following variables (each of which is 
binary): whether a sender and a receiver are in a common online running club, whether 
a sender and a receiver have attended the same marathon race before, whether a sender 
and a receiver mutually follow each other, whether a receiver has pressed like on a 
sender’s running record in the past half year28. The common online running club and 
common races reflect the shared experience between a sender and a receiver (Aral and 
Walker 2014). Mutually following each other is a variable constructed from the 
network structure and has been used to represent the strength of a tie (e.g., Shi et al. 
2014). The likes behaviors represent receiver’s positive association with the sender 
(Kosinski et al. 2013), representing receivers’ fondness toward senders.29 We avoid 
using the continuous form of the number of likes because it would be affected by the 
length of the relationship. The range of the closeness index is from zero to four, with 
zero indicating low closeness and four representing a close relationship. 
                                                
28 The like feature in the platform is similar to Facebook’s feature. Results are robust to different time 
periods (3-months and 1-year) for constructing this measure.  
29 It could be argued that senders’ like on receivers also represents a positive signal of closeness between 
pairs. Adding an extra variable, whether a sender has pressed like on a receiver’s running record in the 





We test the curvilinear relationship in the Reciprocity Treatment group by using 
the following model suggested by Haans et al. (2016): 
𝑌2∗ = 	𝛽n + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥	2 + 𝛽: ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥	2: + Σ𝛽q𝑍2 + 𝜀2 
𝑌2 = 1	[𝑌2∗ > 0] 
(3) 
where the dependent variable and the control variables are the same as in the 
main models. Note that we disallowed senders to pick friends during the pairing period, 
and receivers are randomly selected from a sender’s friends list. Therefore, the social 
closeness (ClosenessIndex) between senders and receivers is exogenous in our setting. 
To confirm this, we conducted ANOVA analyses to examine both senders’ and 
receivers’ pre-treatment distances across different levels of closeness. The F-statistics 
show that both senders’ (p = 0.57) and receivers’ pre-treatment distances (p = 0.45) are 
balanced among different levels of closeness. Table 3.7 Column (1) shows the results 
of equation (3). The significant and negative sign of the squared term of the 
ClosenessIndex indicates an inverted U-shaped relationship (p < 0.01).30 Although it is 
necessary for the squared term to be significant in order to establish the presence of a 
U-shaped relationship, it alone is not sufficient (Haans et al. 2016). We conducted a 
formal test for an inverted U-shaped relationship as described by Lind and Mehlum 
(2010) and confirmed that there is an inverted U-shaped effect of ClosenessIndex on 
completion rate.  
Figure 3.5 visually illustrates this relationship. We can clearly discern that when 
senders and receivers are very distant and very close, the challenge completion rates 
                                                
30 To alleviate the concern of skewness, we also test the model by removing or replacing extreme values 





are roughly 30%, but when senders and receivers are moderately close, the challenge 
completion rate reaches above 45%. As noted previously, we interpret this finding as 
follows: for distant friends, reciprocity may be less effective because there is no strong 
need for participants to maintain a long-term relationship or seek future interaction. For 
close friends, the weaker effect is likely because individuals do not worry about 
jeopardizing the relationship even if they fail to complete the challenge or because they 
can easily pay back the favor through other offline interactions. We also examine the 
curvilinear relationship for the other two groups. As we would expect, such an inverted 
U-shaped relationship does not exist in the Baseline Control and Friend Control groups 
because there is no concern about maintaining a long-term relationship between senders 
and receivers when failing to complete the challenge. 
3.4.3. Addressing the Diminishing Marginal Returns Concern 
One might legitimately conjecture that the Reciprocity Treatment group 
outperforms the Friend Control group because of the law of diminishing marginal 
returns. That is, individuals in the Friend Control group might value the second virtual 
gold coin less because they already own one and, as a result, exert less effort to 
complete the challenge. If that were the case, the effect of reciprocity could be 
overestimated. To examine this possibility, we tested another treatment during the pilot 
test conducted in May 2017 prior to the full experiment. Individuals in this group do 
not receive a gold coin (“a gift”); rather, they only receive a message from the platform 
inviting them to complete the challenge and win a gold coin. Thus, the receiver does 





more. This helps us assess the effectiveness of the first gold coin in the self-interest 
scheme. We call this group the No Gift group.  
In the pilot test, we only included the Friend Control and Reciprocity Treatment 
groups, in addition to the No Gift group. A similar concern in designing these three 
groups is the comparability issue. As in the full experiment, a receiver was randomly 
selected from the sender’s friends list and randomly assigned into one of these three 
groups. Receivers in the Reciprocity Treatment and Friend Control groups receive the 
sender’s information, but such information is not disclosed to receivers in the No Gift 
group. Users in the No Gift group only see a challenge invitation from the platform. 
Individuals in the No Gift or Friend Control group are facing the same 
challenge, and winning the challenge would give them the same reward (a virtual gold 
coin). If diminishing marginal returns exist, then the second virtual gold coin should be 
valued less than the first virtual gold coin sent from a friend. Therefore, the motivation 
of the Friend Control group users to win the second gold coin should be weaker than 
that of the No Gift group users. However, contrary to this conjecture, we find that the 
Friend Control group (36.3%) outperforms the No Gift group (30.9%), although the 
result was not statistically significant; likely as a result of the smaller sample size. This 
helps alleviate the concern about potential diminishing marginal returns. 
3.4.4. Addressing Imbalance in the Pre-treatment Distances 
3.4.4.1. Matching 
Although we use individuals’ online user identification that should be 
orthogonal to individuals’ characteristics to do the randomization, we find that 





in the pre-treatment period.31 One might be concerned that since runners’ performance 
is an important factor in challenge completion, the imbalance between the Friend 
Control and Reciprocity Treatment groups might bias outcomes. We conduct additional 
analyses to address this issue. However, before showing the additional analyses, we 
note that since individuals in the Friend Control group have higher performance than 
individuals in the Reciprocity Treatment group, individuals’ completion challenge rate 
in the Friend Control group should be higher than individuals in the Reciprocity 
Treatment group because it is easier to complete the challenge.32 Therefore, our results 
do not overestimate the effects of reciprocity, rather, if pre-treatment performance 
affects our results, we underestimate the effects of reciprocity. 
We perform two additional sets of analyses to further alleviate this concern: 
propensity score matching (PSM) and inverse probability weighting (IPW). We use 
PSM to match the Friend Control and Reciprocity Treatment groups using individuals’ 
characteristics to calculate the propensity score in the first stage Probit model, including 
the pre-treatment distance, the number of friends, gender (female), age, tenure, the 
number of races participated, and the types of challenge (30 km or 45 km) that the 
participant was assigned to. Before matching, individuals in the Friend Control group 
run 20.13 km in the pre-treatment period, which is higher than the 18.59 km of 
individuals in the Reciprocity Treatment group in the pre-treatment period (p < 0.05). 
                                                
31 Since Friend Control is the ideal control group that controls the effects of friend’s gifts, we only discuss 
Friend Control and Reciprocity Treatment in this section. 
32 To calculate the level of difficulty in completing a challenge, we calculate the difference between 
individuals’ pre-treatment distances and the challenge goal. The higher this number, the harder the 
challenge. On average, individuals in the Friend Control group only need to run 14.88 km to complete 
the challenge and individuals in the Reciprocity Treatment group need to run 15.67 km to do so. The 
differences are statistically significant, indicating that individuals in the Friend Control group are likely 





After matching, individuals in the Friend Control and Reciprocity Treatment groups 
run 18.81 km and 19.29 km in the pre-treatment period, respectively. The difference is 
not statistically significant.33 We confirm that all the other characteristics are not 
statistically different in Table 3.8. Table 3.9 shows the regression results. Column (1) 
shows that individuals’ completion rate in the Reciprocity Treatment group is higher 
than that in the Friend Control group (p < 0.05). The marginal effects show an 8.9% 
difference. Considering the average completion rate in the matched Friend Control 
group is 32.4%, the effect of reciprocity results in a 27.5% increase. The increase is 
higher than what we estimated in the main model (20.4%), which further support the 
arguments that our main results are indeed underestimating the effects of reciprocity. 
An alternative method to address the problem of imbalance is to employ 
inverse-probability weighting (IPW). We use IPW to reduce the bias of unweighted 
estimators. We deployed a two-step approach to calculate IPW estimators: a Probit 
model to estimate inverse-probability weights by using individuals’ characteristics; 
followed by computing the average treatments effects using the estimated inverse-
probability weights. After including IPW in the model, we find that the average 
treatment effect between the Friend Control and Reciprocity Treatment groups is 7.0% 
(p < 0.05), which is roughly equivalent in magnitude to the results from the main model. 
3.4.4.2. Performance Comparisons 
 The purpose of our experiment is to examine if individuals increase their 
performance in terms of total running distances under different manipulations. Since 
                                                
33 In addition, the difference between individuals’ pre-treatment distances and the goal in the two groups 
is not statistically different. This means the level of difficulty in completing the challenge, on average, 





there is an imbalance in pre-treatment distances among groups, directly comparing 
individuals’ performance during the treatment period between groups might be 
misleading. As before, we first employ the PSM to find a matched sample. Before 
presenting results, we visually examine the cumulative probability of individuals’ total 
running distances in the treatment period using the matched samples. Figure 3.6 shows 
that the cumulative probability of the Reciprocity Treatment group is shifted to the right 
as compared to that of the Friend Control group34, showing better overall performance 
than the Friend Control group. The horizontal line indicates a cumulative probability 
at 50%. The median distances are 20.0 km and 26.3 km in the Friend Control and 
Reciprocity Treatment groups, respectively. 
Results in Table 3.9 Column (2) show that individuals’ performance35(total 
running distance in the treatment period) in the Reciprocity Treatment group is superior 
to that in the Friend Control group when using the matched sample. On average, 
individuals in the Reciprocity Treatment group can run 3.06 km more than those in the 
Friend Control group (p < 0.05). Considering the average distance that subjects in the 
Friend Control group ran in the treatment period (26.55 km), this represents an 11.50% 
increase. Likewise, we employ IPW in the model and find that the average treatment 
effect between the Reciprocity Treatment and Friend Control groups is 2.26 km. 
3.4.5. Robustness Checks 
 In the results reported thus far, our findings remain remarkably consistent 
across a variety of models (e.g., addressing imbalance through the use of PSM 
                                                
34 We exclude top 5% of users in both groups to better present the graph. 
35 We also analyzed other measures performance, viz., improvement from the pre-treatment period and 





matching and IPW analysis, using performance as an alternative measure to examine 
the treatment effect through the OLS model) and alternative measures (such as those 
for the closeness index). We further conduct an additional series of robustness checks 
to eliminate alternative explanations. 
3.4.5.1. Mitigating the Potential of Cheating Behavior 
 While an important aspect of the novelty of this study is our ability to track 
individuals’ running records using digital devices such as smartphones or wearable 
technologies, there may be a concern related to the potential for cheating. Despite the 
fact that the platform supports multiple devices, some users may develop a habit of 
using the traditional method, which is to manually input the distance they run through 
the web or mobile interface. To the degree these are self-reported, one might question 
the veracity of the data. To alleviate this concern, we retain individuals who only use 
the digital devices to automatically record running distances and examine their 
outcomes. There are 9.3%, 9.2%, and 9.0% of individuals in the Baseline Control, 
Friend Control, and Reciprocity Treatment groups, respectively, who have some 
manual running records during the treatment period. The proportions are not 
statistically different. After excluding those individuals, we find that the challenge 
completion rates are 28.6%, 32.3%, and 38.7% in the Baseline Control, Friend Control, 
and Reciprocity Treatment groups, respectively. Table 3.10 Columns (1) and (2) show 
the results. The results are qualitatively similar to the main results. As we have shown 
previously, the Reciprocity Treatment group is statistically better than the Baseline 





Besides manually manipulating running records, there are other possible 
cheating methods such as driving a car while turning on the mobile application. To 
alleviate this concern, we only retain individuals who keep all their records publicly 
visible. The platform allows individuals to keep their records private or reveal their 
running records to the public and to the user’s friends. We assume that the visibility of 
running records creates a moral obligation to tell the truth. Studies have suggested that 
the observability can change individuals’ behaviors (Exley and Naecker 2016), and 
publicly violating prevailing social norms can result in shame or guilt (Bicchieri 2005). 
We keep individuals who always reveal their records to the public or their friends and 
run a subsample analysis. Only 6.7%, 5.6%, and 7.3% of individuals in the Baseline 
Control, Friend Control, and Reciprocity Treatment groups, respectively, posted some 
private running records during the treatment period. The proportions are not 
statistically different. After excluding those individuals, we find that the challenge 
completion rates are 30.2%, 34.3%, and 39.8% in the Baseline Control, Friend Control, 
and Reciprocity Treatment groups, respectively. Table 3.10 Columns (3) and (4) show 
the results. Consistent with the main findings, the Reciprocity Treatment group 
significantly outperforms the Baseline Control group (p < 0.01) and the Friend Control 
group (p < 0.05) in terms of challenge completion rate. 
3.4.5.2. Retaining Persistent Weak Runners 
A potential concern with our treatment is that we only observe individuals’ 
performance for two weeks and use this pre-treatment performance as a criterion 
(below 40 km) to find the weak runners as receivers. Since it is possible that 





choose a receiver who is actually a capable runner but taking a short break during the 
pre-treatment period. To address this concern, we trace individuals’ running behaviors 
back to eight weeks (roughly two months) and only retain individuals who registered 
at least eight weeks before the treatment period. We apply the same criterion and 
include only those individuals whose average two-week running distance over eight 
weeks is smaller than 40 km in our subsample. The results of the subsample analyses 
are shown in Table 3.10 Columns (5) and (6) and are statistically significant. The 
marginal effects show an 8.0% and a 6.6% difference, respectively. Considering the 
average completion rates are 29.4% in Baseline Control group and 31.40% in Friend 
Control group, this is a 27.2% and 21.0% increase. The results indicate that the 
treatment effect of reciprocity on persistent weak runners is as strong as the effect on 
the whole sample. 
3.4.5.3. Alternative Measures of Closeness 
Our theoretical arguments proposed a key conditioning role for the social 
closeness between the senders and the receivers. We used a multi-dimensional index to 
operationalize closeness, and tested the robustness of this relationship using alternative 
operationalization of the index. To further ensure the robustness of this index, we re-
estimate the relationship using alternative measures suggested in prior literature. We 
measure the number of days senders and receivers know each other 
(DaysKnowEachOther36) to gauge the length of their friendship (Gilbert and 
Karahalios 2009) as a proxy for social distance. Chen et al. (2009) also use the length 
of time participants know the other person to measure the level of closeness of 
                                                





relationships between friends. We calculate the number of days since a sender and a 
receiver first built a social connection on the platform (either followed or be followed) 
until the last date of pre-treatment period. Table 3.7 Column (2) shows the results. 
Consistent with ClosenessIndex, DaysKnowEachOther shows an inverted U-shaped 
relationship of reciprocity on completion rate (p < 0.05).  
A second alternative to conceptualize social closeness is to consider the network 
structure. The number of common friends between senders and receivers 
(CommonFriends37) has long been used to measure the level of trust and cooperation 
in relationships (see more discussion in Aral and Walker 2014). To measure 
CommonFriends, we compare all the friends38 of a pair comprised of a receiver and a 
sender and calculate the number of common friends shared by receivers and senders. 
Table 3.7 Column (3) shows the results. The number of common friends shows a 
similar inverted U-Shaped relationship (p < 0.05). 
The Pearson correlation coefficient between ClosenessIndex and 
DaysKnowEachOther is 0.21 (p < 0.01), and that between ClosenessIndex and 
CommonFriends is 0.39 (p < 0.01), indicating small to medium strength correlations 
between ClosenessIndex and the other two variables (Cohen 1988). We see that 
ClosenessIndex correlates with these two measures, but not to a large extent. The results 
suggest that although, as might be expected, the shared social contexts between senders 
and receivers (ClosenessIndex) are positively correlated with other types of 
interpersonal relationship, they are not indistinguishable from each other. This 
                                                
37 We take a natural logarithm transformation of this variable to address skewness. 





alleviates the potential concern that all three variables measure the same facet of the 
social closeness between senders and receivers. 
 3.4.5.4. Falsification Test 
Independent of the magnitude, individuals in each of our groups increase their 
performance, indicating the success of our manipulation. One potential concern might 
be that the observed improvement is not a result of individuals’ intrinsic motivation, 
but rather caused by unobserved external environmental factors such as good weather. 
We address this concern as follows. We find one group of users that can suitably serve 
as a control for such external factors. Because each receiver is paired with a sender; we 
are able to use the sender as a control group to see whether they also improve their 
performance during this period. Since the senders’ role is to simply forward a message 
to their friends, it is unlikely that they would change their behaviors because of our 
intervention. Figure 3.7 shows that the senders do not improve. In fact, senders show a 
modest decline in performance. The results further support the efficacy of the 
intervention. 
We further confirm if the weather conditions in the pre-treatment and treatment 
periods are similar. The average temperatures in both periods are 28.9°C (83.9°F) and 
28.6°C (83.5°F). The average precipitation hour is 2.8 hours and 2.6 hours for a total 
of 14 days, and the humidity level is 79.4% and 78.2%. Since the weather conditions 
are similar between these two periods, the increased distance can be attributed to our 





3.4.6. Post-treatment Surveys 
 Our main analyses have focused on directly comparing the effects of the 
treatments through observable, objective measures. While observability increases the 
rigor of our analysis, it does not provide deep insights into study participants’ 
perceptions about the treatment, such as their motivations to participate in the 
challenge, the subjective perception of closeness, and their emotions during the 
treatment period. To gain such insights that may further enhance interpretation of 
findings, we conducted a post-treatment survey that was distributed electronically to 
all individuals participating in the challenge. A total of 526 participants completed the 
survey for an overall response rate of 35.9%; and 33.9%, 39.5%, and 34.3% in Baseline 
Control, Friend Control, and Reciprocity Treatment groups, respectively.39 Not 
surprisingly, individuals who complete the challenges were more likely to respond: the 
challenge completion rate is 73.0% among all the respondents. 
Using the survey data, we first explore what motivates individuals to participate 
in the challenge. We asked respondents to select all possible reasons from a pick-list of 
four, five, and seven potential motivations in the Baseline Control, Friend Control, and 
Reciprocity Treatment groups. On top of the four general motivations such as 
interesting and healthy, one additional motivation related to social comparison was 
added in the Friend Control group, and two additional reciprocity related motivations 
were added in the Reciprocity Treatment group. In the Baseline Control and Friend 
Control groups, “this challenge is beneficial for my health” ranks as the top reason to 
participate (62.9% in the Baseline Control and 62.7% in the Friend Control groups), 
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followed by “this challenge is interesting” (50.9% in the Baseline Control and 56.5% 
in the Friend Control groups). In the Reciprocity Treatment group, these two reasons 
receive an affirmative response from 53.0% (Healthy) and 49.4% (Interesting), 
respectively. Besides general reasons to attend the challenge, we added two items that 
related to reciprocity in the Reciprocity Treatment group: showing gratitude (Palmatier 
et al. 2009) or avoiding guilt (Dahl et al. 2005). There were 74 votes (44.6%) for “I feel 
guilty toward my friend who sends me a gold coin if I did not win a gold coin” and 107 
votes (64.5%) for “I would like to express my gratitude to my friend who sends me a 
gold coin” among 166 respondents in Reciprocity Treatment group. Although these 
motivations are not mutually exclusive, the statistics indicate that the majority of 
participants in the Reciprocity Treatment group undertake the challenge as a way to 
express gratitude, which is especially beneficial in our setting because it helps 
strengthen the social connections between senders and receivers, an essential element 
for long-term health of participants and for the sustainability of the platform. 
To the extent that our study is motivated by the need to induce healthy behavior 
using interventions that are effective, it is important to understand if there are potential 
negative side-effects associated with the treatments. One possible side-effect of using 
the reciprocity to motivate individuals is to incur negative feeling such as stress, 
frustration, or guilt if receivers cannot complete the challenge. We ask respondents to 
indicate how they felt during the challenge, including both negative and positive 
emotions such as finding the challenge stressful, experiencing self-doubt, feeling 
frustrated, experiencing guilt, and feeling joyful, energetic, and content (Shaver et al. 





differences between the Friend Control and Reciprocity Treatment groups for both 
negative and positive emotions. These results alleviate the problem of possible side 
effects associated with the use of a reciprocity-based incentive. 
 Finally, in the main analysis and robustness checks, we used three objective 
measures to gauge social closeness. In the survey, we complement these measures with 
the “Inclusion of Other in the Self” (IOS) scale, which provides a subjective assessment 
of the perceived closeness of a relationship (Aron et al. 1992). We ask respondents 
(who are the receivers) to select the nature of the relationship between them and their 
sender “friend” in the experiment from seven graphs (see Appendix Figure A2). In each 
of the graphs, one circle refers to the participant and the other to the friend who sent 
the participant a gold coin. Different degrees of overlap correspond to different levels 
of perceived closeness in the relationship, quantified on a scale of 1-7. We use this 
measure to test the inverted U-shaped relationship the social closeness on reciprocity. 
Table 3.7 Column (4) shows the results. The results are consistent; as before, we find 
an inverted U-shaped relationship (p < 0.05). Our finding of the key conditioning effect 
of closeness and the specific form of this effect is consistent across multiple observable 
and subjective measures, further enhancing confidence in the findings. 
3.5. Discussion 
Finding effective interventions that can motivate positive behavior change for 
health-related behaviors has the potential to enhance economic and societal welfare. 
Researchers and policymakers are increasingly asking for more evidence in support of 
what incentives work and under what conditions (Blumenthal et al. 2013). We proposed 





financial incentive based intervention and tested its effects in a large-scale randomized 
controlled trial with over 1,700 pairs of users. We find that reciprocity outperforms 
self-interest in terms of challenge completion rates and running distances. We show 
that a friend’s gift and a reciprocity-based incentive (the Reciprocity Treatment group) 
can boost performance relative to a conventional incentive program (the Baseline 
Control group) by 32.0%. We further find that, after controlling for the effects of a 
friend’s gift, a reciprocity-based incentive can still improve the challenge completion 
rate by 20.4% as compared to a self-interest based incentive. Our results provide strong 
evidence to support the effectiveness of a reciprocity-based incentive, a new form of 
commitment device for healthy behavior change.  
A key result from our study is that the effects of reciprocity and heterogeneously 
manifest, conditional on the nature of the interpersonal relationship between the gift 
exchange dyad. We find an inverted U-shaped relationship of the social closeness 
between senders and receivers on challenge completion rates. We interpret these results 
through the lens of relationship maintenance. For distant friends, the aspiration to build 
a long-term relationship is low and for close friends, a strong relationship is already 
established with or without completing this challenge to maintain it. In this study, we 
randomly pick friends as receivers for senders to test the conditional effects of social 
closeness. If we did not manipulate the randomization process, a reasonable conjecture 
is that a sender would choose a friend she/he is close to. However, our results show that 
such close pairs might not yield the best results because the effects are inferior to 





practitioners to identify optimal pairs to precisely motivate each individual and 
maximize the effects of reciprocity in real-world settings. 
We acknowledge some limitations of our field experiment and discuss 
promising opportunities for future work. First, the treatment period for our challenge 
only spans two weeks. This duration might not be long enough to foster a long-term 
healthy habit, although we note that this observation period is longer and the observed 
behavior more effortful than the majority of prior studies on reciprocity. While we 
believe that the need to reciprocate to friends is essential to maintain the interpersonal 
relationship, whether the same value of gifts and the obligation to return can be 
generalized to a longer-period challenge is still an empirical question. An interesting 
question for future research would be to explore if multiple reciprocity-based 
interventions are unnecessary in order for long-term habits to develop.  
Second, while most gift-exchange literature uses a monetary incentive to induce 
behavior changes, studies exploring the effects of non-monetary incentives have started 
to attract attention (Kube et al. 2012). Our study used a non-monetary incentive, a 
virtual gold coin for a lottery drawing to win sports accessories. A lottery represents an 
uncertain gift with a probability of winning gifts, in contrast to a guaranteed gift such 
as water bottle. It is not clear whether the effect of reciprocity would be conditional on 
the types of gifts or what would be an optimal gift to increase individuals’ performance. 
Our study can be extended by changing the value of the gifts (small vs. large gifts) and 
the types of gifts (monetary vs. non-monetary gifts; certain vs. non-certain gifts). 
Third, our experiment was conducted in the setting of an online platform. 





connections and running records, we are not able to observe activities that happened 
offline. For instance, we are not able to tell whether individuals who fail to reciprocate 
their friends’ gift would compensate their friends offline, such as buying senders a 
meal. The unobservability of offline behaviors might lead to an underestimation of our 
experimental results, which is a typical constraint for a less controllable but more 
realistic field experiment as compared to a lab experiment. 
Fourth, from the game design perspective, there are other conditions worthy of 
study. For instance, our current research design cannot fully differentiate between 
reciprocity and altruism. Although we argued that the treatment effect is caused by the 
desire to return the gift out a sense of obligation, we cannot completely rule out the 
possibility that the behavior is a result of altruism. A future direction to separate these 
two effects might be to include another group, in which individuals can earn a virtual 
gold coin and have a right to decide whether they want to keep this earned virtual gold 
coin, reciprocate back to the senders, or forward to other friends. Relatedly, our design 
does not allow us to determine whether a sender-receiver (pair) design is better than a 
non-pair design. For example, one can design another control group to randomly pick 
individuals to participate in the challenge and win two virtual gold coins (double 
incentives). The overall spending would be exactly the same as the treatment group’s 
spending, but this design does not use dyads. Future studies could build on the evidence 
presented here to conduct additional experiments that are able to isolate such effects.  
Fifth, our experiment was conducted in physical activity context. While we 
believe that the underlying psychological and economic mechanisms of reciprocity 





strongly affected by many other factors. More empirical evidence is needed to examine 
whether reciprocity outperforms self-interest in fields such as glucose monitoring or 
hypertension control. 
Finally, since the pairs of users in our platform are already online friends, our 
test of the curvilinear relationship of closeness is shifted to the right because we are not 
able to observe a pair of complete strangers. Although we cannot find a pair of complete 
strangers, the limitation might not be a major concern. In this study, we have shown 
that a moderate closeness between senders and receivers would be stronger than a 
distant one. There is no valid reason to believe that the obligation to return favors to 
total strangers would be stronger than to moderately close friends. Furthermore, to 
leverage the power of reciprocity, we need to rely on individuals’ social connections. 
A pair comprised of complete strangers would not be suitable to apply a reciprocity-
based incentive. 
 In conclusion, this study harnesses the power of modern wearable and mobile 
technologies, which are increasingly being used in wellness programs (Claxton et al. 
2016; Handel and Kolstad 2017). These devices, technologies, and social networks 
allow us to precisely track users’ behaviors and pair senders and receivers. Leveraging 
these features, we designed a new incentive based on reciprocity and conducted a 
randomized controlled experiment to test its effectiveness. We provide evidence that a 
reciprocity-based design can substantially improve the cost-effectiveness of a 
conventional incentive program and if identified appropriately, judicious choice of 
pairs of senders and receivers would further strengthen such effects. From the 





increasingly important to gain a better understanding of how interventions can be more 
accurately customized for individuals. Our field experiment provides useful evidence 







Chapter 4: Does Computer Ownership Cause Income Mobility? 
Spillover Effects and the Role of Caste in India 
Abstract 
Income mobility is an important metric to assess the equality of opportunity to 
move along the economic and social ladders, and has significant implications for both 
public policy and individual well-being. This study uses a newly available and high-
quality panel data to study income mobility in India between 2005 and 2011, and the 
role of computer ownership and caste to explain observed patterns in income mobility 
of households. We discuss determinants of income mobility and assess the extent to 
which computer ownership influenced income mobility in India at a time when it 
experienced significant adoption and diffusion of computers. Our main findings show 
that households experiencing a positive change in computer ownership have a higher 
probability of moving upward in terms of their income quintiles, indicating a possible 
role of technology to overcome the poverty trap, among other reasons. We also find 
that beyond private returns to focal households, computer ownership also creates social 
returns to other households in the same neighborhood. Our analyses of information 
technology (IT) externalities and spillovers suggest that computerization from the same 
caste group in a neighborhood has a significantly positive spillover effect on upward 
income mobility. These findings underscore the need to consider social interactions and 
social embeddedness for a more complete understanding of returns on digitization. We 
discuss the implications of our findings for research and policies related to digitization, 
human capital, and income mobility. 
 
Keywords: Computer ownership, India, Income mobility, Technology literacy, IT 
spillover, Caste 
4.1. Introduction 
Reducing poverty and income inequality have long been major concerns for 
policy makers. The traditional measures for gauging the distribution of income such as 
Gini coefficient or Theil index for cross-sectional data (Deininger and Squire 1996; 
Theil 1967) provide a useful but static view of income inequality. Therefore, 
increasingly there is a growing attention on income mobility (Chetty et al. 2014; 
Lukiyanova and Oshchepkov 2012), which is considered a more dynamic way to gauge 
inequality in income distribution over time. An interesting way to conceptualize 





in Sawhill and Condon 1992; Schumpeter 1955, p. 126). Imagine that at time t1, the 
rooms in the hotel are occupied, but the occupants receive unequal accommodations 
regarding the quality of rooms. Suppose we revisit occupants who still live in the hotel 
at a later time t2, mobility will inform us the extent to which occupants had 
opportunities to move between rooms over time. Fairness means that occupants living 
in shabby rooms had a chance to move to the ordinary or luxurious rooms, and people 
living in the luxurious rooms did not have an entitlement to occupy them all the time.  
The main constraint to study a dynamic view of income distribution is the 
paucity of relevant panel data from the same entity at two or more points of time to 
analyze the change in economic well-being such as income or consumption. It is 
therefore not a surprise that despite significant progress in understanding the value of 
IT at multiple levels, we know very little whether computers contribute to income 
mobility, a critical metric from a policy and individual viewpoint. To the extent many 
emerging economies are deploying computers and trying to digitize their economy, it 
is important to know whether computer ownership can help with upward income 
mobility. This question is particularly important in the Indian context where the 
government is pushing toward further digitization as part of its “Digital India” initiative 
(Economic Survey of India 2015; Ghosh 2015; Liu and Mithas 2016; Srivastava and 
Roche 2015).40 
In this study, we utilize two recent waves of nationally representative and very 
high quality Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS) data from India between 2005 
and 2011 to construct a dynamic view of income mobility in India (Desai and 
                                                





Vanneman 2016; Desai et al. 2016). Our work focuses on micro-level income mobility, 
which examines income change between two time points for the same households. We 
focus on the issue of income mobility as it relates to information technology (IT), 
extending and complementing prior literature which tends to study income mobility 
considering human capital, social economic status, or labor market (Buchinsky et al. 
2003; Cuesta et al. 2011; Dartanto and Nurkholis 2013; Woolard and Klasen 2005).  
Our study makes at least two contributions. First, this study is perhaps among 
the first in the information systems literature to investigate the impact of computer 
ownership on income mobility after controlling for determinants that have been 
extensively studied such as human capital and economic status. Prior literature 
documents private returns regarding wage premiums due to computer literacy mainly 
from a static viewpoint (Dolton and Makepeace 2004; Krueger 1993); our research 
extends that to provide evidence from the dynamic perspective. Second, in addition to 
examining private returns to computer ownership, we view the relationship between 
computer ownership and income mobility through the lens of the social interaction 
process.  
We pose the following question: Does digitization generate any positive 
externalities or social returns when it comes to income mobility? In other words, does 
the proportions of computer ownership in the same community (e.g., district in India) 
influence focal family’s economic mobility? To preview our key results, we find that 
the computer ownership brings not only private returns to households but also social 
returns to other households. The direct effect of owning a computer is associated with 





addition, every 1% increase in computer ownership in a district is associated with an 
increase of 0.11% in upward income mobility, providing support for the notion of 
positive externalities in computer ownership. For further insights, we decompose the 
spillover effects in two parts: the effect from the same caste or religious group and the 
effect from other caste or religious groups. For these analyses, we leverage the presence 
of caste system in India, a system of social stratification that similar to other social 
stratification systems limits interactions among different social groups. We argue that 
IT spillover should be stronger when interacting members belong to the same caste or 
religious group than when members belong to other caste or religious groups. Our 
empirical results show support for the argument that an increase in the proportion of 
households from same caste or religious groups owning computers exerts a positive 
and strong effect on other households' income mobility. Every 1% increase in owning 
a computer in a district from the same caste group is associated with an increase of 
0.10% in upward mobility. However, the effect of computer ownerships from the other 
caste groups is not statistically different from zero. A Wald test show a significant 
difference of computer ownership in a district between the same caste group and 
different caste groups. Taken together, these results indicate that social returns of 
computer ownership exist when there is an effective social interaction process. 
4.2. Background and Theoretical Framework 
4.2.1 Prior Literature 
Three streams of literature frame the background of our strudy. First, because 
of its centrality and policy importance, income mobility has received significant 





world such as China (Ding and Wang 2008; Shi et al. 2010), Russia (Lukiyanova and 
Oshchepkov 2012), Britain (Jarvis and Jenkins 1995), France (Buchinsky et al. 2003), 
and Latin America countries (Cuesta et al. 2011).  
Among studies that focus on India, Fields (2007) conducted a comprehensive literature 
review of income mobility. His review shows that most studies investigated mobility 
issues in India using three principal data sources: National Council for Applied 
Economic Research (NCAER) data between 1968 and 1970, the International Crops 
Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) data in 1970s and 1980s, and 
data from Palanpur (a village in Moradabad district of Uttar Pradesh) between 1950s 
to 1990s. For example, Gaiha (1988) uses NCAER panel data between 1968 to 1970 to 
show that access to cultivable land and modern agricultural inputs influence upward 
mobility for cultivating poor. Bhide and Mehta (2004) use NCAER data set in the early 
1970s and 1980s to investigate determinants of income mobility such as tribal status, 
demographic composition, and literacy. Walker and Ryan (1990) use panel data in the 
1970s and 1980s from ICRISAT to examine how the education of father, caste, 
inherited land, quality of inherited land affect respondents’ income mobility. Lanjouw 
and Stern (2003) use data between 1950s to 1990s from Palanpur, to investigate the 
role of growth of the rural non-farm economy in determining income-poverty and 
improvement in living standards of the poor. More recently, Gautam et al. (2012) use 
Additional Rural Income Survey (ARIS) and Rural Economic and Demographics 
(REDS) surveys in 1999 and 2007 to examine income, consumption, and asset 
mobility. The mobility in their research was associated with land classes, agro-climate 





instance, landless or marginal farmers were found to be the most vulnerable groups 
regarding income or assets mobility.41 
Second, previous literature discusses how access to information technologies 
helps to alleviate various societal problems such as digital inequality, mortality, and 
well-being of the general public. Government initiatives play critical roles to reduce 
the problem of digital inequality for socioeconomically disadvantaged groups in both 
developing and developed countries (Hsieh et al. 2011; Venkatesh and Sykes 2013). 
Hsieh et al. (2011) argue that social capital influences adoption of information 
technologies, especially for socioeconomically disadvantaged groups. Researchers 
argue that access to digital resources might reduce costs and improve health outcomes 
(Agarwal et al. 2010). For instance, Venkatesh and Sykes (2013) show that IT 
intervention reduce infant mortality rate and argue that IT could complement other 
investments such as medical facilities. Recent work suggests that IT empowers 
individuals living in the rural areas in the developing countries to improve their living 
standards (Jha et al. 2016; Leong et al. 2016). This is because IT increases individuals’ 
income by creating opportunities to access new market (e.g. e-commence, Leong et al. 
2016), or a variety of financial services (e.g. mobile money ecosystem, Kendall et al. 
2011). 
Third, increasingly spillover effects or social returns to IT are beginning to 
receive attention in recent years. Previous literature investigates knowledge or 
technology spillover effects in terms of productivity or innovation at several levels such 
                                                






as firms, industries, or countries. Job hopping, foreign investment, or technology 
diffusion are possible mechanisms to transfer knowledge from one entity to another. 
For instance, Mun and Nadiri (2002) investigate information technology externalities 
between 1984 and 2000 in the United States and find that computerization of one 
industry’s customer and suppliers industries lead to a reduction in both labor and 
material costs of the focal industry. Han et al. (2011) show that IT investments from 
suppliers industries lead to an increase in the productivity of downstream industries, 
and find that IT intensity and competitiveness of downstream industries moderate such 
spillover effects. Chang and Gurbaxani (2012) analyze the spillover effect from an 
outsourcing perspective and show that firms would benefit from IT service firms 
because of their accumulated knowledge. The underlying reason is that IT-related 
knowledge makes the external vendors achieve higher levels of efficiency in delivering 
IT services. Cheng and Nault (2007) investigate the effects of information technology 
investments made upstream on the effects to downstream productivity by arguing that 
the competition on the supply side will generate extra benefits that can be passed on 
downstream. Their empirical results show that a 10.5% increase in suppliers’ IT capital 
lead to an increase of suppliers’ output by 0.63% to 0.70%. Tambe and Hitt (2013) 
argue that the mobility of IT workers generates significantly positive spillover effects 
on firm productivity. In short, previous literature discusses IT spillover effects mostly 
from a productivity perspective whereby firms increase productivity through an 
accumulation of technological know-how, and IT spillover increases the output 





Our review of the prior literature suggests that few prior studies have examined 
income mobility from an IT perspective, even though there is a vigorous debate in the 
academic literature (Acemoglu 2003) and practitioner press (Long 2015; Rotman 2014) 
on the role of IT in influencing income inequality and living standards. In addition, 
most studies used data before the year 2000 in India and mainly focus on rural areas, 
and hence they have little to say whether recent adoption and diffusion of computers in 
the Indian economy (Nilekani 2008; Parker et al. 2016) may have contributed to income 
mobility, something that we address in this study. 
4.2.2 Hypotheses 
Wider adoption of personal computers and related technologies in the last three 
decades has improved the way people communicate, learn, and earn a living. There are 
more than 2 billion personal computers in use globally in 2015.42 Information 
technologies connect populations beyond geographical and time constraints and bring 
radical transformation to the society. 
Why will computer ownership affect income mobility? First, computer 
ownership can lead to an increase in computer literacy, which may increase wage 
premiums in the long run. Chua et al. (1999) show that computer experience can be 
accumulated through owning a computer at home. Venkatesh and Vitalari (1987) show 
that continuous use of computer through adequate training can reduce deficiency of 
computer knowledge, and find that early adopters of computers at home extensively 
use word processing and business applications for work-related tasks, i.e. individuals 
                                                






gain digital literacy from computer ownerships and gain skills to handle work-related 
tasks and business applications. Such accumulation of computer literacy can result in 
salary premium at work. For instance, Krueger (1993) used Current Population Survey 
(CPS) to evaluate the returns to computer use, and show that workers who know how 
to use computers earn 10% to 15% more than workers have no computer literacy. The 
direct benefit of computer on wages has been documented in mostly cross-sectional 
data in various contexts such as West Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom (Arabsheibani and Marin 2006; Oosterbeek 1997; Reilly 1995). 
Second, computers ownerships at home can reduce computer anxiety and 
provide flexibility in work-related tasks. Ogunkola (2008) argues that computer 
ownership can build confidence that mitigates fear and anxiety about computers. 
Computer anxiety is an aversion of interacting with computers or thinking about 
computers (Poynton 2005), which is especially common in middle-aged adults and 
elderly (Dyck and Smither 1994). Fear of computer leads to an inferior status for 
individuals in a digital world. For instance, Link and Marz (2006) show that students 
who lack basic computer skills were skeptical about e-learning and refused to use the 
existing e-learning offerings at one university, and in turn lost the opportunity to reap 
benefits from the e-learning systems. Furthermore, information technologies make it 
feasible to supplement one’s income by working at home. Venkatesh and Vitalari 
(1992) show that supplemental work by using computers at home has a positive effect 
on flexibility and household income and is negatively related to commuting time. 
The differences between computer owners and non-owners might persist over 





computer skills. Computer expertise gained from computer use at home may affect 
computer use at future workplace (Facer et al. 2001). Therefore, we hypothesize that a 
household with a computer would enjoy a higher income than a household without a 
computer. Such effect would lead to a disparity of income between computer owners 
and non-owners, and may affect their socio-economic outcomes over time. Therefore, 
we hypothesize: 
H1: A positive change in computer ownership leads to upward income mobility. 
We argue that computerization in a region leads to positive social returns for 
the following reasons. First, computer diffusion is an engine of growth and a source of 
labor market changes. When technology evolves, it spreads throughout the economy 
and brings generalized productivity gains (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995). David et 
al. (1997) show that the spread of computer technology explains the increase of growth 
in the relative demand for more-skilled workers. Therefore, regional computer adoption 
rate leads to productivity gains and a possible change in local labor market, bringing 
long-term economic benefit to the regions. Furthermore, information technology 
fosters human capital. Studies of human capital show that an accumulation of human 
capital of a person not only affects the earnings for that individual but also the earnings 
of other individuals (Manda et al. 2002). Moretti (2004) suggests that increasing the 
aggregated stock of human capability in one region would lead to a positive effect on 
society that was not fully reflected in the private returns of individuals. 
Second, computerization generates knowledge spillover, which is key to 
generate social returns in a region. Knowledge diffusion plays a critical role in 





create not only private returns for the investors but also create a long-term social return 
by growing the economy (Jones and Williams 1998). Leon-Ledesma (2005) shows how 
international trade drives R&D diffusion and productivity growth. Acs et al. (2009) 
discuss the positive relationship between knowledge and the degree of 
entrepreneurship, and demonstrate that knowledge generated endogenously results in 
spillover effects that allow other individuals to identify and exploit opportunities. 
Likewise, computer ownership can increase owners’ digital literacy, which flows 
among individuals in a region raising the level of local computer knowledge. Since 
digital literacy has been linked to an increase of individuals’ wages (Krueger 1993), we 
argue that computer knowledge spillover effects derived from the growth of computer 
ownership would also increase income mobility in the neighborhood due to spillover 
effects. 
Third, learning from earlier adopters reduces costs for the late adopters. 
Heckman (2000) argues that learning begets learning and earlier technology adopters 
make the late adopters easier to learn a new technology. Such learning processes can 
be found in various contexts. For instance, Saxenian (1996) shows that individuals 
learn from each other when moving between firms and industries in Silicon Valley. An 
increase in computer ownerships in a region makes it easy for late adopters to imitate 
and shortens the time to diffuse computer knowledge. Furthermore, the spillovers of 
technology not only benefit the late adopters but also the early adopters. For example, 
interoperability of computer software brings benefits to both existing adopters and 
future adopters (Katz and Shapiro 1986). An increase of computer ownership in a 





acceleration of digital literacy. Knowledge flows from highly endowed individuals to 
less endowed individuals create a positive spillover effect from technology owners to 
non-technology owners. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H2: There is a positive spillover effect of computers ownership in a 
neighborhood on upward income mobility. 
One key reason for the spillover effects is the process of social interactions. Han 
et al. (2011) argue that positive IT spillover effects in the form of IT-enabled 
innovations that be transferred to downstream industries are enabled by interactions 
among industry players. It is well-known that one’s social connections affect one’s 
behaviors in various setting. Individuals’ social networks would affect ones’ access to 
various resources, such as finance (Aldrich et al. 1987), information, or labor resources 
(Aidis et al. 2008). For instance, Bandiera et al. (2010) demonstrate how workers’ 
behaviors are affected by their socially connected friends. Mas and Moretti (2009) 
study the peer effect in a supermarket and find that there is a positive spillovers effect 
of introducing a highly productive staff into the chain. 
Since social connections affect one’s decisions and outcomes, we expect caste 
in India to play an important role in how IT spillover operates when it comes to income 
mobility. The word caste derives from Portuguese casta, meaning breed or race, and 
caste has long existed in India. Caste is a form of a social stratification system that has 
gone through significant changes since India’s independence but still plays a significant 
role in modern Indian society. Desai and Dubey (2012) discuss caste and social distance 
and depict the relationship among castes as follows: “there is an increasing tendency to 





and proudly brandish their own narratives of origin (p. 7).” The caste stratification in 
India has also influenced other religious or ethnic groups such as Muslims, Christians, 
and Sikhs (Desai and Kulkarni 2008).  
Caste affects not only dietary habits, educational opportunities, economic 
advantages, but also interactions with members of other castes as well. Gille (2011) 
uses social caste in India to construct weighting matrix to examine education spillover 
effects on farm productivity and finds that caste is a valid indicator for social 
interactions because households are influenced more by the educational level of 
neighbors from the same caste than from other castes. This argument builds on the 
assumption that a close neighbor has a stronger influence than distant ones (Goux and 
Maurin 2007). People are influenced differently by their close caste groups. The 
spillovers effect would happen when individuals interact with each other, and the caste 
system can potentially impede interactions and communications among members of 
different castes while facilitating those among members of the same caste or religious 
groups. Thus, households are more likely to be influenced by neighbors in the same 
caste group through daily interaction. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H3: Compared to computer ownership from other groups in a neighborhood, 
there is a positive spillover effect of owning computers from the same group in 
a neighborhood on upward income mobility. 
4.3. Method 
4.3.1 Data 
We use two waves of a nationally representative survey from India: Indian 





conducted by National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER), New Delhi 
in collaboration with the University of Maryland in 2004–2005 (Desai et al. 2016) and 
2011-2012 (Desai and Vanneman 2016). The data necessary for our study became 
available in 2015 when IHDS released data from the second wave of the survey, and 
we use the latest versions of data released in 2016. Respondents in this survey are 
typically the household head or a knowledgeable person who knows about the 
household economic situation, and the response rate of IHDS is as high as 92% 
(Sonalde et al. 2010). Both surveys contain a rich amount of information, including 
household employment, total income, consumption expenditure, social network, 
residence, caste and religion group, household size, etc. The IHDS 2005 survey covers 
26,734 households (143,374 individuals) and 14,820 households (72,380 individuals) 
in rural and urban areas respectively and covers 1,503 villages and 971 urban 
neighborhoods across India. About 83% of these households were resurveyed in 2011-
2012. The IHDS 2011 survey consists of 14,573 households (135,118 individuals) and 
27,579 households (69,450 individuals) in rural and urban areas respectively.  
The high quality of IHDS data make it comparable to other datasets as Census 
and NFHS, and IHDS data have been used in several studies (Adams 2008; Desai and 
Adams 2006; Dutta 2015; Frijters and Sharma 2012; Sen and Noon 2007; Vanneman 
et al. 2008) to investigate poverty rate, education disparity, and learning outcomes. To 
create a balanced panel between 2005 and 2011, we take steps to cleanse data and 
dropped observations with missing data. The final sample we constructed is a balanced 
one by matching the household ID from two waves of surveys. The sample covers 





in 33 states. 
4.3.2 Variables 
Our unit of analysis is a household. The Household income measure is derived 
from more than fifty questions, including agricultural, non-agricultural, pensions, and 
government benefits. We deflate household income in 2011 back to 2005 equivalents 
by using Consumer Price Index (CPI).43 Merely using the household income without 
considering the household compositions can be misleading. Therefore, we follow 
previous literature in poverty and wealth literature and account for household size and 
composition (Lukiyanova and Oshchepkov 2012; Roberts 2001; Woolard and Klasen 
2005) in our models. We use the well-known adjusted household income, Adult 




(𝐴𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠 + 0.5	𝑋	𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛)n. 
(1) 
Where Adults means the number of adults in the household older than 18 years 
of age, Children is the number of children whose age is below 18. We follow Woolard 
and Klasen (2005) to set a scaling parameter as 0.9 to reflect modest economies of 
scale. We take a log of the Adult Equivalent Income (AEI) variable. 
We used transition matrices to examine the movement of income over two-time 
points. We divided households’ incomes into m groups (deciles or quintiles) in both 
periods. Let P be a matrix of m X m transitions, 𝑃2< means the percentage of units whose 
income class fall in class i at first period and j at second period. Therefore, in the 
                                                





transition matrices, the rows represent initial income classes at the first period and the 
columns indicate the final income classes at the second period. 𝑃2<	 𝑖 = 𝑗  represents 
the percentage of households who still remain in the original income class, which are 
known as ‘no mobility (immobile)’, while 𝑃2<	(𝑖 ≠ 𝑗) represents households move from 
original income class to a new income class, which are called ‘mobiles’. Among those 
mobiles units, households move from i to j (i<j) are regarded as moving upward and 







We categorized household into a quintile (m=5) as suggested by Woolard and 
Klasen (2005). Therefore, each household in a given year is sorted from top to bottom, 
and categorized into one out of five categories. Based on the transition matrix, we 
constructed our main dependent variable, Income Mobility (Mobility). Mobility, which 
equals to 0, represents households becoming worse-off (𝑃2<	 𝑖 > 𝑗 ); Mobility, which 
equals to 1, represents households staying the same in terms of their stratum 
(𝑃2<	 𝑖 = 𝑗 ); and Mobility, which equals to 2, represents households becoming better-
off (𝑃2<	 𝑖 < 𝑗 ). 
Table 4.1 provides a summary of variables used in this study. The variables can 
be categorized into two broad types: one for endowment effect in the base year (2005), 
and one for change, which was calculated by subtracting value in 2005 from the value 
in 2011. 
The average Mobility approximately equals to 1 because we observe the same 





percentage of households moving downwards). Because we deflated household income 
by CPI, the positive change in AEI indicates an upward movement or economic 
progress.  
In our dataset, only a very small percentage of households (0.9%) owned a 
computer in 2005, but we observed a surge of owning a computer (6.0%) from 2005 to 
2011. We also calculated the proportion of households who own computers at the 
district level (the district level in India is similar to a county in the United States). We 
further calculated the proportion of technology ownership at the district level based on 
the households’ castes and religions. We computed two sets of figures for each 
household: the proportion of households owning computers in the same caste or 
religious group, and the proportion of households owning computers in other caste or 
religious groups. According to IHDS’s survey, a household could belong to one of the 
following caste or religion: Brahmin; Forward caste; Other Backward Classes (OBC); 
Dalit; Adivasi; Muslim; Christian, Sikh, and Jain. 
Table 4.1 provides other important indicators such as human capital and 
economic status variables. There were roughly 25.4% of persons in a household have 
jobs in 2005. On average, there were approximately 5.9 persons in a household. The 
percentages of male adults and female adults in a household fell between 32.7% and 
32.5%. Household heads’ age was approximately 48.2 years old with only 9.1% of 
households’ heads were female. Our sample households experienced a minor increase 
of the share of individuals in a household having a job (4.2%). The increase of share of 
male and female adults was quite minor, ranging from 1.1% to 4.3%. There were 





head. We controlled households’ economic status. Households, on average, had 7.6 
durable goods. There were 50.2% of households who own land, and 27.5% of 
households lived in urban in the base year. We also examined the extent of social 
harmony in a region. IHDS survey asked the respondents whether people generally get 
along with each other well or have a conflict with others. On average, 54.9% of 
households indicated that their villages or neighborhoods got along well. 
Tables 4.2 provide a more comprehensive picture of a household owning 
computers in 2005 and 2011. The computer ownerships saw a significant increase in 
the period. Among those who did not have a computer in 2005, there were 6.0% of 
households owning a computer in 2011. Among those who did own a computer in 2005, 
a modest proportion of household report not having computers in 2011 (33.4%). Table 
4.3 shows detail information of computer ownership and income mobility among castes 
and religious groups. All groups experienced a sharp increase in computer ownership 
from 2005 to 2011. Among them, OBC, Dalit, and Christian, Sikh, Jain have higher 
income mobility than the other groups. 
4.3.3 Modeling Determinants of Mobility Change 
Following Dartanto and Nurkholis (2013), we use ordered logit model to 
investigate determinants of mobility change given that the dependent variable 
(Mobility) is inherently ordered. The dependent variable represents the change of 
mobility for a household based on the transition matrix (moving upward, no mobility, 
or moving downward).44 The initial value related variables represent households’ 
                                                
44 We construct a more granular mobility index by subtracting Quintile position in 2005 from Quintile 
position in 2011 to create a dependent variable with 9 levels of mobility. For simplicity, we present 





conditions in the base year and are useful to examine whether such endowment effects 
in the base year persist across time. The change-related variables represent changes in 
households’ assets as well as demographic composition and employment, which might 
be reasonably be seen as exogenous to the mobility (Woolard and Klasen 2005).45 
To test our hypotheses, we use the following models: 
𝑌2∗ = 	𝛼 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝐶2 + 𝛽: ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝐸2 + Σ𝛽@ ∗ 𝑋2 + 𝜀2 (3) 
𝑌2∗ = 	𝛼 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝐶2 + 𝛽: ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝐸2 + 𝛽@ ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐶2 + 𝛽I ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐸2
+ Σ𝛽 ∗ 𝑋2 + 𝜀2 
(4) 
𝑌2∗ = 	𝛼 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝐶2 + 𝛽: ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝐸2 + 𝛽@ ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐺𝐶𝑂𝐶2 + 𝛽I ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐺𝐶𝑂𝐸2
+ 𝛽 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑇𝐶2 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐺𝐶𝑂𝐸2 + Σ𝛽 ∗ 𝑋2 + 𝜀2 
(5) 
Where 
𝑌2∗ is the unobserved dependent variable such that: 
𝑌2 = 0  if 𝑌2∗ 	≤ 𝜇n (0 represents households’ welfare become worse (𝑃2<	 𝑖 > 𝑗 )),  
𝑌2 = 1  if 𝜇n ≤ 	𝑌2∗ 	≤ 𝜇6 (1 represents households’ welfare remain the same (𝑃2<	 𝑖 = 𝑗 )), 
𝑌2 = 2  if 𝜇6 ≤ 	𝑌2∗ 	≤ 𝜇: (2 represents households’ welfare become better (𝑃2<	 𝑖 < 𝑗 )) 
 
Each major construct could be decomposed into two parts: the change between 
2005 and 2011, and the endowment in 2005. While the change-related variables are 
variables of interest, the endowment related variables are used to control initial status. 
𝐶𝑂𝐶 is a positive change in computer ownership, which means a household has no 
computer in 2005 and owns it in 2011. 𝐶𝑂𝐸 indicates computer ownership in 2005. 
Similarly, 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐶2 and 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐸2 represent the change and endowment of 
proportion of households owning a computer in a district. 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑺𝑮𝐶𝑂𝐶2 and 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑺𝑮𝐶𝑂𝐸2 represent the change and the endowment of proportion of households in 
the same caste group owning a computer in a district. 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑶𝑮𝐶𝑂𝐶2 and 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑶𝑮𝐶𝑂𝐸2 
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represent the change and the endowment of proportion of households in other caste 
groups owning a computer in a district. 𝑋2 is a vector of both the change and 
endowment of all the human capital, and economic variables, including Adult 
Equivalent Income (AEI), household size, share of persons has jobs in a household, 
share of male adults, share of female adults, household head’s age, household head’s 
gender, number of durables owned by a household, land owner or not, and living in the 
rural or urban area. In the ordered logit model, 𝜀2 has a standard logistic distribution. 
4.3.4 Selection of Computer Ownership  
The independent variable, computer ownership, can potentially suffer from a 
self-selection problem because households made decisions based on their needs and 
preferences. Therefore, the self-selection problem can lead to potentially biased 
statistical inferences. When the endogenous variable is binary, it is common to use the 
Heckman two-stage model (Heckman 1976) to address the endogeneity associated with 
computer ownership. More specifically, we use an endogenous treatment regression to 
solve this issue. The endogenous treatment regression will first have a selection 
equation using a Probit specification and then a second-stage for outcome equation. It 
allows a correlation structure between the unobservables that affect the treatment and 
the unobservables that affect the potential outcomes: 
𝑌2∗ = 	𝛼 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝐶2 + 𝛽: ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝐸2 + Σ𝛽@ ∗ 𝑋2 + 𝜀2  
𝐶𝑂𝐶2 =
1, 𝑖𝑓	𝜸𝒁𝒊𝒕 + 𝑢2 > 0
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
(6
) 
where 𝒁𝒊 include one variable that affects households’ decision on computer ownership 
but does not directly influence households’ income mobility and other control variables 





distribution. The exogenous variable is the distance in kilometers to the nearest 
government or private Higher Secondary/Inter College. Individual who live close to a 
high school have a higher probability to access school resources. Pal et al. (2007) 
indicates that “computer-aided learning (CAL) projects are active in over 20,000 public 
primary schools in India. … include a computer center with 3-5 machines set up per 
primary school.” These computer centers together with school libraries complement 
regional and national library systems in India (Mahajan 2010), and may provide access 
to some digital resources for public use. This increase in digital literacy can lead to an 
increase in computer ownership, which satisfies the requirement of a valid exogenous 
variable. Distance to school has been extensively used as an exogenous variation in the 
returns to education literature (Currie and Moretti 2003; Kane and Rouse 1995). There 
is no reason to believe the distance to school would be directly correlated with income 
mobility. Carneiro et al. (2016) argue the distance variable was not endogenously 
determined and showed that “distance to the nearest secondary school is uncorrelated 
with direct determinants of wages” (p.4). 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1 Income Mobility 
Table 4.4 presents a two-stage view of income mobility in India between 2005 
and 2011. The quintile mobility matrix is derived from sorting AEI in the samples in 
2005 and 2011. Quintile 1 means the lowest tier (bottom 20%), and quintile 5 represents 
the highest income class (top 20%). We find that 35.5% of households in the lowest 
quintile in 2005 remain the poorest in 2011, and 51.8% of households stay in the richest 





the lowest quintile moves one quintile and another 37.8% moves to the middle or top 
quintile in 2011. Given that the top and bottom quintile households can only move 
down or up in this transition matrix, it is not surprising that the top and bottom quintile 
in the trace is higher than the middle ones. Table 4.5 shows the distribution of the 
dependent variable: households’ income mobility. We find that approximately 33.2% 
of households stay in the same quintile from 2005 to 2011. 
4.4.2 Determinants of Income Mobility 
 Hypothesis 1, which argues that positive change in computer ownership is 
associated with upward mobility, is supported. Column 1 of Table 4.6 shows the result 
of the ordered logit model, where we examine the direct effect of positive change of 
owning a computer, and control for the endowment effect of computer ownership in 
the base year. The positive sign of computer ownership in the base year indicates a 
possible technology impediment for poverty trap. It shows household with an 
endowment of technology takes advantage of technological knowledge to advance their 
income level. Change in computer ownership leads to upward mobility. The positive 
sign indicates households gaining computer ownerships enjoy upward mobility. We 
calculate the marginal effects to interpret the results. Households with a positive change 
in computer ownership experience an increase of 13.4% in upward mobility. As we 
argued in the previous section, owning a computer might increase computer literacy 
and help with upward income mobility if household members leverage the benefits 
from computer use. 
 We find support for Hypothesis 2, which posits that computer ownership has 





ownership at the district level. Column 2 of Table 4.6 shows the spillover effect and 
shows that an increase of computer ownerships in a district is associated with an 
increase in income mobility. To better interpret the results, we calculate the marginal 
effect of computer ownership at the district level. Every 1% increase of owning a 
computer in a district leads to an increase of 0.11% in upward income mobility. 
 Hypotheses 3 argues that households gain positive spillover effects of computer 
ownership in a district from the same caste group than other caste groups, and we find 
support for the hypothesis. Column 3 of Table 4.6 shows that computer ownership from 
the same group has a significantly positive effect, yet computer ownership from the 
distant groups has an insignificant effect. A Wald test show a significant difference in 
computer ownership in a district between the same caste and different caste groups 
(probability > chi2 is smaller than 0.01). Every 1% increase of owning a computer in a 
district from the same caste group leads to an increase of 0.10% in upward mobility. 
 Other variables in our models show relationships along expected direction, 
consistent with prior literature. From Table 4.6, we observe a negative relationship 
between initial income and subsequent income change. Such phenomenon of moving 
toward the mean has been extensively documented in previous research (Shi et al. 2010; 
Woolard and Klasen 2005). Households having more number of household members 
would have a negative effect on subsequent income change, suggesting that larger 
households might have a harder time to improve their economic position. Similar 
findings are reported by Haddad and Ahmed (2003) and Woolard and Klasen (2005).  
4.4.3 Alternative Models Using Changes in Adult Equivalent Income 





household mobility can be “derived directly from the standard household utility 
maximization model with adult equivalent household income as a money metric 
measure of utility (p. 878).” Following Woolard and Klasen (2005), we use the change 
of the adult equivalent income (AEI) between 2005 and 2011 as an alternative 
dependent variable to run parsimonious OLS models, which means we reproduced the 
models from equation (3) to equation (5) by using ∆𝑌2 as dependent variable, where ∆𝑌2 
= log(𝐴𝐸𝐼2 ) – log (𝐴𝐸𝐼2¡), and x = 2005 and y = 2011. 
 Table 4.7 show the result of the models. Similar to previous ordered logit 
models, households experiencing a change in owning a computer show a positive effect 
on change of AEI. Furthermore, we find support for IT spillover effects at the district 
level, and the effects mainly come from the increase of computer ownership in a district 
in the same caste group. 
4.4.4 Correcting the Self-selection of Computer Ownership 
 To correct the self-selection problems associated with computer ownership, we 
employ two strategies. First, we test the endogenous treatment regression model as 
specified in equation (6). Table 4.8 shows the results. We test two dependent variables: 
Mobility and ∆𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐸𝐼. Column 1 and Column 3 show the coefficient of the selection 
equation, while Column 2 and Column 4 present the coefficients of the outcome 
equation. As expected, distance to high school negatively correlated with the adoptions 
of computers (p < 0.01). The longer distance to high school, the less likely a household 
positively changes to own a computer. Our main results hold after accounting for self-
selection problems, and change in owning a computer leads to an increase in Mobility 





correlation between the errors in the selection equation and the errors in the outcome 
equation. This shows that computer ownership does suffers from self-selection issues 
and therefore needs to be corrected.  
Second, the self-selection problem results in a non-randomized sample. We use 
a propensity score matching (PSM) approach to address this problem (for further details 
on propensity score approach, see Mithas et al. 2006; Mithas and Krishnan 2009; 
Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). We use PSM to match households that choose to own a 
computer and households that chose not to do so. We compare households in our 
sample to ensure that treated and untreated subjects have similar propensity scores in 
terms of their observed characteristics. To estimate the propensity score, we employ a 
probit model in the first stage to calculate the probability of a household owing 
computer with observable variables such as wealth index (number of durables), the 
number of individuals in a household, and years of education. We perform a one-to-
one nearest-neighbor matching without replacement and identify control and treatment 
observations on a common support region. After matching two samples, there are 1,912 
observations included from treated and untreated groups respectively. Table 4.9 shows 
that the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of household mobility is 
approximately 0.120 with a t-statistics of 5.37. This indicates that households with a 
positive change in computer ownership experience upward mobility compared to 
households who did not experience a positive change in computer ownership. Table 
4.10 provides a broadly similar result as indicated by Table 4.9.  
4.4.5 Robustness Checks 





sample to test our model to rule out the possibility of outliers generated by small 
villages in rural areas or small neighborhoods in urban areas. Therefore, we keep 
villages or neighborhoods that have more than 57 households (excludes 0.5 standard 
deviations less than the mean46) to do a robustness check. The reduced sample has 
27,772 households in each year. Table 4.11 presents our findings. Similar to what we 
discussed in the previous section, the results in Table 4.11 fully support H1 to H3. 
Second, one might argue that the positive network externalities of computer 
ownership are merely a representation of economic growth. It is the economic growth 
that leads to an upward income mobility, and the increase of computer ownership in a 
region is only a byproduct. To alleviate this concern, we create a variable, regional 
economic growth, and control for this variable. We calculate the average increase of 
household income in a district level and then take a log form of this variable. Table 
4.12 presents the results. As expected, the regional economic growth leads to a strong 
upward income mobility. All the hypotheses are still supported even after controlling 
for regional economic growth in each district.47  
Third, we argue that owning a computer at home leads to an increase in 
computer literacy, and in turns benefit individuals at work. Since home computers are 
considered a shared good because they are often shared by multiple users48, the benefits 
brought by computer ownership might be larger when there are more individuals with 
                                                
46 Using  other thresholds such as excluding one standard deviation yield similar results. 
47 Besides calculating regional economic growth using our sample from the same questionnaire, we also 
collected data on gross state domestic product (GSDP); our findings remain unchanged even when we 
control for state-level economic growth. 
48 For instance, one survey showed that 30% of the respondents share their computers with their children 





jobs in a household. Observing family members interacting with computers may lead 
to a reduction in fear to use computers (Beckers and Schmidt 2001). With a higher 
proportion of individuals having a job, family members who face computer related 
challenge could help each other and create an environment that facilitates digital 
literacy among family members.  
Table 4.13 shows the results to test these arguments. The interaction term 
involving computer ownership and share of persons with jobs is positive and 
statistically significant (p<0.01), implying that a household with higher shares of 
persons with jobs experiences a higher level of upward mobility when it experiences a 
positive change in computer ownership. Figure 4.1 shows the moderating effects 
visually. Households might have three outcomes: moving upward (green area), no 
mobility (gray area), and moving downward (red area). As the share of persons with 
jobs in a household increases, the probability of a household’s moving upward also 
increases. However, the slopes of moving upwards are different between households 
having negative or no change of computer and households having a positive change in 
computer ownership. For example, households having negative or no change of 
computers have 27.4% of chance to move upward when only having 20% of individuals 
having jobs in a household, the chance increase to 35.8% when having 80% of 
individuals having jobs in a household. This indicates a (35.8%-27.4%) / 27.4% = 
40.5% of increase. On the contrary, households having a positive change of computers 
experience an increase from 45.5% to 71.6% when moving from 20% to 80% of 
individuals having jobs in a household. This shows a (71.6%-45.5%) / 45.5% = 57.4% 





ownership and share of persons with jobs in the previous table. 
Finally, because IT spillover effects depend on extensive social interactions 
among individuals, such effects will be stronger in an environment where people get 
along well with each other than in an environment with conflicts. Columns 1, 2, and 3 
in Table 4.14 provide evidence that supports this argument. In Column 1, the 
interaction term between the change of computer ownership in a district and get along 
well is positive and statistically significant at 1% level. This means the marginal effects 
of the regional IT spillover are conditional on the level of regional harmony. While the 
marginal effect of every 1% increase of IT spillover leads to a 0.02% increase in upward 
mobility in a region where harmony level ranks at a 25 percentile, the marginal effect 
of IT spillover could be as high as 0.32% in a region where harmony level ranks at 75 
percentile. In Column 2, the interaction term between the change of computer 
ownership in a district from the same group and get along well is not significant, 
probably because individuals have a strong bond for the same group regardless of the 
conflict level in a district. Therefore, the IT spillover effect is not conditional on the 
regional harmony. In contrast, in Column 3, the positive significance of the interaction 
term indicates IT spillover effect exists even from distant caste groups when individuals 
get along well with each other. A similar calculation of the marginal effects shows that 
the IT spillover effect from distant groups is -0.11% in a region where harmony level 
ranks at a 25 percentile but is 0.12% in a region where harmony level ranks at a 75 
percentile supporting the argument that the IT spillover effects would be amplified 






4.5.1 Main Findings 
Our goal in this study was to assess the extent to which computer ownership 
leads to upward income mobility. We examined the role of IT in income mobility, 
accounting for other well-documented factors such as initial income, and socio-
economic status. Our models suggest that households experiencing a positive change 
in owning a computer experience upward mobility between 2005 and 2011. We also 
find that households with a positive change in computer ownership enjoy an even 
higher upward mobility when they have a higher share of persons with jobs, probably 
because job market rewards individuals with computer skills and households’ members 
benefit from an increase in computer literacy. 
Furthermore, our findings suggest that computer ownership generates not only 
private returns to households but also social returns to their neighborhoods. Our focus 
here was on the indirect effect of computer ownership or spillover effects, which are 
externalities that are experienced by unrelated third parties. The positive externalities 
would flow from high knowledge endowed users to the low ones through social 
interaction. Our results show support for the positive spillover effects of computer 
ownership. We use caste as an indicator of social distance given the role that caste plays 
in India as a distinct social stratification system, and show that the computer ownership 
in the same caste group generates a stronger positive spillover effect on income 
mobility than that from other caste groups in a district. We also show that a friendly 
community facilitates the spillover effect, and such an effect applies even from distant 
caste groups. Since the knowledge transfer would be smoother under harmonious 





each other. We provide a series of robustness checks, which include alternative models, 
endogenous treatment effects, propensity score matching, a reduced sample that 
excludes outliers, and the control of economic growth. Together these models provide 
confidence that owning a computer leads to upward income mobility. 
In summary, we document a positive direct effect of digitization on income 
mobility, suggesting that information accessibility plays an important role in 
household’s economic status and mobility. Besides the private return of digitization, 
we also see a social return of digitization in the form of generating positive spillover 
effect. We further decompose the spillover effect into proximate and distant ones based 
on the social stratification system in India. The results suggest that digitization 
generates a positive spillover effect, plausibly through intensive social interaction. As 
we mentioned in the previous section that caste system, a socially stratified system, in 
India could form communication impediment among individuals from different groups, 
which in turn yields a positive spillover effect from the same group but the insignificant 
effect from other caste groups. 
Our research contributes to a broad stream of literature that relates to computer 
literacy and digital divide (Hsieh et al. 2008; Srivastava and Shainesh 2015; Venkatesh 
and Sykes 2013). We extend from a static view of computer ownership to a dynamic 
view across time, and examine divergence of income mobility between computer 
owners and computer non-owners. Owning a computer at home provides benefits at 
work (Facer et al. 2001) because it increases computer literacy and reduces computer 
anxiety (Chua et al. 1999). We find that computer endowment might be related to 





also find positive change in computer ownership leads to upward income mobility. 
Extending from a one-period snapshot of computer impacts on income, our work 
incorporates a time dimension to provide a dynamic view of such effect. The results 
indicate such effect might persist over time, increasing the income disparity between 
technology owners and non-owners, creating digital-divide. 
4.5.2 Implication for Research 
Our findings suggest implications for further research. First, the benefit of IT 
on improving the productivities of organizations has been well established in the IS 
field but studies that discuss the linkage between IT and income mobility are scant. To 
the best of our knowledge, this research is among the first to analyze the direct effect 
of computer ownership on income mobility and the spillover effects in the form of 
social impact. Although our research focuses only on computer ownership, further 
research should concentrate on other technologies. For example, Smartphone usage and 
Internet access could drastically improve the richness of information retrieval and 
sharply reduces the time of receiving such information. One would expect even a 
stronger spillover effect among households in the same district for smartphone usage 
or Internet access. 
Second, this research examines the effect of a positive externality of computer 
ownership and speculates that the spillover effect might come from human interaction 
through their social network. A follow-up study could take a closer look at such 
interactions directly to provide a granular policy intervention. Beyond ones’ caste, 
future research could focus on other factors such as ethnicity or individuals’ social ties. 





effects on the process of IT spillover. 
Third, India in the past two decades has gone through rapid economic growth 
and experienced significant IT deployment, while becoming the leading IT and 
business process outsourcing provider in the world. Whether the positive returns of 
computer ownership on income mobility would hold in other contexts and emerging 
economies is an empirical question. We call for more research to investigate the direct 
and spillover effects of digitization in other countries for generalizability. 
4.5.3 Implication for Practice 
The findings of this study provide implications for understanding the social 
impacts of public policies related to information technology. The positive spillover 
effect of computer ownership provides some justification for a government subsidy for 
computer use in public education. Our study is particularly relevant for emerging 
economies such as India, China, and Brazil because these countries are currently 
experiencing a technology revolution along with their economic development. A better 
understanding of the externalities of technology use and adoption may be informative 
for policymaking for government and think tanks. 
Besides the direct effect and spillover effects of technology use, this study also 
finds a digital divide among different socio-economic and caste groups. We observe 
that users in some location such as living in an urban area, or users from specific caste 
group own a higher endowment of technologies. A critical issue for the policy may be 
to reduce the disparity among various socio-economic groups. Spillovers of computer 
ownership provide a new angle for technology policies, especially when there is a trade 





private returns but also social returns. Therefore, to fully reap the social welfare of 
disseminating positive knowledge spillover, policymakers should pay attention to 
reducing the cost of information exchange and removing the obstacles to interactions 
among different ethnic groups and cultural backgrounds. Our research suggests that 
providing education in computer courses at school and digital training programs for job 
seekers can reduce disparity due to digital literacy between technology owners and non-
owners to assist with upward mobility. 
To conclude, this study suggests that the benefits of digitization should not be 
measured only in terms of tangible measures such as productivity, but there is a need 
to also look at intangible benefits such as spillover effect on income mobility through 
social interactions. Our results suggest that households benefit from an increase in the 
extent of digitization in the same district in terms of upward income mobility, 







Table 2. 1 Message Design of each Group 
Group Message 
Control Goals help you form a habit of running; the statistics show runners who 
set up a goal can increase the number of times they run in a month by 
17%. Please set up a goal. 
Social Norms Goals help you form a habit of running; the statistics show runners who 
set up a goal can increase the number of times they run in a month by 
17%. Last month, [Number] runners set up a goal. Please set up a goal.  
   Note: [Number] is 5,223 for the treatment in February and is 5,715 for the treatment in 
March. 
 
Table 2. 2 Randomization Check 
 Control Social Norms t-stat 
# of participants 3682 3514  
 Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max P-
values 
Age 38.99 7.92 16.00 67.00 38.87 7.95 16.00 69.00 0.52 
Gender (percent of 
female) 
0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.90 
Daily distance in pre-
treatment month 
2.20 2.56 0.00 22.21 2.21 2.50 0.00 23.43 0.87 
% Registered by 
Facebook account 
0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.05 
Log (# of friends) 2.98 1.61 0.00 7.84 3.04 1.63 0.00 7.93 0.12 
High social connection 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00 0.17 
Log (# of races) 1.12 1.30 0.00 4.96 1.10 1.27 0.00 4.70 0.48 
Log (# of comments) 1.87 2.22 0.00 10.05 1.88 2.24 0.00 10.30 0.85 
Log (tenure) 6.24 0.82 3.43 7.48 6.20 0.82 3.71 7.48 0.08 
Is weekend 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.96 
 
Table 2. 3 Correlation Table 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Age 1.00         
2. Gender (percent of female) -0.08* 1.00        
3. Distance in pre-treatment month 0.12* -0.11* 1.00       
4. % Registered by Facebook account -0.12* 0.07* -0.15* 1.00      
5. Log (# of friends) -0.03* -0.04* 0.36* 0.09* 1.00     
6. Log (# of races) -0.00 -0.09* 0.34* -0.22* 0.50* 1.00    
7. Log (# of comments) 0.03* -0.02 0.42* -0.21* 0.70* 0.59* 1.00   
8. Log (tenure) 0.02 -0.12* 0.24* -0.28* 0.49* 0.51* 0.48* 1.00  
9. Is Weekend -0.04* 0.00 -0.14* 0.00 -0.11* -0.08* -0.13* -0.02* 1.00 
N 7196         







Table 2. 4 Treatment Effects on Goal Setting and Goal Attainment 









Social Norms 0.115*** 0.070 -0.179* -0.070 
 (0.043) (0.046) (0.106) (0.113) 
High social connection 0.137* -0.084 0.148 0.786*** 
 (0.072) (0.111) (0.163) (0.278) 
Social Norms X 
High social connection 
 0.381***  -0.944*** 
 (0.136)  (0.332) 
Age -0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.009 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) 
Gender (female) -0.092 -0.094 -0.146 -0.135 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.142) (0.143) 
Pre-treatment running distance -0.003 -0.002 0.108*** 0.111*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.024) (0.025) 
Registered by FB account 0.042 0.043 -0.009 0.004 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.111) (0.112) 
Log (# of races) 0.146*** 0.148*** -0.093* -0.100* 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.052) (0.052) 
Log (tenure) -0.157*** -0.158*** -0.022 -0.009 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.075) (0.075) 
_cons -0.714*** -0.679*** -0.392 -0.555 
 (0.231) (0.230) (0.533) (0.538) 
Monthly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7196 7196 608 608 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Log pseudolikelihood -2038.56 -2034.49 -389.86 -385.98 
Note: Baseline group is Control group 







Table 2. 5 Addressing the Selection Issue 

















Is weekend -0.236***  -0.234***  
 (0.061)  (0.061)  
Social Norms 0.115*** -0.199* 0.070 -0.079 
 (0.043) (0.113) (0.046) (0.121) 
High social connection 0.130* 0.116 -1.212** 0.787*** 
 (0.072) (0.193) (0.497) (0.278) 
Social Norms X 
High social connection 
  0.375*** -0.978*** 
  (0.136) (0.358) 
Age -0.001 0.009 -0.001 0.009 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) 
Gender (female) -0.095* -0.122 -0.097* -0.121 
 (0.058) (0.162) (0.058) (0.163) 
Pre-treatment running distance -0.007 0.105*** -0.006 0.110*** 
 (0.009) (0.028) (0.009) (0.026) 
Registered by FB account 0.039 -0.017 0.039 -0.002 
 (0.045) (0.112) (0.045) (0.114) 
Log (# of races) 0.143*** -0.121 0.145*** -0.118 
 (0.021) (0.092) (0.021) (0.104) 
Log (tenure) -0.154*** 0.012 -0.155*** 0.013 
 (0.032) (0.129) (0.032) (0.135) 
_cons -0.665*** -0.075 -0.630*** -0.150 
 (0.231) (1.101) (0.231) (0.143) 
Monthly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7196 7196 
Prob > chi2 0.75 0.85 
Log pseudolikelihood -2420.43 -2412.68 
  Note: Baseline group is Control group 








Table 2. 6  Different Types of High Social Connections 





Social Norms 0.070 -0.082 
 (0.046) (0.134) 
High social connection (Only High Out-degree) -0.011 0.429 
 (0.309) (0.709) 
High social connection (Only High In-degree) -0.481 5.475*** 
 (0.449) (0.563) 
High social connection (Both High) -0.068 0.756** 
 (0.119) (0.329) 
Social Norms X High social connection (Only High Out-degree) 0.615 -0.462 
 (0.379) (0.778) 
Social Norms X High social connection (Only High In-degree) 0.960* -4.908*** 
 (0.535) (0.750) 
Social Norms X High social connection (Both High) 0.296** -1.059*** 
 (0.149) (0.377) 
Age -0.001 0.009 
 (0.003) (0.007) 
Gender (female) -0.093 -0.152 
 (0.058) (0.161) 
Pre-treatment running distance -0.001 0.112*** 
 (0.009) (0.026) 
Registered by FB account 0.045 0.008 
 (0.045) (0.115) 
Log (# of races) 0.148*** -0.113 
 (0.021) (0.100) 
Log (tenure) -0.158*** 0.007 
 (0.032) (0.129) 
_cons -0.682*** -0.395 
 (0.231) (1.135) 
Monthly dummies Yes Yes 
N 7196 7196 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.87 
Log pseudolikelihood -2032.52 -2413.88 
Note: Baseline group of the treatment variable is Control group; baseline group of social connections 
variable is low social connected individuals; we suppressed the results of the selection model for 
Column (2) of heckprobit model to maintain simplicity. 






Table 2. 7 Models for Subgroups (Matching) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Probit OLS OLS Probit 
 Goal 
Attainment 
Log (# of 
friends) 
Goal minus Distance 
in Previous Month 
Run Next 
Month 
Control group 0.543** -0.482** -0.626** 0.678*** 
 (0.220) (0.190) (0.282) (0.258) 
Matched subgroup 0.417* -0.526*** -0.509* 0.776*** 
 (0.220) (0.189) (0.268) (0.257) 
Age 0.009 0.005 -0.019 0.012 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) 
Gender (female) -0.126 0.272** -0.310 0.093 
 (0.143) (0.125) (0.209) (0.222) 
Registered by FB 
account 
0.018 0.826*** -0.015 0.004 
 (0.113) (0.101) (0.180) (0.174) 
Log (# of races) -0.088* 0.349*** -0.057 -0.094 
 (0.052) (0.050) (0.091) (0.092) 
Log (tenure) -0.016 0.783*** -0.003 0.195 
 (0.075) (0.071) (0.124) (0.122) 
_cons -0.998* -2.506*** 2.457*** -1.302 
 (0.572) (0.501) (0.936) (0.820) 
High social 
connection 
Yes No Yes Yes 
Pre-treatment running 
distance 
Yes Yes No Yes 
Monthly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 608 608 608 608 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.00 
Log pseudolikelihood -387.95 -963.26 -1285.34 -143.48 
  Note: Baseline group is Social Norms motivated subgroup 







Table 2. 8 Redefining Goal Attainment 










Social Norms -0.036 -0.070 -0.106 
 (0.136) (0.134) (0.077) 
High social connection 0.693** 0.631* 0.431 
 (0.312) (0.348) (0.358) 
Social Norms X 
High social connection 
-0.962*** -0.735** -0.535 
(0.352) (0.371) (0.374) 
Age 0.004 0.004 -0.000 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
Gender (female) -0.111 -0.008 0.088 
 (0.153) (0.154) (0.105) 
Pre-treatment running distance 0.158*** 0.182*** 0.143*** 
 (0.026) (0.032) (0.034) 
Registered by FB account -0.017 -0.095 -0.121 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.085) 
Log (# of races) -0.099 -0.116 -0.126*** 
 (0.108) (0.102) (0.039) 
Log (tenure) -0.052 0.007 0.068 
 (0.129) (0.132) (0.063) 
_cons -0.081 0.184 1.738*** 
 (1.091) (1.116) (0.404) 
Monthly dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 7196 7196 7196 
Prob > chi2 0.99 0.87 0.13 
Log pseudolikelihood -2423.92 -2411.02 -2323.33 
Note: Baseline group is Control group; we suppressed the results of the selection model for all 
columns of heckprobit model to maintain simplicity. 






Table 3. 1 Message to Qualified Senders 
Group Message 
Sender Congratulations on being selected to participate in the "You Exercise, We Send a Gift" 
event: Since you have run more than 40 km in the past two weeks, your friend will get 
a chance to win a gold coin. We find some of your friends' exercise frequency is not as 
good as it should be. We want to raise a challenge for your friend to help them to form 
an exercise habit. To encourage them to participate in our challenge, we would like to 
provide him/her a chance to win gold coins. Each gold coin represents a chance to enter 
into the lottery drawing. The following prizes are being offered:  
[Rewards Figure49] 
It is not the gift that counts, but the thought behind it. Your challenge would be much 
more meaningful for your friend than a challenge raised by RunningPlatform. If you 
agree to help us, we will randomly find a qualified friend and present him/her a challenge 
(We have a limited quota, please take this opportunity now).  
Agree, press here to pick your lucky friend / Disagree 
 





RunningPlatform is now holding a "You Exercise, We Send a Gift" 
event. RunningPlatform is committed to providing better service to every runner, 
so we now sent you a gold coin. We would like you to accept our challenge. If you 
win the challenge, you will earn a second gold coin. 
Challenge: From 2017/8/21 to 2017/9/3 (a two-week period), you can win this 
challenge if your accumulated distance exceeds W km. Each gold coin represents a 
chance to enter into the drawing. You have already received a gold coin from 
RunningPlatform. The second gold coin will double your chance of winning the 
lottery. The following prizes are being offered: 
[Rewards Figure] 
We will notify you at the end of this event. The winner can leave shipping 
information or go to the store to pick up the prize. 




RunningPlatform is now holding a "You Exercise, We Send a Gift" 
event. Your friend (XXX) ran 40 km in the past two weeks to earn you a gold coin, 
and has now sent you this gold coin. We would like you to accept our challenge. If 
you win the challenge, you will earn a second gold coin. 
Challenge: From 2017/8/21 to 2017/9/3 (a two-week period), you can win this 
challenge if your accumulated distance exceeds W km. Each gold coin represents a 
chance to enter into the drawing. You have already received a gold coin from your 
friend (XXX). The second gold coin will double your chance of winning the lottery. 
The following prizes are being offered: 
[Rewards Figure] 
We will notify you at the end of this event. The winner can leave shipping 
information or go to the store to pick up the prize. 
Accept challenge / Not accept 
                                                









RunningPlatform is now holding a "You Exercise, We Send a Gift" 
event. Your friend (XXX) ran 40 km in the past two weeks to earn you a gold coin, 
and has now sent you this gold coin. We would like you to accept our challenge. If 
you win the challenge, you will return your friend a gold coin. 
Challenge: From 2017/8/21 to 2017/9/3 (a two-week period), you can win this 
challenge if your accumulated distance exceeds W km. Each gold coin represents a 
chance to enter into the lottery drawing. You have already received a gold coin from 
your friend (XXX). Winning this challenge can help your friend (XXX) win a gold 
coin to enter into the drawing. The following prizes are being offered: 
[Rewards Figure] 
We will notify you at the end of this event. The winner can leave shipping 
information or go to the store to pick up the prize. 
Accept challenge / Not accept 
Note: W could be either 30 km or 45 km depending on the pre-treatment distance a runner ran. 
XXX represents a sender’s online name. RunningPlatform is a pseudo name of the platform to maintain 
anonymity. 
 





Your challenge is going to start. From 8/21 to 9/3 (a two-week period), you can win 
this challenge if your accumulated distance exceeds W km. Each gold coin represents 
a chance to enter into the drawing. You have already received a gold coin from 
RunningPlatform. The second gold coin will double your chance of winning the lottery. 





Your challenge is going to start. From 8/21 to 9/3 (a two-week period), you can win 
this challenge if your accumulated distance exceeds W km. Each gold coin represents 
a chance to enter into the drawing. You have already received a gold coin from your 
friend (XXX). The second gold coin will double your chance of winning the lottery. 






Your challenge is going to start. From 8/21 to 9/3 (a two-week period), you can win 
this challenge if your accumulated distance exceeds W km. Each gold coin represents 
a chance to enter into the drawing. You have already received a gold coin from your 
friend (XXX). Winning this challenge can help your friend (xxx) win a gold coin to 
enter into the drawing. The following prizes are being offered: 
[Rewards Figure] 
Note: W could be either 30 km or 45 km depending on the pre-treatment distance a runner ran.  
XXX represents sender’s online name. RunningPlatform is a pseudo name of the platform to maintain 
anonymity. 
 







Yes Your accumulated distance: X km. You have completed this challenge. 
You will win a second gold coin. Each gold coin represents a chance to 
enter into the drawing. The following gifts are being offered, and we 






No Your accumulated distance: X km. You have not completed this 
challenge. Please keep on going to win yourself a second gold coin. Each 
gold coin represents a chance to enter into the drawing. The following 





Yes Your accumulated distance: X km. You have completed this challenge. 
You will win a second gold coin. Each gold coin represents a chance to 
enter into the drawing. The following gifts are being offered, and we 
will draw lucky winners after this event. 
[Rewards Figure] 
No Your accumulated distance: X km. You have not completed this 
challenge. Please keep on going to win yourself a second gold coin. Each 
gold coin represents a chance to enter into the drawing. The following 





Yes Your accumulated distance: X km. You have completed this challenge. 
Your friend will win a gold coin. Each gold coin represents a chance to 
enter into the drawing. The following gifts are being offered, and we 
will draw lucky winners after this event. 
[Rewards Figure] 
No Your accumulated distance: X km. You have not completed this 
challenge. Please keep on going to win your friend a gold coin. Each 
gold coin represents a chance to enter into the drawing. The following 
gifts are being offered, and we will draw lucky winners after this event. 
[Rewards Figure] 
Note: X indicates the total running distance.  
 
Table 3. 5 Randomization Check 
















N 571 590 577 N/A 
(Sender) Pre-treatment Distance (km) 82.49 79.41 77.59 0.09 
(Sender) Age 41.68 41.34 41.61 0.72 
(Sender) Tenure (days) 872.80 853.92 820.29 0.28 
(Sender) # of Race 13.82 12.45 11.63 0.15 
(Sender) % Female 17.7% 15.3% 16.6% 0.53 
(Sender) # of Friends 129.34 132.39 126.25 0.87 
(Receiver) Pre-treatment Distance (km)* 18.74 20.13 18.59 0.02 
(Receiver) Pre-treatment Distance for 30 km Group 
(km) 13.07 13.91 13.27 0.17 
(Receiver) Pre-treatment Distance for 45 km Group 
(km) 32.34 32.54 31.99 0.47 
(Receiver) Age 40.06 40.23 40.55 0.51 
(Receiver) Tenure (days) 789.58 805.75 771.14 0.57 
(Receiver) # of Race 7.99 7.13 7.30 0.50 
(Receiver) % Female 31.7% 26.4% 29.6% 0.14 
(Receiver) # of Friends 88.40 92.05 88.78 0.92 





Table 3. 6 Regression Results of Completion Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Main Models Redefine Completion 
of Challenge for the 
Declined Participants 
Average Treatment 


























Reciprocity Treatment  0.28*** 0.20** 0.25*** 0.19** 0.35*** 0.21** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Pre-treatment Distance 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
# of Friends 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Female -0.04 -0.14 -0.07 -0.17** -0.04 -0.18* 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Age 0.02*** 0.01** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tenure -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
# of Race 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01* 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
_cons -1.89*** -1.56*** -1.93*** -1.60*** -1.97*** -1.59*** 
 (0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.33) (0.33) 
Challenge Type 
Dummy  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sender's 
Characteristics  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1148 1167 1148 1167 977 972 
Log pseudolikelihood -708.30 -732.22 -720.30 -738.07 -624.28 -633.23 
Chi2 74.53 71.06 80.91 81.22 73.89 62.38 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Note: Baseline group is Baseline Control Group in (1), (3), (5); Baseline group is Friend Control Group in (2), 
(4), (6); Sender’s characteristics include pre-treatment running distance, the number of friends, gender (female), 








Table 3. 7 Curvilinear Relationship of Closeness 









ClosenessIndex 0.43***    
 (0.15)    
ClosenessIndex squared -0.11***    
 (0.04)    
DaysKnowEachOther  0.66*   
  (0.39)   
DaysKnowEachOther 
squared 
 -0.08**   
  (0.04)   
CommonFriends   0.31**  
   (0.15)  
CommonFriends squared   -0.08**  
   (0.04)  
IOS    0.47* 
    (0.26) 
IOS squared    -0.06** 
    (0.03) 
Pre-treatment Distance 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
# of Friends 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Female -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.28 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.28) 
Age 0.01* 0.02** 0.01* 0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Tenure -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
# of Race 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
_cons -1.75*** -2.99*** -1.58*** -3.14*** 
 (0.44) (1.09) (0.43) (1.04) 
Challenge Type Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sender's Characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 577 577 577 166 
Log pseudolikelihood -367.29 -368.11 -369.40 -71.41 
Chi2 43.32 39.46 38.33 31.35 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Note: Sender’s characteristics include pre-treatment running distance, the number of friends, gender 










Table 3. 8 Randomization Check for the Matched Sample 
 
Table 3. 9 Regression Results for the Matched Sample 





 Probit Model OLS Model 




Reciprocity Treatment 0.25*** 3.06** 
 (0.08) (1.37) 
Pre-treatment Distance 0.03*** 0.71*** 
 (0.01) (0.11) 
# of Friends 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Female -0.11 -3.13** 
 (0.09) (1.51) 
Age 0.02*** 0.38*** 
 (0.01) (0.11) 
Tenure -0.00 -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
# of Race 0.01*** 0.38*** 
 (0.00) (0.08) 
_cons -1.52*** 0.22 
 (0.32) (5.65) 
Challenge Type Dummy  Yes Yes 
Sender's Characteristics  Yes Yes 
N 1062 1062 
R2  0.185 
Log pseudolikelihood -665.47  
Chi2 61.64  
Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Note: Baseline group is Friend Control Group; Sender’s characteristics include pre-
treatment running distance, the number of friends, gender (female), age, tenure, and the 
number of races participated.   
 Friend 
Control 
Reciprocity Treatment T-test 
(p-value) 
N 531 531 N/A 
(Sender) Pre-treatment Distance (km) 79.12 77.51 0.48 
(Sender) Age 41.38 41.68 0.51 
(Sender) Tenure (days) 856.82 828.85 0.42 
(Sender) # of Race 12.59 11.74 0.45 
(Sender) % Female 15.1% 16.4% 0.56 
(Sender) # of Friends 130.87 125.11 0.64 
(Receiver) Pre-treatment Distance (km) 18.81 19.29 0.44 
(Receiver) Pre-treatment Distance for 30 km group (km) 13.73 13.72 0.97 
(Receiver) Pre-treatment Distance for 45 km group (km) 31.70 32.10 0.40 
(Receiver) Age 40.51 40.23 0.53 
(Receiver) Tenure (days) 784.74 800.12 0.65 
(Receiver) # of Race 7.15 7.23 0.91 
(Receiver) % Female 28.4% 27.9% 0.84 
(Receiver) # of Friends 87.08 91.52 0.69 





Table 3. 10 Robustness Checks 

























Reciprocity Treatment 0.29*** 0.21** 0.27*** 0.19** 0.23*** 0.19** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Pre-treatment Distance 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
# of Friends 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Female -0.05 -0.11 -0.04 -0.15 -0.02 -0.06 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
Age 0.02*** 0.01** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tenure -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
# of Race 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
_cons -1.96*** -1.55*** -2.02*** -1.73*** -2.18*** -1.59*** 
 (0.33) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.35) (0.35) 
Challenge Type Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sender's Characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1043 1061 1068 1092 942 956 
Log pseudolikelihood -627.56 -654.90 -652.72 -678.70 -566.19 -588.49 
Chi2 74.31 63.75 74.23 73.95 63.93 45.25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Note: Baseline group is Baseline Control Group in (1), (3), (5); Baseline group is Friend Control 
Group in (2), (4), (6); Sender’s characteristics include pre-treatment running distance, the number of 
friends, gender (female), age, tenure, and the number of races participated; The sample at each column 
is as follows. Columns (1) and (2): exclude users who upload manual running records; Columns (3) 







Table 4. 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean S.D. 
Income variables 
Mobility 0.978 0.817 
∆log (Adult Equivalent Income) 0.423 1.048 
Log (Adult Equivalent Income) in base year 9.075 0.962 
IT variables 
Household owns a computer in base year 0.009 0.096 
Positive change in computer ownership (Not owning a computer 
in base year, and owning a computer in the second period.) 
0.060 0.237 
% of households in a district own a computer in base year 0.009 0.019 
Change in % own a computer in a district 0.054 0.064 
% of (same group) households in a district own a computer in 
base year 
0.009 0.035 
Change in % (same group) own a computer in a district 0.055 0.099 
% of (other groups) households in a district own a computer in 
base year 
0.011 0.033 
Change in % (other groups) own a computer in a district 0.058 0.083 
Human capital variables  
Share of persons with jobs in base year 0.254 0.239 
Household size in base year 5.872 3.038 
Share of male adults in base year 0.327 0.165 
Share of female adults in base year 0.325 0.147 
Age of household head in base year 48.205 13.338 
Whether a household head is a female in base year 0.091 0.288 
Economic and social status variables 
Number of durables owned by household in base year 7.576 3.711 
Land owner in base year 0.502 0.500 
Urban in base year 0.275 0.446 
% Get along well in a district 0.549 0.289 
Variation variables 
Change in share of persons with jobs 0.042 0.268 
Change in household size -0.997 3.036 
Change in share of male adults 0.011 0.200 
Change in share of female adults 0.043 0.168 
Change from male to female household head 0.084 0.277 
Change in % get along well in a district 0.032 0.413 








Table 4. 2 Change in Households Owning Computer across Years 
 Owns Computer in 2011  
Owns Computer in 2005 No Yes Total 
No 29,993 1,919 31,912 
 93.99% 6.01% 100% 
Yes 101 201 302 
 33.44% 66.56% 100% 
Total 30,094 2,120 32,214 
 93.42% 6.58% 100% 
 
Table 4. 3 Statistics by Castes and Religious Groups 
 Frequency Owns a computer Mobility 
Groups 2005 2011 2005 2011  
Brahmin 1744 1714 2.4% 15.6% 0.908 
Forward caste 4923 5045 2.1% 12.7% 0.929 
Other Backward Classes (OBC) 11213 11045 0.6% 4.6% 0.992 
Dalit 6837 6885 0.3% 2.9% 1.020 
Adivasi 2899 2985 0.5% 4.2% 0.951 
Muslim 3592 3619 0.8% 5.1% 0.948 
Christian, Sikh, Jain 1006 921 3.2% 21.0% 1.079 
 
Table 4. 4 Quintile Mobility Matrix by Adult Equivalent Income (AEI) 
 2011 Quintile 
2005 Quintile 1 
(bottom 
20%) 




20%) 35.46% 26.70% 18.88% 12.89% 6.07% 100% 
2 29.29% 26.75% 22.56% 14.84% 6.57% 100% 
3 20.26% 23.33% 24.85% 21.21% 10.35% 100% 
4 12.97% 16.61% 21.63% 27.11% 21.68% 100% 
5 (top 20%) 6.13% 7.65% 12.75% 21.67% 51.81% 100% 
 
Table 4. 5 Household Mobility Variation Based on Quintile Mobility Matrix 
 Mobility 
0 (Moving downward) 11,118 
 34.51% 
1 (No Mobility) 10,691 
 33.19% 









Table 4. 6 Determinants of Households' Change in Mobility (OLogit, DV: Income 
Mobility) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Mobility Mobility Mobility 
Change in own a computer (H1) 0.769*** 0.761*** 0.757*** 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) 
Household owns a computer in base year 0.715*** 0.743*** 0.713*** 
 (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) 
Change in % own a computer in a district (H2)  0.638**  
  (0.273)  
% of households in a district own a computer in base year  -1.393*  
  (0.747)  
Change in % (same group) own a computer in a district (H3)   0.565*** 
   (0.136) 
Change in % (other groups) own a computer in a district (H3)   -0.167 
   (0.205) 
% of (same group) households in a district own a computer in base year   0.088 
   (0.348) 
% of (other groups) households in a district own a computer in base year   -0.709* 
   (0.379) 
Share of persons with jobs in base year 0.706*** 0.706*** 0.712*** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
Adult equivalent income in base year -1.367*** -1.368*** -1.369*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Household size in base year -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Share of male adults in base year 0.505*** 0.505*** 0.505*** 
 (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) 
Share of female adults in base year -0.180* -0.181* -0.180* 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) 
Head age in base year -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of durables owned by household in base year 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.111*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Household Head is female in base year 0.042 0.042 0.039 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Land owner in base year -0.035 -0.032 -0.033 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Urban in base year 0.197*** 0.191*** 0.194*** 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.033) 
Change in household size -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Change in share of male adults in a household 0.704*** 0.702*** 0.699*** 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
Change in share of female adults in a household 0.002 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) 
Change from male to female household head 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.125*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Change in share of persons with jobs 1.225*** 1.223*** 1.228*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
State dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Group dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 32214 32214 32214 
Log pseudolikelihood -30676 -30672 -30666 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table 4. 7 Determinants of Households' Change in ln(AEI) (OLS, DV: ∆𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐸𝐼) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐸𝐼 ∆𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐸𝐼 ∆𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐸𝐼 
Change in own a computer (H1) 0.473*** 0.470*** 0.467*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Household owns a computer in base year 0.329*** 0.341*** 0.332*** 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) 
Change in % own a computer in a district (H2)  0.285**  
  (0.116)  
% of households in a district own a computer in base year  -0.608*  
  (0.340)  
Change in % (same group) own a computer in a district (H3)   0.271*** 
   (0.058) 
Change in % (other groups) own a computer in a district (H3)   -0.109 
   (0.085) 
% of (same group) households in a district own a computer in base year   -0.136 
   (0.150) 
% of (other groups) households in a district own a computer in base year   -0.311** 
   (0.144) 
Share of persons with jobs in base year 0.409*** 0.409*** 0.413*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Adult equivalent income in base year -0.800*** -0.800*** -0.801*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Household size in base year -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Share of male adults in base year 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Share of female adults in base year -0.089** -0.089** -0.090** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Head age in base year -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of durables owned by household in base year 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Household Head is female in base year 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Land owner in base year -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Urban in base year 0.141*** 0.138*** 0.142*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Change in household size -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Change in share of male adults in a household 0.222*** 0.222*** 0.220*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Change in share of female adults in a household -0.052 -0.053 -0.054 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Change from male to female household head 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Change in share of persons with jobs 0.628*** 0.627*** 0.629*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Constant 7.566*** 7.552*** 7.569*** 
 (0.079) (0.080) (0.081) 
State dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Group dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 32214 32214 32214 
R2 0.410 0.410 0.411 








Table 4. 8 Endogenous Treatment Regression Models for Computer Ownership 














Change in own a computer  1.083***  0.567*** 
  (0.392)  (0.065) 
Distance to high school in base year -0.013***  -0.014***  
 (0.004)  (0.005)  
Household owns a computer in base year -5.895*** 0.326*** -6.411*** 0.326*** 
 (1.043) (0.113) (0.126) (0.117) 
Share of persons in a household with jobs in 
base year 
-0.552*** 0.155*** -0.755*** 0.295*** 
 (0.210) (0.029) (0.169) (0.035) 
Adult equivalent income in base year 0.267*** -0.479*** 0.216*** -0.813*** 
 (0.053) (0.010) (0.034) (0.008) 
Household size in base year 0.034** -0.003 0.048*** -0.011*** 
 (0.016) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) 
Share of male adults in a household in base 
year 
0.383* 0.157*** 0.480** 0.192*** 
 (0.233) (0.045) (0.203) (0.054) 
Share of female adults in a household in 
base year 
0.180 -0.036 -0.010 -0.111** 
 (0.208) (0.046) (0.226) (0.054) 
Head age in base year 0.002 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
Number of durables owned by household in 
base year 
0.151*** 0.018*** 0.169*** 0.070*** 
 (0.028) (0.005) (0.010) (0.003) 
Household Head is female in base year 0.212*** -0.003 0.234*** 0.068*** 
 (0.081) (0.021) (0.083) (0.023) 
Land owner in base year -0.076 -0.027** -0.148*** 0.002 
 (0.069) (0.012) (0.055) (0.013) 
Urban in base year -0.024 -0.065 0.049 0.005 
 (0.168) (0.061) (0.169) (0.060) 
Change in household size 0.073*** -0.010*** 0.085*** -0.011*** 
 (0.016) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) 
Change in share of male adults in a 
household 
0.984*** 0.226*** 1.312*** 0.239*** 
 (0.349) (0.041) (0.150) (0.040) 
Change in share of female adults in a 
household 
0.606*** 0.006 0.641*** -0.014 
 (0.182) (0.038) (0.165) (0.042) 
Change from male to female household head 0.030 0.054*** 0.139 0.098*** 
 (0.114) (0.021) (0.086) (0.023) 
Change in share of persons in a household 
with jobs 
-0.516*** 0.384*** -0.608*** 0.554*** 
 (0.123) (0.023) (0.127) (0.027) 
Constant -5.541*** 5.496*** -5.022*** 7.788*** 
 (0.449) (0.111) (0.408) (0.106) 
State dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21448 21448 21448 21448 
Wald test of 𝜌 (prob > chi2) 0.08 0.10 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 4. 9 Average Treatment Effect on the Treated using Propensity Score Matching 
Approach (Mobility) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Mobility Mobility Difference in 
Mobility 
 Change of Owning 
Computer Others  
Before 
matching 
Mean 0.994 0.977 0.017 
(0.91) Freq. 1,919 30,295 
After 
Matching 
Mean 0.995 0.875 0.120*** 
(5.37) Freq. 1,912 1,912 
t-statistics in parentheses *** p < .01 
 
Table 4. 10 Average Treatment Effect on the Treated using Propensity Score 
Matching Approach (∆𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐸𝐼) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐸𝐼 ∆𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐸𝐼 Difference in ∆𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐸𝐼 
 Change of Owning Computer Others  
Before matching Mean 0.540 0.416 0.124*** 
(5.04) Freq. 1,919 30,295 
After Matching Mean 0.543 0.304 0.239*** 
(7.01) Freq. 1,912 1,912 







Table 4. 11 Robustness Check: Remove Outliers 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Mobility Mobility Mobility 
Change in own a computer (H1) 0.797*** 0.788*** 0.782*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Household owns a computer in base year 0.750*** 0.761*** 0.745*** 
 (0.094) (0.095) (0.096) 
Change in % own a computer in a district (H2)  0.820**  
  (0.339)  
% of households in a district own a computer in base year  -0.221  
  (1.001)  
Change in % (same group) own a computer in a district (H3)   0.673*** 
   (0.163) 
Change in % (other groups) own a computer in a district (H3)   -0.037 
   (0.253) 
% of (same group) households in a district own a computer in base year   0.371 
   (0.393) 
% of (other groups) households in a district own a computer in base year   -0.610 
   (0.410) 
Share of persons with jobs in base year 0.729*** 0.731*** 0.735*** 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
Adult equivalent income in base year -1.371*** -1.373*** -1.374*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Household size in base year -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.023*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Share of male adults in base year 0.490*** 0.485*** 0.485*** 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) 
Share of female adults in base year -0.212* -0.213* -0.213* 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) 
Head age in base year -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of durables owned by household in base year 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Household Head is female in base year 0.056 0.056 0.052 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Land owner in base year -0.035 -0.030 -0.032 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Urban in base year 0.151*** 0.131*** 0.138*** 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) 
Change in household size -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Change in share of male adults in a household 0.703*** 0.700*** 0.696*** 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
Change in share of female adults in a household 0.002 -0.000 -0.003 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
Change from male to female household head 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.165*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Change in share of persons with jobs 1.225*** 1.225*** 1.229*** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
State dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Group dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27772 27772 27772 
Log pseudolikelihood -26440 -26437 -26431 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  







Table 4. 12 Robustness Check: Control Regional Economic Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Mobility Mobility Mobility 
Change in own a computer (H1) 0.767*** 0.757*** 0.753*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Household owns a computer in base year 0.739*** 0.742*** 0.724*** 
 (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) 
Change in % own a computer in a district (H2)  0.689**  
  (0.277)  
% of households in a district own a computer in base year  0.033  
  (0.749)  
Change in % (same group) own a computer in a district (H3)   0.614*** 
   (0.138) 
Change in % (other groups) own a computer in a district (H3)   -0.064 
   (0.207) 
% of (same group) households in a district own a computer in base year   0.213 
   (0.350) 
% of (other groups) households in a district own a computer in base year   0.048 
   (0.381) 
Share of persons with jobs in base year 0.735*** 0.735*** 0.740*** 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
Adult equivalent income in base year -1.339*** -1.340*** -1.341*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Economic growth in a district 1.362*** 1.364*** 1.366*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Household size in base year -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Share of male adults in base year 0.467*** 0.463*** 0.462*** 
 (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) 
Share of female adults in base year -0.225** -0.227** -0.229** 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
Head age in base year -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of durables owned by household in base year 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.107*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Household Head is female in base year 0.048 0.048 0.046 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Land owner in base year -0.024 -0.018 -0.019 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Urban in base year 0.259*** 0.238*** 0.239*** 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) 
Change in household size -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Change in share of male adults in a household 0.667*** 0.665*** 0.661*** 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
Change in share of female adults in a household -0.041 -0.042 -0.045 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
Change from male to female household head 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.126*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Change in share of persons with jobs 1.252*** 1.250*** 1.255*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) 
State dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Group dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 32214 32214 32214 
Log pseudolikelihood -30259 -30256 -30249 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  





Table 4. 13 Moderating Effect of Share of Persons with Jobs in a Household 
 (2) (2) 
 Mobility ∆𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐸𝐼 
Change in own a computer 0.553*** 0.394*** 
 (0.060) (0.031) 
Household owns a computer in base year 0.722*** 0.331*** 
 (0.084) (0.052) 
Change in own a computer X Share of persons with jobs in base year 1.195*** 0.456*** 
 (0.208) (0.108) 
Share of persons with jobs in base year 0.654*** 0.392*** 
 (0.068) (0.028) 
Adult equivalent income in base year -1.369*** -0.801*** 
 (0.021) (0.007) 
Household size in base year -0.027*** -0.016*** 
 (0.007) (0.003) 
Share of male adults in base year 0.509*** 0.223*** 
 (0.100) (0.042) 
Share of female adults in base year -0.172* -0.087** 
 (0.104) (0.043) 
Head age in base year -0.004*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Number of durables owned by household in base year 0.112*** 0.072*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) 
Household Head is female in base year 0.043 0.049*** 
 (0.044) (0.018) 
Land owner in base year -0.035 -0.007 
 (0.028) (0.011) 
Urban in base year 0.191*** 0.139*** 
 (0.032) (0.012) 
Change in household size -0.031*** -0.015*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) 
Change in share of male adults in a household 0.713*** 0.225*** 
 (0.076) (0.032) 
Change in share of female adults in a household 0.006 -0.051 
 (0.081) (0.034) 
Change from male to female household head 0.130*** 0.065*** 
 (0.045) (0.018) 
Change in share of persons with jobs 1.218*** 0.625*** 
 (0.053) (0.022) 
State dummies  Yes Yes 
Group dummies  Yes Yes 
Observations 32214 32214 
Log pseudolikelihood / R2 -30665 0.410 









Table 4. 14 Spillover Effects Moderated by Regional Harmony 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Mobility Mobility Mobility 
Change in own a computer 0.762*** 0.761*** 0.760*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Household owns a computer in base year 0.743*** 0.720*** 0.708*** 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) 
Change in % own a computer in a district -1.380***   
 (0.494)   
% of households in a district own a computer in base year -1.921**   
 (0.770)   
Change in % (same group) own a computer in a district  0.246 0.600*** 
  (0.294) (0.136) 
Change in % (other groups) own a computer in a district  -0.143 -1.886*** 
  (0.205) (0.414) 
% of (same group) households in a district own a computer in base year  0.141 0.009 
  (0.348) (0.352) 
% of (other groups) households in a district own a computer in base year  -0.659* -0.690* 
  (0.383) (0.382) 
Share of persons with jobs in base year 0.713*** 0.711*** 0.717*** 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
Adult equivalent income in base year -1.369*** -1.368*** -1.369*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
% get along well in a district in base year 0.150* 0.296*** 0.169** 
 (0.081) (0.075) (0.079) 
Change in % get along well in a district 0.258*** 0.260*** 0.260*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Change in % own a computer in a district X % get along well in a district in base year 3.979***   
 (0.799)   
Change in % (same group) own a computer in a district X % get along well in a district 
in base year 
 0.578  
  (0.448)  
Change in % (other groups) own a computer in a district X % get along well in a district 
in base year 
  3.235*** 
   (0.658) 
Household size in base year -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.027*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Share of male adults in base year 0.510*** 0.508*** 0.510*** 
 (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) 
Share of female adults in base year -0.185* -0.181* -0.184* 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) 
Head age in base year -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of durables owned by household in base year 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Household Head is female in base year 0.044 0.042 0.040 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Land owner in base year -0.030 -0.030 -0.034 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Urban in base year 0.196*** 0.193*** 0.193*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Change in household size -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Change in share of male adults in a household 0.702*** 0.697*** 0.699*** 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
Change in share of female adults in a household 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) 
Change from male to female household head 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Change in share of persons with jobs 1.231*** 1.231*** 1.235*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
State dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Group dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 32214 32214 32214 
Log pseudolikelihood -30647 -30652 -30641 








Figure 2. 1 Number of individuals in Control group and Social Norms group per day 
 
 









































































Figure 2. 3 Average Treatment Effects by subgroup 
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Figure 2. 5 Differences among Groups 
 
 
Figure 3. 1 Rewards offered in Lottery Drawing 
 
 































































































































Figure 3. 3 Geographic Distribution of Individuals by Groups 
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Figure 3. 5 Curvilinear Relationship of Social Closeness 
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Figure 4. 1 How Share of Persons with Jobs in a Household Moderates the 
Relationship between Positive Change in Computer Ownership and Income Mobility 
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Table A1. Summary statistics of each subgroup 
Subgroup 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
N 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 716 
Conditional Average Treatment Effects 
(Goal Setting) 
-0.9% 2.2% 4.4% -0.7% 4.3% 0.8% -0.1% 1.0% -2.5% 8.3% 
Conditional Average Treatment Effects 
(Goal Attainment) 
-7.3% 23.6% 9.9% -0.8% -6.8% -2.5% 11.4% -11.7% -5.8% -33.7% 
Age 39.72 40.05 39.19 38.34 38.13 38.06 38.51 39.21 39.23 38.86 
Gender (percent of female) 0.23 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.20 
Daily distance in pre-treatment month 1.16 1.62 1.47 1.44 1.70 1.76 2.27 2.65 3.57 4.40 
% Registered by Facebook account 0.24 0.33 0.55 0.57 0.62 0.61 0.55 0.52 0.44 0.42 
Log (# of friends) 0.08 1.16 1.94 2.46 2.88 3.27 3.67 4.14 4.72 5.74 
Log (# of races) 0.17 0.44 0.61 0.66 0.92 1.07 1.38 1.58 1.93 2.33 
Log (tenure) 5.46 5.86 5.92 6.01 6.21 6.32 6.45 6.53 6.67 6.76 
 
 







Alpizar et al. 
(2008) 
Senders are 




Donation Giving gifts increases the likelihood 
of donations, but is far from 
profitable considering the costs of 
gifts. 







Physicians demonstrate reciprocity 
with better service when receiving 




 Monetary gifts Workers’ 
performance 
The unconditional compensations 
increase sales force performance, 
but the magnitude is less than half 
that of the conditional 
compensations. 
Falk (2007)  Non-monetary 
gifts 
(postcards) 
Donation Gifts treatments as compared to 
non-gifts treatment can elicit more 
donations in a sizable manner. 
Besides that, large gifts elicit more 
donations than small gifts. 
Gneezy and 
List (2006) 
 Monetary gifts Workers’ 
performance 
Gift treatment performs better than 
non-gift treatment only in the first 
few hours. 
Kube et al. 
(2012) 






The non-monetary gifts elicit 
stronger reciprocity than the 
monetary gifts. 
 
Chen et al. 
(2009) 
Senders are either 
strangers or friends 
Monetary gifts Monetary 
returns 
Participants’ positive reciprocity 
was not affected by the existing 
relationship (strangers vs. friends) 
between senders and receivers. 
Falk et al. 
(1999) 
Senders are 




Monetary gifts Workers’ 
performance 
Both social approval (participants 
seated Face-to-Face) and social 
pressure (participants allowed to 
discuss after the last round of the 
experiment) treatments do not 
statistically different from the 



















Free sample increases reciprocated 
behaviors, and the results are 
conditional on whether buyers and 
sellers know each other before. 










outperforms self-interest based 
incentive on runners’ physical 
activity. The social closeness 
between senders and receivers has 
an inverted U-shaped relationship 
on the effects of reciprocity. 
 
Table A3. Review of Research on Income Mobility in India 
Study Source & Period Sample Main findings 
Gaiha 
(1988) 
National Council for 
Applied Economic 
Research (NCAER) 




Access to cultivatable land and modern 
agricultural inputs play important roles to improve 





NCAER data set in the 
early 1970s and 1980s 
3,319 rural 
households 
This study shows that caste status is not an 
important factor of income mobility, but tribal 
status and demographic composition of 
households are. Furthermore, literacy, ownership 
of a house, increase in cultivated area and income 







Research Institute for 
the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT) data in 
1970s and 1980s 
219 rural 
households 
Caste, inherited land, the number of bullocks 






Data from Palanpur (a 
village in Moradabad 
district of Uttar 
Pradesh) between 1950s 
to 1990s 
The village had 
1,133 people, 
divided into 193 
households in 
1993 (last survey). 
Village populations, agricultural practices, and 
occupational diversification are three forces of 
change for the village economy. They suggest that 






Income Survey (ARIS) 
and Rural Economic 
and Demographics 




The mobility is associated with land classes, agro-
climate zones, agricultural profit classes, assets 
classes, caste groups, and gender groups. For 
instance, landless or marginal farmers are the 











Computer ownership generates private returns for 
upward income mobility and creates social returns 
(spillover effects) for households in the same 










Figure A1. Conditional Average Treatment Effect by Generalized Additive Model 
Goal Setting Goal Attainment 
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